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SYNOPSIS 
This thesis examines the evolution of presidentialism in contemporary France, with particular 
reference to the presidencies of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969) and Franc;ois Mitterrand (1981-
88), as articulated in constitutional studies, political writings and speeches, electoral programmes 
and polemics, journalism and other sources. Since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, 
the nature and extent of presidential power in France have been the subject of intense critical 
scrutiny. While there is a growing corpus of writings reflecting the diverse interpretations of the 
President's function, no study has yet focused upon an analysis of the debate itself. The thesis 
is primarily a textual study, based upon a wide range of sources. It opens with a discussion of 
the 1958 Constitution, the texts on which it was based, the writings of those most closely 
involved in its drafting and the different historical, ideological and cultural considerations 
underlying the concept of presidential power which it articulates. The thesis then examines the 
body of opposition to this conception of the presidency, focused most sharply in the polemical 
writings of Franc;ois Mitterrand in the 1960s and '70s. By exploring the evolution of Mitterrand's 
opposition to the style of presidentialism emerging under de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard 
d'Estaing, the study identifies the beginnings of the Left's reconciliation to the institutions of the 
Fifth Republic, whilst also highlighting the many tensions and ambiguities to which this evolving 
stance gave rise. 
The thesis then goes on to consider how Mitterrand's tenure of the French presidency subjected 
that office to the most exacting interrogation since the foundation of the Fifth Republic. The 
study shows how Mitterrand's first septennate invites a fundamental re-appraisal of the nature 
and limits of preSidential power in contemporary France. In so dOing, it calls for a new 
understanding of an office subject to a range of constitutional, political, personal and 
Circumstantial factors. The study shows how, during his first term of office, Mitterrand explored 
the full spectrum of presidential power, from the confident interventionism ensured by the 
landslide SOCialist victory in 1981 to the tightly restricted 'cohabitation' with the right-wing 
government of Jacques Chirac. There is, the thesis argues, a whole tradition of French Socialist 
ideology bound up in Mitterrand's early critiques of the Gaullist presidency, while his first seven 
years in power brought about important shifts in his own perception of presidential power and re-
defined the terms in which the debate over presidential ism in France was to be conducted. The 
writings of such contemporary analysts as Avril, Gicquel, Duverger and Colombani attest to the 
Complexity of the questions raised by this study and suggest ways in which Mitterrand's exercise 
of preSidential power brought new dimensions to a debate that has been ongoing since 1958. 
CCC 
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INTRODUCTION 
'Une Constitution definit un regime politique. Elle s'exprime non seulement dans la lettre des 
textes ecrits, mais dans I'origine et la pratique du pouvoir'. 
Professor Roger Pinto, Le Monde, 5 July 1960.1 
Jacques Chirac's election as President of the French Fifth Republic in May 1995 not only 
marked the return of the presidency to the Gaullist Right after an interval of twenty-one years; 
it also brought to a close what was, for many, the excessively long mandate of Franc;:ois 
Mitterrand, whom Serge July described at the time as 'un monarque republicain,.2 This quasi-
monarchical image of the French President as a supreme ruler, enjoying enormous personal 
power is certainly not new - it has been a constant criticism levelled at all Presidents since 
the Fifth Republic was founded in 1958. In particular, it has revealed itself as the Achilles 
heel of outgoing Presidents, who are open to attack concerning their exercise of power from 
major contenders in the run-up to a presidential election. For just as Giscard d'Estaing 
criticised an incumbent de Gaulle for his 'exercice solitaire du pouvoir,3 so Mitterrand 
accused Giscard of outstripping de Gaulle in his domination of the French executive - 'Ie 
President de la Republique s'occupe de tout, m~me les jardins Ie long de la Seine,.4 
In this respect, it is hardly surprising that the question of presidential power was one of the 
key issues at the heart of the 1995 presidential campaign. Conscious of the public's 
disenchantment with the presidency at the end of Mitterrand's second term of office, rival 
candidates Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin both pledged to bring about a more responsible 
interpretation of presidential power if elected. Jospin proposed a reduction of the presidential 
mandate from seven to five years to ensure that the Head of State remained more closely in 
touch with government and the day-to-day needs of the French electorate, an idea 
encapsulated by his calls for a 'President-citoyen'. Chirac also laboured long over his 
rejection of the monarchical trappings of the presidential office, in favour of what he referred 
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to as a 'presidence modeste'. His proposals, which included disbanding the President's 
private squadron of jets,5 undoubtedly lacked the substance of Jospin's constitutional reform. 
Nevertheless, they clearly demonstrated a need to address what has remained one of the 
most controversial issues raised by the 1958 Constitution, that of the extent and limits of 
presidential power within the regime. 
'Presidentialisme' is the French term that has come to encapsulate the notion of presidential 
power which has emerged under the Fifth Republic. But what exactly determines the level 
and type of power available to the French President at any given point in time? Has this 
power increased gradually since the regime's foundation or is it dependent on factors specific 
to each presidency? And why has the exercise of presidential power by successive 
occupants of the Elysee given rise to such dispute and debate? In the following analysis, we 
will seek to provide answers to these questions. By examining the development of 
presidentialism between 1958-1988, we will identify a number of fundamental variables which 
have shaped the nature and form of the modern French presidency. In so doing, we will also 
explore the relationship between these variables and establish whether their importance 
changes over time. 
Arguably, the most important factor shaping presidential power is the Fifth Republic's 
Constitution, since it provides the basic framework which restricts and enables political action 
within the regime. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, his first act was to 
institutionalise his long-time vision for a stronger presidency. This involved several months of 
complex discussion between de Gaulle, the government and members of Parliament to 
determine the notion of presidential power to be enshrined in the constitutional text. Whilst 
those Fourth Republic parliamentarians who participated in the drafting process accepted that 
there was a need to enhance presidential authority in order to guarantee the new regime 
greater political stability, they were conscious that the President's powers should be carefully 
defined so that they did not encroach upon the Prime Minister's pre-eminence in government 
affairs.6 
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Most politicians on the non-Communist Left approved the constitutional text in the 1958 
referendum because they believed that the new regime would establish a system of 
rationalised parliamentarian ism, especially once de Gaulle had been removed from the 
constitutional equation. Experience quickly showed, however, that the Constitution had failed 
to provide the textual clarity and institutional mechanisms needed to protect prime ministerial 
and governmental power from presidential interference, enabling de Gaulle to easily impose 
his 'presidential' reading of the text, whereby the Head of State emerged as the undisputed 
head of executive decision-making within the regime. 
The 1958 Constitution will be the operative variable for our study of presidential power. For 
without a sound knowledge of the powers accorded to the President in the constitutional text, 
we cannot begin to understand the way in which presidential power has been exercised under 
the Fifth Republic and the debates to which this has given rise. It is crucial, therefore, that our 
study begins with a full discussion of the origins of the Constitution, the framework of 
presidential powers which it sets out and the potential problems inherent in the text. For 
reasons of clarity and consistency, we have chosen to divide our examination of those 
presidential prerogatives set out in the Constitution into three key areas, those of formal, 
symbolic and shared powers. Whilst these distinctions may be considered somewhat 
artificial, they are required to provide an effective means of differentiating between fixed and 
unambiguous presidential powers, such as the right to dissolve the National Assembly, and 
those, like articles 5, 20 and 21, which have given rise to conflicting interpretations. Having 
made these distinctions in our opening chapter, we will continue to employ them consistently 
throughout the thesis. 
Much of the constitutional literature on the Fifth Republic seeks to relate the exercise of 
presidential power back to a 'correct' interpretation of the 1958 Constitution. We would argue, 
however, that there is no such thing as a correct reading of the text. The contrasting 
intentions and expectations of those involved in the constitutional drafting process show how 
the presidential role defined in the text is open to a variety of interpretations, and herein lies 
the key to presidential pre-eminence within the regime. For although de Gaulle's dominance 
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of executive power was undoubtedly facilitated by the combined force of his historic persona 
and the Algerian conflict, it is unlikely that successors would have been able to justify the way 
in which they embraced and built upon the presidential practices established under his 
leadership without the help of constitutional imprecision and the symbolic authority conferred 
upon them by direct popular election to back their actions. Thanks to these constitutional 
factors we would argue that the President's reading of the Constitution is largely subjective 
and may be reinforced by the effective exploitation of additional political, circumstantial and 
personal resources. Therefore, rather than attempting to assess the exercise of presidential 
power in the context of a single, 'pure' interpretation of the constitutional text, we will show 
how the inherent flexibility of the Constitution, together with the 1962 amendment, provided 
the foundations for presidential pre-eminence which could then be built on using a range of 
additional factors. 
As Professor Pinto rightly asserts in our opening citation, the nature of a political regime is not 
defined by the Constitution alone, but will also depend upon the way in which power 
structures set out in theory actually work in practice. In the case of the Fifth Republic, the 
constitutional text has proven sufficiently ambiguous to allow successive Presidents to 
transcend their constitutional powers and to impose their own interpretations upon the 
presidential role. The precise nature of this role is, however, dependent upon the presence 
and interaction of three key extra-constitutional variables: namely, political parties and 
alliances; the personality and public perceptions of the President; the political, social and 
economic conditions under which each presidency operates. We will now examine these in 
more detail. 
There two main political variables affecting presidential power under the Fifth Republic: the 
parliamentary majority and the presidential party. Any President wishing to dominate pOlitical 
decision-making will require the support of a parliamentary majority to back his actions. This 
majority may consist of a single-party or a coalition of parties in the National Assembly, but 
the scope of the President's political power will differ accordingly. If the Head of State wants 
to exercise greater control over government action, the presence of a single-party or so-called 
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'presidential' majority is needed. If, on the other hand, the President's parliamentary majority 
derives from an alliance of political parties in which his own is a minority movement, then his 
position is more vulnerable. He would need to secure the coalition's continued support for his 
leadership by ensuring that his appointment of government ministers and policy initiatives 
reflected the range of political forces which brought him to power. Failure to do so could 
result in a loss of support within the coalition, leaving the Head of State without guaranteed 
backing for his policies in the National Assembly, and seriously weakening his ability to direct 
government action. 
The bipolarising political tendencies of the Fifth Republic have also had an impact upon the 
way in which parties compete for power under the regime. Following the introduction of direct 
presidential elections in 1962, it became clear that the presidency would henceforth become 
the central organising principle for political action. Any movement wishing to compete 
effectively for power under the regime would need to present a presidential candidate who 
had received the backing of a strong and unified party or coalition of parties. Whilst this 
posed few problems for the Gaullist movement, which derived both its identity and mission 
from de Gaulle's individual leadership, it had a profound effect upon the organisation and 
electoral strategies of the Left from 1965 onwards as it sought to adapt to the structural and 
behavioural norms of presidential politics. 
The importance of personal variables in shaping the parameters of presidential power should 
not be under-estimated. Thanks to the symbolic powers conferred on the President by the 
Constitution, the Head of State may play on the more personal aspects of the presidential role 
to enhance his status and authority within the regime. The degree of personalism which is 
associated with the Fifth Republic's presidency owes a great deal to its founder and first 
occupant, Charles de Gaulle. For in addition to the actual events of 1958, a great deal of 
mythologising went on at the start of the regime regarding de Gaulle and French history. 
When we talk of myth we do not necessarily mean a fictional account of events, but rather a 
description of events which suits a particular political audience. The myth of the President 
with visionary qualities, protecting the France from internal political instability and external 
6 
threats to her independence which emerged under de Gaulle's leadership, aimed to appeal to 
all the French across party divides. Thanks to the 1962 constitutional amendment, it became 
an integral part of the regime and influenced the comportment and discourse of successive 
Presidents and contenders for the presidency thereafter. 
It is not, therefore, the true personality of the President which is of greatest significance, but 
the notion we have of that personality. But if presidential authority is dependent, in part, on 
public perceptions of the Head of State, it also relies on the comportment of other key political 
actors outside of the presidency who have a relationship with it, such as the Prime Minister. 
The extent to which the Premier and other government ministers are prepared to co-operate 
or comply with the Head of State's interpretation of his presidential role will impact upon the 
development of the presidency. In the case of strong, independent personalities conflicts may 
arise to the detriment of the President's public image. More often than not, however, these 
instances of disagreement or insubordination result in the departure of the minister 
concerned, who is unable to sustain his position against a presidential reading of the 
Constitution. 
Finally, we must also acknowledge the role played by circumstantial factors in our study of 
presidentialism. In addition to political and personal factors, the President's exercise of power 
will be influenced by political, social and economic events unique to his mandate. De Gaulle's 
interpretation of the presidential role, for example, is best understood in the context of the 
crisis which brought about his return to office. This enabled de Gaulle to conjure up an air of 
drama and heroism around his preSidential leadership, which undoubtedly heightened his 
authority within the regime. Similarly, Giscard d'Estaing's election owed a great deal to public 
disenchantment with years of Gaullist rule. He was able to capitalise on this climate to 
promote his image as the President of change and reform. 
The unpredictable character of these conjunctural variables, however, may prove damaging 
to the presidency if they are not handled carefully and appropriately. In this respect, much 
depends upon public perceptions of the President. If, for instance, the Head of State is 
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closely associated with the determination and direction of government policy, any social and 
economic problems arising during his presidency are more likely to have a direct negative 
impact upon his power base. If, however, he retains a distance from government as the 
arbiter of national conflicts and international statesman, his position may be largely protected 
from any negative feedback. Presidential power will also depend upon the political calendar, 
that is to say the timing of presidential and legislative elections. At the beginning of his 
mandate, it may be argued that the President's legitimacy is so strong that he does not need 
to bolster his authority by intervening too closely in government business, whereas he may 
opt to increase his involvement in national affairs in the run-up to a parliamentary election in 
order to rally party support. 
Presidentialism in contemporary France: De Gaulle and Mitterrand 
In order to fully explore the factors affecting presidentialism in contemporary France, the 
thesis will focus on the two most important figures to have shaped the exercise of power 
under the regime: namely, de Gaulle and Mitterrand. As the regime's creator and first 
President, de Gaulle's experience of presidential power is crucial to our understanding of the 
regime's subsequent evolution. His occupancy of the presidency may be referred to as the 
'constitutional' phase in the Republic's development since it established the institutional 
framework within which political actors under the regime would seek to define themselves. 
The flexibility of this framework, with its ambiguous definitions of both the presidential role and 
the desired balance of power within the executive, enabled de Gaulle to impose his own 
interpretation on the text, particularly after the electorate approved the introduction of direct 
presidential elections in the 1962 referendum. 
De Gaulle's 'presidential' reading of the Constitution was perpetuated by his successor, 
former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, whose five years at the Elysee brought to an end 
the Gaullist phase in the development of the modern French presidency. Contrary to the 
image he cultivated as the young, dynamic, modernising President, Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing's exercise of power between 1974 and 1981 did little to challenge the preSidential 
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practices of his predecessors and, many would argue, resulted in an even greater 
concentration of power in the hands of the President. The election of the Socialist, Franyois 
Mitterrand, to the presidency, on the other hand, promised to bring about a fresh 
interpretation of the Constitution, which would ensure a fairer distribution of power within the 
regime. 
Mitterrand was one of the few pOliticians who rejected de Gaulle's new Constitution from the 
outset. He argued that its whole conception was fundamentally flawed as a result of the 
highly irregular way in which de Gaulle had returned to power. Unlike Pierre Mendes-France, 
who pOintedly refused to accept or participate in the new regime, however, Mitterrand soon 
opted to oppose de Gaulle through the channels provided by the Constitution - those of 
legislative and presidential elections, motions of censure and parliamentary debate. As 
leader of the Left from the mid-1960s onwards, Mitterrand continued to oppose the culture of 
presidentialism emerging under the Fifth Republic. His criticisms were countered by 
supporters of the regime and by the first three Presidents themselves, who justified their 
dominance of executive power by referring to constitutional guidelines and conventions in the 
making. 
Following his election in 1981, however, Mitterrand's relationship to the institutions of the Fifth 
Republic changed, as did his interpretation of presidential power. With his calls for a more 
balanced reading of the Constitution throughout the 1960s and 70s seemingly forgotten, 
Mitterrand proved just as capable and just as willing as his predecessors to exploit all the 
resources available in order to maximise power during his first mandate. Even when 
cohabitation stripped him of the ability to directly influence government decision-making 
between 1986 and 1988, Mitterrand still managed to retain his presidential supremacy by 
carefully manipulating the Constitution and popular opinion to his advantage. 
Mitterrand's transition from vociferous critic to ultimate consolidator and his status as the 
longest serving President of the Fifth Republic make him the ideal focus for our analysis of 
presidentialism after de Gaulle. Having built his career in opposition upon the critique of 
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presidential power exercised by de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard, it may be said that 
Mitterrand commented on every twist and turn in the development of presidentialism under 
the Fifth Republic. But what makes him unique among commentators and analysts is the fact 
that he, in turn, actually became the focal point for the presidential debate following his own 
election as Head of State. Having spent years condemning the process of accretion by which 
Successive Presidents had enlarged the scope of their powers, Mitterrand suddenly found his 
own exercise of executive power under attack. Far from bringing about a Significant re-
distribution of power within the French executive, we will see how Mitterrand's exercise of 
presidential prerogatives broadly endorsed the hyper-presidentialist reading of the 
Constitution which had come to dominate the regime since de Gaulle's period in office. In this 
respect, we may refer to Mitterrand's first mandate as the 'socialist consolidation' phase in the 
regime's development. This period also brought fascinating new dimensions to the debate 
about the nature and limits of presidential power in the form of his relationship with the PS, his 
reliance upon networks of personal advisors behind the scenes and, perhaps most 
importantly, his skilful use of the symbolic powers accorded to the President to cultivate an 
image of power under cohabitation. 
The opening chapter of this thesis is intended to lay the foundations for our study of 
presidentialism under the Fifth Republic. Beginning with a brief discussion of the emergence 
of de Gaulle's constitutional vision, which he first articulated in his famous Bayeux address, 
the chapter will go on to examine the extent to which this was successfully translated into the 
1958 Constitution. By examining the transcripts of the constitutional debates relating to key 
presidential powers, we will show how and why expectations differed amongst those 
parliamentarians and ministers involved in the drafting process concerning the nature and 
limits of the Head of State's role within the regime. We will then examine the importance of a 
further constitutional factor - the 1962 amendment - in ensuring that de Gaulle's 
interpretation of his presidential prerogatives became an enduring feature of the regime. 
Having discussed the relationship between constitutional guidelines and the realities of 
preSidential leadership during the early years of the Fifth Republic, chapter 2 will focus on left-
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wing opposition to de Gaulle's exercise of power which crystalised around the persona of 
Franc;:ois Mitterrand. In this chapter, we will identify the origins of Mitterrand's initial 
opposition to the new regime, before going on to trace his gradual reconciliation to the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic during the 1960s. In so doing, we will show how Mitterrand's 
growing acceptance of the norms governing presidential politics sat uneasily with the anti-
personalist philosophy of the French Left. This gave rise to a number of tensions and 
ambiguities in Mitterrand's interpretation of presidentialism when he strove to actively 
challenge de Gaulle's leadership in 1965 and 1968. 
Chapter 3 examines the evolution of presidentialism during the 1970s through a brief 
overview of the presidencies of Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing. Our discussion will 
highlight the growing importance of extra-constitutional factors, such as the size and 
composition of the parliamentary majority and the temperament of the incumbent, in 
determining the way in which presidential power was exercised between 1969 and 1981. The 
chapter will then explore Mitterrand's leadership of the Socialist Party throughout this period 
in order to show how the development of presidential politics impacted upon the party's 
internal organisation and electoral strategies, as well as Mitterrand's public discourse and 
comportment as the candidate of the Left. 
The study will then move on to a detailed analysis of the Mitterrand presidency from 1981-86. 
Focusing on his first five years in office, chapter 4 will show how Mitterrand's exercise of 
presidential prerogatives broadly endorsed the highly-interventionist style of presidency that 
had come to characterise the regime. In this respect, the Left's reconciliation to 
presidentialism marked the final stage in the consolidation of the regime. Opening with a 
discussion of Mitterrand's effective use of the President's formal constitutional powers at the 
start of his presidency, the chapter will then explore the political, personal and circumstantial 
variables which influenced his exercise of power to differing degrees and with differing effects 
during this period. This will be achieved through an examination of his relationship to three 
key groups: the PS and parliamentary majority; the government; his team of personal 
advisors based at the Elysee. 
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Following the Right's victory in 1986, Mitterrand became the first President to experience 
'cohabitation', and the first to find his powers challenged by the other wing of the executive, 
the Prime Minister and government. In chapter 5, we will explore the effects which this 
unprecedented institutional arrangement had upon the scope of presidential power. Stripped 
of his political majority in the National Assembly, the chapter will contend that Mitterrand was 
forced to exploit the more symbolic aspects of his role to maintain an illusion of pre-eminence 
within the regime. As a result, this period of cohabitation called for a new understanding of 
presidential power and the extent to which it is determined by both a highly ambiguous 
Constitution, the agenda and personality of the President and the vagaries of political 
circumstance. 
Far from losing momentum over the years, the debate over presidential power has been 
enriched and enhanced by these contrasting experiences of presidentialism. Most recently, 
the referendum held in September 2000, which approved the reduction of the presidential 
mandate from seven to five years, saw public, Parliament and President drawn together once 
again to debate and decide a key factor determining the balance of power within the regime. 
It is not our intention here to discuss the implications of this change upon the future of the 
French presidency; as we have already stated, our focus lies instead with an examination of 
the origins and evolution of presidential power throughout the first thirty years of the Fifth 
Republic's history. 
Notes to the Introduction 
1 Roger Pinto, 'La logique juridique des regimes politiques', Le Monde, 5 July 1960, p.4. 
2 Serge July, 'Les dix commandements de Mitterrand', Liberation, 13-14 May 1995, p.31. 
3 Quoted in De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential Power in France edited by Jack Hayward 
(London: Hurst, 1993), p.31. 
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4 Extract from Mitterrand's speech before the National Assembly on 27 December 1979 cited 
in Pierre Avril, 'Norme constitutionnelle et norme politique', Le Monde, 30 December 1979, 
p.7. 
5 Jacques Chirac promised the total withdrawal of the presidential fleet of jets known as 
GLAM (Groupement de liaisons aeriennes ministerielles), a process begun by former Gaullist 
Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur. See Le Monde, 23 May 1995, p.8. 
6 See the debates about the nature and limits of presidential power in Documents pour servir 
a I'histoire de I'elaboration de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, 3 vols (Paris: La 
Documentation franc;;aise, 1987, 1988, 1991). 
Chapter 1 
THE BIRTH OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC: 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES AND POLITICAL 
PRACTICE 
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When the French nation voted overwhelmingly to adopt a new Constitution on 28 September 
1958,1 it was a collective decision which would radically change the French political system. 
Whilst it remains debatable whether the French electorate fully appreCiated the impact that this 
would have upon French institutions,2 there is little doubt that de Gaulle himself was only too 
aware of the way in which his new Constitution would transform the nature of executive power in 
post-war France. For although the 4 October 1958 may mark the official declaration of de 
Gaulle's Fifth Republic, the constitutional text itself represented the fruition of over a decade of 
political reflection on the part of de Gaulle. It may be argued, therefore, the origins of the current 
debate about the nature and limits of presidential power in contemporary France lie not, as is 
generally assumed, in the constitutional debates of 1958, but in the earlier writings of de Gaulle 
who, in close collaboration with Michel Debre, produced what is often referred to as the '8ayeux 
Constitution' in 1946. 
Taking as its starting point this embryonic period in the evolution of de Gaulle's constitutional 
ViSion, the chapter will go onto examine three critical stages in the development of the modern 
French presidency: the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958; the introduction of universal 
Suffrage in 1962; de Gaulle's infamous press conference of January 1964. Having set out the 
broad lines of his constitutional vision at 8ayeux, we will show how de Gaulle's return to power in 
1958 provided him with an ideal opportunity to turn his institutional dreams into reality. This task 
Was not, however, quite as straightforward as it may seem due to the involvement of a committee 
of parliamentarians in the constitutional drafting process, who sought clear reassurances that the 
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Constitution would not enable the President to dominate executive power under the new regime. 
In order to calm these fears, de Gaulle and his ministers made a number of minor amendments to 
the wording of their draft text. But, as we will see, these changes were purely cosmetic and in no 
way altered the fundamental ambiguity of the new Constitution which opened it up to different 
interpretations. This inherent flexibility, together with the serious political crisis which threatened 
national security at the time, enabled de Gaulle to impose his own 'presidential' reading of the 
Constitution upon the French once the text had been officially approved by referendum. When 
the Algerian crisis drew to a close, however, de Gaulle needed to find an additional (and more 
permanent) means of justifying his continued political pre-eminence within the regime. This came 
in the form the 1962 constitutional amendment that transformed the institutional status of the 
presidency and ensured that de Gaulle's 'presidential' interpretation of the Constitution, which he 
set out in the clearest possible terms in a press conference in January 1964, became the 
dominant characteristic of the regime. By examining the constitutional guidelines and political 
practice which shaped the development of presidential power during the inaugural years of the 
Fifth Republic, we may gain a better understanding of how and why the presidential function 
subsequently evolved. 
1.1 The emergence of de Gaulle's institutional vision 
The first evidence of an awakening of de Gaulle's political consciousness may be found in his 
letters and notebooks written during the First World War. Like any young officer serving in the 
French army, de Gaulle was eager to see his country emerge victorious from the conflict. As a 
result, his writings during this period were principally concerned with the improvement of national 
defence policy and military strategy. However, his efforts to understand the reasons behind 
France's apparent vulnerability to invasion led de Gaulle to explore the broader question of the 
historical evolution of France's institutions since the Revolution. Whilst he did not select any 
former regime for particular praise, nor attempt to formulate his own precise constitutional vision, 
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de Gaulle's jottings nonetheless revealed an acceptance of certain principles as a basis for any 
future regime - namely those of the Republic, secularism, democracy and universal suffrage.3 
In addition, letters written to his mother at the end of 1915 included criticisms of the 'I'irresistible 
inferiorite de notre regime repub/icain-parlementaire', whose 'absence de gouvernment' rendered 
it ill-equipped to deal with full-scale military conflict.4 In his opinion, the party-dominated Third 
Republic was becoming 'de plus en plus Mte et odieux' and only served to accentuate the 
divisions within the nation. This was not compatible with the concept of national unity that de 
Gaulle felt was an essential element of national security.5 
After the Great War de Gaulle published several works all of which dealt directly or indirectly with 
the question of French military reform. Experience of active combat had convinced de Gaulle that 
Germany would soon seek revenge for her humiliating defeat - an idea which he explored in his 
1924 publication La Discorde chez I'ennemi. As the years passed, this pessimistic prediction 
seemed increasingly plausible, prompting de Gaulle to write Vers I'armee de metier in 1934 and 
La France et son armee in 1936, both of which called for rapid and far-reaching re-organisation of 
France's military forces. De Gaulle viewed such reforms as a national priority as it was only by 
means of 'Ia capacite de reformer Ie corps militaire que I'on jugera la capacite d'adaption de toute 
la societe nationale. Le corps militaire etant I'expression la plus complete de I'esprit d'une 
societe. 6 When left-wing opposition prevented the introduction of any long-term programme of 
military reform, Jean-Louis Debre claims that de Gaulle became increasingly convinced that 
'I'autorite et la continuite d'action imp/iquait un Etat fort'.? 
The need for strong leadership as a means of ensuring coherent and effective action was 
discussed in some detail by de Gaulle in Le Fil de I'epee (1932). As with most of de Gaulle's 
writing between the wars, this book looks at the concept of leadership from a military perspective. 
Nevertheless, it remains an important resource for understanding the origins of de Gaulle's 
insistence upon the need for strong, visionary leadership and his subsequent attacks upon the 
Fourth Republic's Constitution. According to de Gaulle, a great leader had to possess certain 
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personal qualities in order to control events whilst protecting and promoting the interests of the 
French. Talent was not enough - a natural leader would, in de Gaulle's view, be a man of 
prestigious character who was not afraid to assume sole responsibility for France's destiny.s In 
his own words: 'Ie chef ne se com;oit guere sans une forte dose d'egoi'sme, d'orgeuil, de durete 
et de ruse, mais on lui passe tout cela et m~me il en prend de relief s'il en fait des moyens pour 
realiser de grandes choses'. 9 
In this book, de Gaulle goes on to explain that a leader must be able to act independently which 
would involve renouncing all political or personal allegiances. There are, of course, definite 
Bonapartist overtones to de Gaulle's depiction of the accomplished military leader above the 
party fray, who emerges as a saviour figure at a time of national crisis to lead France out of 
danger and restore national pride. But whilst de Gaulle may have admired Napoleon's boldness 
and military expertise, he was careful to highlight his own rejection of fixed beliefs and political 
doctrines that had proven to be the Achilles heel of many great leaders in the past. 10 Above all, 
de Gaulle regarded the ability to adapt one's actions to different contexts as the most important 
quality of any leader. As we will show, de Gaulle's appreciation of the importance of flexibility not 
only played a key role in determining his own actions both during and after the Second World 
War, but it was also one of the basic principles which informed the 1958 Constitution. 
1,1.1 The war years, the Liberation and the founding of the Fourth 
Republic 
'Mais que les evenements deviennent graves, Ie peril pressant, que Ie salut commun exige tout a 
coup !'initiative, Ie goOt du risque, solidite, aussit6t la change la perspective et la justice se fait 
jour. Une sorte de lame de fond pousse au premier plan I'homme de caractere [ ... ]. A lui, 
naturellement, la tache difficile, I'effort principal, la mission decisive'. 11 
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When de Gaulle wrote these lines in 1932, he could not have known just how pertinent they 
would become in describing his own entrance into the political arena in 1940. De Gaulle fled to 
England overnight following Petain's request for an armistice with Germany. Opposed as he was 
to the idea of French capitulation and the investiture of an undemocratic regime, de Gaulle 
declared himself leader of the Free French in a prophetic radio broadcast on 18 June 1940. He 
based his legitimacy upon the power void left by the members of the Third Republic's executive 
who, he claimed, had abandoned their duty to defend France against foreign invasion. It was not 
until de Gaulle moved to Algiers in 1943 to join representatives of the former Third Republic, 
however, that the question of France's post-war infrastructure began to be examined more 
closely.12 Amongst the constitutional proposals presented to de Gaulle by the various Resistance 
movements, one in particular appealed to the general - it was the 'Jacquier-Bruere' project 
drafted by Michel Debre and Edouard Monick. 13 
Like de Gaulle, Debre shared the view that France's surrender in 1940 was not simply a military 
defeat, but that it was also the consequence of ineffectual government and, more specifically, the 
weakness of the presidency, which had come to characterise the Third Republic's political 
regime. That is not to say that the Third Republic's Constitution failed to provide the President 
with key executive powers: according to the 1875 text, the President was the head of executive 
power, he appointed government ministers and could dissolve the National Assembly when and if 
he chose to. However, following President MacMahon's dissolution of the National Assembly, 
which formed part of his failed attempt to mount a coup d'Etat in 1877, the President's power of 
dissolution was discredited and its use subsequently abandoned, robbing the Head of State of a 
key means of keeping Parliament in check. The nominal loss of this prerogative seriously 
undermined the President's status within the regime. This effect was compounded by the fact 
that Parliament had the power to elect the President and, from 1877 onwards, it resulted in the 
appointment of rather dull, compliant personalities who were unlikely to challenge the privileges 
and prerogatives of Parliament. Thus the presidency became a purely ceremonial function, 
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lacking a strong character to raise its profile within the regime and, more importantly, to call 
directly upon the French to protect their heritage and resist the invading forces in 1940.14 
In this early framework for a new Constitution Debre set out to remedy the institutional 
deficiencies of the Third Republic by limiting Parliament's ability to dominate executive decision-
making. Inspired by what he perceived as the increased coherence of the US political system of 
checks and balances,15 Debre proposed to limit Parliament's powers to matters of law and 
finance, as well as placing strict controls upon its ability to control the government by means of 
the motion of censure and the dissolution of the National Assembly. In addition, he 
recommended that the President's executive authority be enhanced so that he became a kind of 
elected monarch.16 In this way, the Head of State would become 'Ie premier sage de la nation', 
providing the French with a permanent source of stability and unity within the regime. 17 This role 
would not require the President to actively participate in the determination of government policy, 
but simply to oversee its implementation.18 At this stage, Debre ruled out the possibility of 
introducing the direct election of the President by the people for fear that France would once 
again end up governed by 'un general a la maniere des pronunciamentos,.19 In his view, the 
election of both the National Assembly and the President by universal suffrage could only result in 
conflict between the two. Instead, he proposed that the Head of State be chosen by 'un college 
particulier qui associe aux membres du Parlement des representants des organisations 
syndicales, des conseils generaux, des grandes municipalites', with a possible extension to 
include 'certains delegues des Universites ou de la magistrature,.20 In this way, the President 
would no longer be exclusively dependent upon Parliament for his position as he had been under 
the Third Republic. 
After the German surrender of May 1945, de Gaulle officially began to tackle the problem of 
France's post-war institutions. A constituent Assembly, elected by proportional representation,21 
appointed de Gaulle as head of government and together they set about drafting a new 
Constitution that could then be submitted for popular approval. However, as de Gaulle was soon 
19 
to discover, the majority of members of the newly-elected Assembly did not share his vision for a 
new set of institutions to correct the weaknesses of the Third Republic. Preparatory work on the 
new Constitution indicated a marked reluctance to establish a greater balance of power between 
government and Parliament and, as a result, the concept of a sovereign Assembly was emerging 
once more. Furthermore, as Lacouture notes, in re-establishing a working Parliament, de Gaulle 
found himself at the mercy of various political formations that were no longer dependent upon him 
for their legitimacy as they had been under the Resistance. 22 Faced with a National Assembly 
marked by the presence of a powerful Left, de Gaulle decided to withdraw temporarily from the 
political centre stage so as not to ostracise himself further or jeopardise his future legitimacy by 
becoming too closely associated with 'une reuvre d~nt if pressent I'extreme faiblesse,.23 
1.1.2 8ayeux: an 'embryonic' Constitution 
FOllowing his sudden departure from government in January 1946, de Gaulle took full advantage 
of his new-found political freedom to hold regular meetings with Michel Debre, Rene Capitant and 
Leon Noel to discuss the elaboration of an alternative Constitution. The outcome of these 
discussions was revealed in a landmark speech given by de Gaulle at Bayeux on 16 June 1946.24 
The 'Bayeux Constitution', as it has been called, set out de Gaulle's vision for France's 
institutions. In this respect, it may be regarded as de Gaulle's first official constitutional 
declaration and, more specifically, as the embryonic form of what later developed into the 1958 
Constitution. 
Before we examine the central ideas in the Bayeux speech, let us first comment briefly upon de 
Gaulle's reasons for choosing to present his institutional vision to the French so soon after 
leaVing office. After the war, de Gaulle had been greatly disappointed to see the revival of a 
partY-dominated Assembly, yet he remained convinced that the shortcomings of the system 
Would quickly become apparent, and the electorate would call upon him to take control of 
France's destiny once more. The timing of the Bayeux speech - after the popular rejection of the 
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first draft Constitution on 5 May 1946, and before the constituent Assembly returned to the 
drawing board to begin working on a revised project - would seem to suggest that de Gaulle 
hoped to influence the constitution-making process. It is not clear why de Gaulle believed that a 
public and political climate, which had been resistant to the prospect of a strong State, might 
suddenly become more receptive to such a concept five months later. Nevertheless, there is 
reliable evidence,25 not least the portentous tone of the Bayeux address itself, to corroborate the 
view that de Gaulle did not anticipate having to wait long before returning triumphantly to power. 
As remembered by his close friend, Claude Mauriac, de Gaulle's own words clearly convey his 
high expectations prior to Bayeux: 'Ie 16 juin, a Bayeux, je mettrai les Frangais en face de ma 
conception de ce que doit ~tre la Constitution. Je mettrai les constituants en face de leurs 
responsabitites. Et its feront ce que je dirai [ ... j, I'opinion pub/ique cristallisera autour des idees 
Simples et sages dont chacun saura desormais qu'elles sont les miennes,.26 
De Gaulle's 'Bayeux Constitution' called for legislative, executive and judicial powers to be 
'nettement separes et fortement equi/ibres'. This would be achieved thorough the creation of a 
bicameral Parliament in which the second 'administrative' chamber, whose members would be 
chosen by local government bodies, would act as a corrective to the first 'political' chamber 
elected by universal suffrage. To ensure that this new institutional arrangement functioned 
smoothly, and that long-term French interests would never again suffer as a result of party 
political conflict, de Gaulle also proposed the appOintment of a Head of State or as he put it, 'un 
arbitrage national [ .. j au-dessus des contingences politiques', with fewer potential checks upon 
his powers than under the 1875 Constitution.27 According to de Gaulle's vision, the President 
would become the supreme representative of the nation, the arbiter between parties and the 
guardian of France's independence and institutional stability. But in order to fulfil these 
constitutional duties, he had to be able to act independently of Parliament. His election by the 
two parliamentary chambers was, therefore, out of the question. Instead, the President would be 
chosen 'par un college qui englobe Ie Parlement, mais beaucoup plus large et compose de 
maniere a faire de lui Ie president de I'Union frangaise en m~me temps que celui de la 
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Republique,.28 As the supreme source of executive authority,29 the President would have the 
power to promulgate laws, issue decrees and sign treaties. He would also appoint government 
Ministers and, more importantly, the Prime Minister. Finally, de Gaulle recommended that the 
PreSident be able to dissolve Parliament and call a general election should he deem it necessary. 
Only as a result of these enhanced preSidential prerogatives, he claimed, would France possess 
the powerful State needed to restore national unity. 
The wording of the Bayeux address also reveals a great deal about de Gaulle's perception of the 
prime ministerial function under the proposed regime. No mention is made, for instance, of the 
Premier's role in drawing up government policy, as had been the case under the Third Republic. 
Instead, de Gaulle affirms that the Prime Minister will 'dirige[r] la politique et Ie travail du 
Gouvernement'. Clearly, there is a distinction to be made between directing government action 
and dictating it. In this respect, it is significant that de Gaulle omits to specify exactly who will 
determine national objectives under the new regime. By directly acknowledging the Premier's 
role as an executor, de Gaulle seemed to be implying that the President would be the architect of 
government policy. For although de Gaulle describes the Head of State as an 'arbitre' above 
POlitical affiliations, one is inclined to agree with Veronique Alibert-Fabre when she concludes 
that, in the case of a strong personality like de Gaulle, this was unlikely to produce a politically 
inactive presidency. Particularly when the incumbent is required to 'pre sider les can seils du 
Gouvernement et d'y exercer cette influence de la continuite' which,3o according to leading 
POlitical analysts like Maurice Duverger, is the determining factor in establishing the real head of 
government within a regime.31 
The Bayeux speech is much more than a verbal Constitution since it also integrates some of the 
more abstract concepts which informed de Gaulle's political philosophy. The most important of 
these ideas is that of legitimacy. As self-appointed Head of the Resistance, the legitimacy of de 
GaUlle's actions derived from the conviction that he had been blessed with a certain 'superiorite 
morale', Which obliged him to act to defend the interests of the French nation against attack, even 
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if this meant stepping outside of the law.32 This notion of a '/egitimite de mission', as Chevallier 
calls it, is often associated with Bonapartism and rests on the assumption that 'the leader himself 
embodied the nation and was the living incarnation of popular sovereignty in action,.33 In reality, 
de Gaulle had certainly not received the approval of the electorate for his actions in 1940, which 
had been greeted with bewilderment by the Allies and indifference by the French themselves. 
Moreover, it cannot be said that his early appeals to the French to resist German occupation 
reflected the general mood of the country, since historical evidence suggests otherwise. 34 
Therefore, in order to justify his legitimacy before the inhabitants of Bayeux, de Gaulle 
constructed a myth of the Resistance in which he depicted himself as France's saviour, the leader 
of an elite group, whose moral superiority, boldness and willingness for self-sacrifice in the name 
of French Liberation lent de Gaulle a quasi-sacred quality that implicitly exempted his actions 
from normal institutional and judicial restrictions. 35 As we will see, it was this claim that he 
possessed a unique moral legitimacy which later enabled de Gaulle to return dramatically to the 
political arena in 1958 and present himself as the only person, who was both capable and 
commendable enough to see France safely through the Algerian crisis. 
In his study of de Gaulle's political career, Jean Lacouture draws our attention to the 
inappropriate timing of the Bayeux speech when he notes that 'Ie tout n'est pas de dire les 
choses vraies, et necessaires. /I taut aussi les dire en temps voulu, et les rendre assimilables a 
l'auditeur'.36 In this respect, Bayeux may be regarded as an error of judgement on the part of de 
Gaulle, who had clearly under-estimated the degree of public and political hostility towards the 
concept of a powerful Head of State following the Liberation. The public's primary concern was to 
see things return to 'normal' as quickly as possible; major institutional upheaval did not, therefore, 
seem like a very attractive prospect. Those political reactions which did filter through into the 
press were predominantly negative, and clearly determined by the position of each party in the 
ongoing constitutional debate.37 Unsurprisingly, de Gaulle's speech was greeted with varying 
degrees of hostility by the French Left. In an article published the following day in Le Populaire, 
Leon Blum rejected de Gaulle's notion of a more powerful presidency, stating that 'sur Ie principe 
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republica in, il n'y a pas de concession, ni de conciliation possible. L'Assemblee, directement 
issue du suffrage universel, doit avoir Ie premier et Ie dernier mot. ,38 The Communist Party 
leader, Georges Thorez, was more damning in his assessment of Bayeux and denounced de 
Gaulle as 'Ie general factieux'. Similarly, in L'Humanite, Cognoit warned his readers that such an 
increase in presidential powers might lead to dictatorship: 'il faudra beaucoup de vertu a ce chef 
de tEtat tel que Ie congoit Ie discours de Bayeux pour ne pas rever parfois de Cesarisme,.39 The 
attitude of the Radical press was generally positive, since it approved of any project which moved 
a step closer to the notion of presidential power which was enshrined in the 1875, but never 
allowed to flourish. 4o Nevertheless, some reservations were expressed with regard to the level of 
power accorded to the Head of State. In La Oepeche du Midi, for instance, Martinaud-Deplat 
called upon de Gaulle to revise his constitutional proposals lest they be interpreted as a 'simple 
etape vers la conquete du pouvoir personnel'.41 
Despite these expressions of disapproval, it must be said that, on the whole, parliamentary 
reaction to the Bayeux speech was noticeably lacking and most parties, with the exception of the 
Communists and the Socialists, failed to respond directly to de Gaulle's proposals. Three 
Possible reasons may be suggested for this political silence. Firstly, it may have been a mark of 
respect for de Gaulle; the memory of his heroic actions during the war making parliamentarians 
reluctant to criticise publicly the man to whom Free France owed so much. The second 
argument, put forward by Jean Charlot, contends that in 1946 political parties were far more 
concerned about the potential impact which the creation of a Gaullist party would have upon their 
Positions, than they were about the constitutional projects of an individual who had affirmed his 
determination to remain outside of the political arena. 42 But perhaps the most likely explanation is 
that Parliament was so thoroughly absorbed by its own constitutional projects that it simply did 
not pay much attention to de Gaulle's Bayeux address. After all, to take issue with de Gaulle's 
constitutional vision would have been to promote it as an unwelcome dimension within an already 
complex debate. Consequently, the significance of this speech was only truly evaluated after de 
Gaulle returned to power in 1958. 
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De Gaulle's speech at Epinal, on 29 September 1946, on the other hand, succeeded in provoking 
a rapid and direct response from all political parties. The Epinal address was more aggressive in 
tone and more overtly critical of the second constitutional project, which had just been approved 
by Parliament. In this speech, de Gaulle denounced the draft Constitution as unsatisfactory since 
it failed to incorporate an effective separation of powers or to accord sufficient power to the 
President. This, he claimed, would result in the continued 'omnipotence des partis'. He also 
used this address as an opportunity to reiterate his own constitutional proposals, particularly in 
relation to the presidency: 'if nous paralt necessaire que /e chef de I'Etat en soit un, c'est-a-dire 
qu'if soit e/u et choisi pour representer reellement /a France et I'Union frangaise, qu'if lui 
appartienne [ ... ] d'assurer au-dessus des partis /e fonctionnement regulier des institutions et de 
faire va/oir, au milieu des contingences po/itiques, /es inferets permanents de /a nation'. In 
addition to his calls for a Head of State 'qui en soit un', de Gaulle also indicated his support for 
the principle of popular consultation to allow the French to decide their own institutional destiny.43 
As Alibert-Fabre pOints out, neither the prospect of a politically powerful President nor the 
incorporation of the referendum into the Constitution were usual features of French 
parliamentarianism.44 It is hardly surprising then that many politicians regarded de Gaulle's 
demands as confirmation of his intention to establish an autocracy with the President dominating 
executive power. As we will see, these early concerns as the way in which de Gaulle's 
institutional vision could develop were eventually borne out by his description of the presidential 
role at a press conference in January 1964. Furthermore, the fact that de Gaulle chose to re-
employ the same expression - 'un chef de I'Etat qui en soit un' - on this occasion is more than 
mere coincidence; it pOints to a definite congruence between the early conception of the 
presidency articulated at Bayeux and Epinal and his exercise of presidential power after 1962. 
Concerned by the potentially negative influence that this speech might have upon the forthcoming 
cOnstitutional referendum, the parties were quick to reject de Gaulle's criticisms. Spokesmen for 
the three major political movements (PCF, SFIO and MRP) joined together to announce that they 
Would prefer to see de Gaulle remain 'au-dessus des querelles politiques' and encouraged voters 
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to ignore Epinal and to endorse the proposed Constitution.45 In Le Populaire, Leon Blum 
expanded upon his previous assessment of the Bayeux speech to conclude that what de Gaulle 
was really advocating was an American-style presidential regime, whereby the President would 
be elected by universal suffrage. According to Blum, such a notion was wholly undesirable, since 
French history had shown that the direct election of strong political figures always took the form of 
a plebiscite.46 Vincent Auriol, President of the National Assembly, also spoke out to warn of the 
dangers of following the advice of a lone political figure or party, adding that de Gaulle's 
institutional vision was too absolutist to accommodate the diversity of France's political 
landscape. 47 Even the MRP, which accepted de Gaulle's point that the new Constitution was 
'imparfaite', confirmed 'que /'interet du pays est de ratifier la Constitution',48 causing a split 
between the MRP and the Union gaulliste. 49 As for the Communist Party, it merely reiterated the 
opinion expressed by Thorez after the Bayeux address that 'Ie general a pris la tete de toutes les 
forces reactionnaires et anti-democratiques du pays,.50 
In the October referendum the French did not rally to de Gaulle's alternative Constitution and 
approved the inauguration of a regime which reproduced many of the Third Republic's 
Constitutional weaknesses; as Duverger put it at the time - 'c'est I'air me me de la Troisieme 
Republique qu'on respire dans la Quatrieme,.51 Far from bringing about a more even distribution 
of power between the executive and legislative branches, the 1946 Constitution ensured that it 
Was concentrated once more in the National Assembly, which had the power to approve 
government programmes as well as to elect the President of the Republic. The regime itself was 
characterised by coalition governments which lasted an average of six months, before 
disintegrating when the different parties involved disagreed over a key policy issue. The degree 
of government instability is conveyed effectively by the fact that 25 different governments and 15 
different Prime Ministers came and went during the regime's relatively short life.52 
Whilst it would be wrong to describe the President as completely powerless under the Fourth 
Republic, it is fair to say that the extent to which he was able to influence executive or legislative 
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decision-making was always at the discretion of the government and Parliament. As a result, the 
two Presidents of the Fourth Republic, Vincent Auriol (1947-54) and Rene Coty (1954-8) were, at 
times, involved in policy-making, government appointments and both took advantage of their 
status as a symbol of continuity (unaffected by governmental instability and elections) to offer 
advice and warnings to successive governments. Nevertheless, the fact remains that this 
authority was highly personalised and did not derive from constitutional guidelines, political 
conventions or strong party support. In this respect, the President could not challenge 
parliamentary pre-eminence and, as President Coty found out when the Algerian conflict reached 
crisis-point in 1958, this prevented him from intervening decisively and effectively to stave off a 
national emergency. Thus it was that after twelve years outside of the political arena, de Gaulle 
was able to return to power and see his vision for a powerful presidency become an institutional 
reality. 
1.2 Setting up the Fifth Republic 
At 67 years old, de Gaulle knew that his return to the political stage in 1958 would be the last 
chance he would have to realise his constitutional project. Consequently, he was determined not 
to repeat his mistakes of 1946 by allowing the parties to cast him aside once he had achieved a 
resolution to the Algerian conflict. 53 On 28 May 1958, President Coty invited de Gaulle to form a 
government and three days later he presented his cabinet before the National Assembly. Despite 
Continued fighting in Algeria and increasingly pressing economic and financial problems, de 
Gaulle's first priority was to draft a new Constitution, which would build a legitimate Republic by 
creating a State that was both effective and democratic.54 
De Gaulle by no means stood alone as champion of a stronger executive. Politicians from the 
Left, Right and Centre also recognised this obvious need. Where their views differed, however, 
Was how this stronger executive could be achieved. Unsurprisingly, the Right favoured a 
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powerful Head of State chosen independently of Parliament, whilst the Left sought a traditional 
head of government elected by Parliament but constitutionally protected against those 
parliamentarians who had overthrown all too many governments under the Third and Fourth 
Republics. As we will see, the 1958 constitutional text represents a kind of compromise in so far 
as it sets out a bifurcated executive power to be shared by President and Prime Minister. 
Before we examine more fully the concept of executive power as it is set out in the Fifth 
Republic's Constitution, a very brief oveNiew of the 1958 constitution-making process is in order. 
Having accepted President Coty's request to step in as Le President du Conseil (as Prime 
Ministers were called under the Fourth Republic), de Gaulle sought from the National Assembly a 
change in the procedure for amending the Constitution which would, in effect, authorise his 
government to draft a new Constitution. De Gaulle instructed his Minister of Justice, Michel 
Debre, to put together a working group that could begin drafting a text. This group worked closely 
with an interministerial committee, which included de Gaulle himself and four powerful Ministers 
of State. The government then submitted this draft text to the Comite Consu/tati' Constitutionne/ 
(CCC) - a body comprised mainly of members of Parliament, who had been democratically 
selected by their peers and were authorised to suggest revisions to the government's text.55 The 
CCC examined the text from the 29 July to the 14 August. Its recommendations were looked at 
by the working group and the interministerial committee, which included de Gaulle, Debre, the 
leading parliamentarians Guy Mollet and Pierre Pflimlin, as well as ministers of State, before a 
new text was prepared for submission to the Council of State on 25 and 26 August. Further 
re .. 
VISions were then suggested and the final text was presented to the people at La Place de /a 
Repubfique in Paris on 4 September. 
In the fOllowing examination of the key formal, symbolic and shared powers accorded to the 
President in the 1958 Constitution, it will be shown that far from establishing a single, clear 
definition of the division of responsibilities between President and Prime Minister, the ambiguous 
Wording of certain aspects of the 1958 Constitution gave rise to two contrasting interpretations of 
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executive power, the so-called 'presidential' and 'parliamentary' readings of the Constitution. 
According to the 'parliamentary' reading of the text, which was favoured by those on the Left, the 
Prime Minister was the head of executive power and it was his responsibility to dictate and direct 
all aspects of government action, whilst the President occupied a more symbolic, non-
interventionist role as national guide. For those on the Right, however, the text was open to a 
'presidential' reading which placed the Head of State firmly in the driving seat of executive policy-
making. 
Given the way in which the regime subsequently evolved, it is a common assumption that all 
those involved in drafting the Constitution knowingly endorsed a 'presidentialist' reading of the 
Constitution. The order of the Constitution alone (it begins by listing the powers accorded to the 
PreSident of the Republic) has undoubtedly helped to perpetuate this notion that members of the 
CCC and government alike expected the Constitution to establish a predominantly presidential 
regime. An analysis of the constitutional debates, however, reveals that this was not, in fact, the 
case. Archives show that members of the CCC sought and received explicit assurances from de 
Gaulle and his ministers that the President would not be allowed to dominate the executive and 
that a 'parliamentary' reading of the text would prevail. As we will see, de Gaulle deliberately 
misled members of the CCC into believing that he too favoured a more balanced distrib.ution of 
executive power to gain parliamentary approval for his project, knowing that he had succeeded in 
keeping the text sufficiently ambiguous to allow him to adopt a preSidential reading of the text as 
soon as the new regime was officially underway. 
1.2.1 The formal powers of the President 
The PreSident and Parliament 
The 1958 Constitution grants the President a number of concrete powers, which are not open to 
interpretation or debate. The first of these 'real' powers concerns the Head of State's right to 
diSSOlve Parliament once in any given year, without ministerial countersignature (article 12). De 
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Gaulle regarded this as one of the most important weapons in the presidential armoury, as it 
provided the Head of State with a means of ensuring greater governmental stability.56 The threat 
of dissolution was an effective deterrent against attempts by Parliament to overthrow the 
executive (as was common practice under the Third and Fourth Republics), since most deputes 
would not want to run the risk of losing their seats in a new legislative election. In addition, article 
12 could be invoked by a newly elected President to return a favourable parliamentary majority or 
by an incumbent President in need of 'relegitimising' his position. At one meeting de Gaulle 
elaborated further upon the use of article 12, stating that the President should have the power to 
dissolve both the National Assembly and the government 'si {'un ou /'autre excede {es limites de 
sa competence,.57 This was opposed by the parliamentarians, Guy Mollet and Pierre Pflimlin, on 
the grounds that it would imply too active a role in day to day politics which was not the 
PreSident's function. In the end, agreement was reached when de Gaulle assured his colleagues 
that dissolution would only be used in exceptional circumstances.58 Yet such verbal assurances 
Were by no means legally binding, and did not alter the fact that dissolution was entirely at the 
PreSident's discretion. It is simply is not logical to argue that the Head of State only disposes of 
this power sometimes, when the text itself clearly states otherwise. De Gaulle's guarantees, 
therefore, had no real constitutional basis, and it is a testament to his skills of persuasion that he 
managed to convince two sceptical parliamentarians to the contrary. 
Article 10 requires the President to promulgate laws no later than two weeks after they have been 
VOted by Parliament. If he wishes, the President may send a bill back to Parliament for a second 
re d' 
a Ing - a request that cannot be denied. Similarly, article 13 states that it is the President's 
respon 'b'I' 
Sl Iity to Sign decrees from the Council of Ministers. Should he refuse, the government is 
Obliged to follow the normal procedure of presenting and voting the law in Parliament, which is a 
longer and . 
more complex process. Article 61 also gives the President the right to submit any Bill 
to the Can rt t· . 
S I U lanai Council should he deem it unconstitutional. However, only the Constitutional 
COunCil po . " 
Ssesses the Judicial powers required to stop the passage of the Bill. In this respect, the 
PreSident' . . 
s Judgement IS of a more symbolic nature. Collectively, articles 10, 13 and 61 give the 
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President what Fournier refers to as a certain 'pouvoir d'empecher,;59 not only because they may 
be used to slow down the legislative process, but also because the President's refusal to sign 
certain pieces of legislation may turn popular opinion against the government, prompting it to 
amend the bill in question or to abandon it entirely. 
The referendum - 'the constitutional mark of Gaullism,.60 
De Gaulle was certainly not the first political figure to argue for the compatibility of the 
parliamentary regime and the referendum, but he was the first to incorporate the notion into his 
constitutional projects. Influenced by his discussions with Rene Capitant, who was a firm believer 
in the ability of the referendum to unify the State,61 de Gaulle came to regard this form of popular 
consultation as the most perfect example of democracy in action, as true legitimacy could only 
derive from direct electoral approval. 62 Unlike Capitant (and to a lesser extent Debre), who 
regarded the referendum as an opportunity for dialogue between the people and State,63 de 
Gaulle saw it as a plebiscite upon his individual leadership, just as it had been under the 
Napoleonic Empires. The direct link which the referendum creates between the President and 
the electorate effectively excludes Parliament, and is consistent with de Gaulle's contempt for 
political parties and his desire to see their power reduced. 64 Originally, de Gaulle had wanted to 
allow the President to call a referendum on any proposed law which Parliament refused to adopt, 
as well as any question of fundamental importance to the nation.65 However, following its 
deliberation by the CCC, the scope of the referendum was limited to proposed constitutional 
amendments (article 89), and issues relating to Community agreements or the ratification of 
international treaties (article 11) .66 
The power of appointment 
As we have seen, one of de Gaulle's priorities when drawing up a new Constitution was to 
gUarantee the President a greater degree of executive autonomy than under the Fourth Republic, 
Where presidential involvement in appointing the government was limited to the designation of the 
Prime Minister, whose proposed cabinet and political programme then had to be ratified by a 
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majority in the National Assembly.57 Article 8 of the 1958 Constitution gives the President the 
sole power to nominate the Prime Minister, who then selects the members of his government in 
consultation with the President. Throughout the constitutional debates, questions were raised 
about the independence of a Prime Minister who owed his position to the President, and the 
latter's ability to dismiss the Prime Minister at will. Unsurprisingly, the CCC, which was largely 
made up of staunch parliamentarians, sought assurances from de Gaulle and his spokesmen that 
the President would not be able to remove the Prime Minister at will. Raymond Janot, the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement, calmed such fears by stating categorically that the President 
could not dismiss the Prime Minister because the government was responsible before Parliament 
and not before the President of the Republic. 58 Moreover, he argued that this was implicit in the 
wording of the article itself; the fact that the President had the power to terminate the functions of 
other ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister implied that he had no such 
power to remove the Prime Minister himself. De Gaulle's explanation to the eee on 8 August 
was much more straightforward. Asked by Paul Reynaud whether the President had the power to 
dismiss the Premier, de Gaulle replied unequivocally 'Non, if ne peut pas revoquer Ie premier 
ministre, sans quoi d'ail/eurs Ie Premier ministre ne pourrait pas gouverner avec fibre esprit. ,69 He 
then went on to reiterate Janot's point that 'Ie Premier ministre n'est pas responsable devant Ie 
president de la Repubfique [ .. ], sans quoi tout /'equi/ibre de notre projet de Constitution serait 
renverse car un element essential de ce projet est que Ie president de la Repubfique est un 
arbitre et qu'if est la pour assurer Ie fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics'. 70 
This statement clearly shows de Gaulle agreeing (or rather pretending to agree) with the view that 
the Premier should not be answerable to the Head of State, because such dependency would 
enable the President to influence government affairs, thus preventing the Premier from governing 
freely.71 Furthermore, his final assertion that without such a separation of prerogatives the 
desired balance of power within the regime would be compromised, not only seemed to confirm 
that there was only one possible reading of the Constitution, but that this reading was 
predominantly parliamentary, with the Prime Minister enjoying a level of autonomy which did not 
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render him subordinate to the Head of State. In this instance, de Gaulle's perception of an equal 
division of power between Prime Minister and President appears to be identical to that envisaged 
by members of the CCC. This represented a significant deviation from the style of presidency 
described at Bayeux. We will see later in our discussion, however, that de Gaulle soon revealed 
his preference for a more interventionist interpretation of the President's role once the 
Constitution had been approved. Nevertheless, these solemn declarations were convincing 
enough to mollify the CCC; less than a week later, Paul Reynaud wrote to de Gaulle to thank him 
for appearing before the committee and, in particular, for confirming that 'malgre I'accroissement 
des pouvoirs du chef de I'Etat [ ... J, c'est bien du regime parlementaire qu'jf s'agit'. 72 
Even if members of the CCC were won over by de Gaulle's assurances, some observers 
remained unconvinced. Rather surprisingly, one such sceptic was Michel Debre. In a meeting of 
the working group which prepared the draft Constitution to be submitted to the CCC, Debre 
expressed the view that 'Ie pouvoir de nomination comporte Ie pouvoir de revocation,.73 In other 
words, he acknowledged that the failure of this early outline of the Constitution to tackle the 
removal question implied that the President, who was empowered to appoint the Prime Minister, 
would indeed have the power to dismiss him as well. De Gaulle was clearly not completely 
convinced by Debre's argument because after the text had been modified by the CCC and 
approved by the government so that it read 'Ie President de la Republique nomme Ie Premier 
ministre. /I ne peut mettre fin a ses fonctions que sur la presentation par celui-ci de sa 
demission,/4 de Gaulle made one final alteration, deleting the 'ne ... que' construction from the text 
before it was presented to the electorate. This grammatical change from negative to positive 
alters the fundamental sense of the sentence, weakening the Prime Minister's position and 
making him more vulnerable to presidential dismissal. Practical implementation of article 8 soon 
proved that the Prime Minister would indeed find himself unable to cling onto his position against 
the wishes of the President. Ironically, it was Debre himself who would become its first victim. 
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Emergency powers 
Finally, we come to what is undoubtedly the most controversial of the President's 'real' powers, 
that of article 16. It allows the President to take whatever measures he deems necessary 
'Iorsque les institutions de la Republique, l'independance de la Nation, l'integrite de son territoire 
ou I'execution de ses engagements internationaux sont menacees d'une maniere grave et 
immediate et que Ie fonctionnement regulier des pouvoirs publics est interrompu.' In other words, 
the President is granted full emergency powers in times of extreme crisis to take sole control of 
the country's decision-making. Although there have been a few constitutional articles since the 
Revolution which may be considered as precedents of article 16,75 the inclusion of emergency 
powers in the 1958 Constitution was primarily due to both de Gaulle and Debre's interpretation of 
French capitulation at the beginning of the Second World War. In an appearance before the CCC 
on 8 August 1958, de Gaulle explained that had President Lebrun been constitutionally 
empowered to act as the legitimate defender of national integrity in 1940, he would have been 
able to transfer this legitimacy to become head of the provisional government in Algiers, and 
there would have been no need for de Gaulle to have taken matters into his own hands. 76 
This article was one of the few which received prolonged attention from members of the CCC. 
Whilst agreeing with the principle of emergency powers, committee members were nonetheless 
concerned that the wording of the original text was too imprecise and might lead to confusion, as 
well as possible abuse, when such powers were invoked. Consequently, there was almost 
unanimous support for Paul Coste-Floret's proposal that the Constitutional Council, the Prime 
Minister and the Presidents of the two Chambers all be consulted before article 16 could be 
invoked.?? De Gaulle agreed to the amendment on the condition that the Constitutional Council 
appeared in the last line of the paragraph and not the first, as had been originally proposed by the 
CCC.78 Even though this does not alter the actual meaning of the article, it is significant because 
it illustrates once again the importance which de Gaulle placed upon fine-tuning, in order to 
ensure that the emphasis clearly lay with the presidential right to invoke emergency powers. De 
GaUlle saw article 16 as being inextricably linked to the President's arbitrational role to guarantee 
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that French institutions functioned smoothly.79 In addition, the CCC approved a further two 
amendments, put forward by Messrs Teigen and Dejean, which aimed to place tighter restrictions 
upon the limits of these exceptional powers. It was hoped that the combined effect of these 
changes would guarantee against the possible abuse of article 16, thus weakening the argument 
of the 'cartel des non',80 whose opposition to the new Constitution centred mainly upon 'Ia 
dictature legale' which article 16 might impose upon the French.81 
Despite the understandable concerns which were voiced as a result of the inclusion of article 16, 
it has only ever been used once, by de Gaulle, from 23 to 30 April 1961, at the height of the 
Algerian crisis. Nevertheless, this one instance amply illustrates the potential for the Constitution 
to give rise to renewed debates, once the implementation of a power is underway. De Gaulle's 
use of article 16 caused considerable controversy in political circles, even if, as Leon Noel 
affirms, the public and the press remained relatively disinterested by the whole affair.82 The 
debate centred mainly upon what Jacques Fauvet referred to as 'I'erreur du general de Gaulle [ ... ] 
d'avoir laisse en vigueur pour une duree indeterminee I'article 16, alors que rien ni personne 
n'interrompait plus «Ie fonctionnement regu/ier des pouvoirs publics»,.83 Maurice Duverger 
was more scathing in his attacks upon de Gaulle. He accused the General of deliberately 
prolonging the use of his emergency powers for a period of six months, when sufficient 
institutional stability had been re-established by the end of April 1961.84 Even amongst those 
who agreed with de Gaulle's interpretation of article 16 in 1961, the question of the extent and 
limits of emergency powers remained the subject of lively debate.85 
1.2.2 The symbolic powers of the President 
Article 5· 'I'esprit de fa fonction presidentielle,.86 
'Le President de la Repub/ique veille au respect de la Constitution. II assure par son arbitrage, Ie 
fonctionnement regulier des pouvoirs publics ainsi que la continuite de I'Etat. /I est Ie garant de 
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I'independance nation ale, de l'integrite du territoire, du respect des accords de Communaute et 
des traites. ,87 
It is significant that article 5 should open the section on presidential powers in the 1958 
Constitution, since it dictates the broad constitutional objectives that should inspire the actions of 
any President of the Fifth Republic. In this respect, it may be viewed as a reference point, which 
ensures that any territorial conflicts arising between President and Prime Minister due to the 
many imprecisions and gaps in the Constitution may be quickly resolved. Article 5, which may be 
found in its most primitive form in de Gaulle's 1946 speech at Epinal,88 was not the focus of 
lengthy discussion by the CCC and only became the subject of controversy once the Constitution 
was put into practice. An analysis of the Travaux Preparatoires that document the constitutional 
debates of 1958, provides a clear explanation for this lack of debate - quite simply, none of the 
committee members anticipated that article 5 was open to different interpretation. They believed 
that article 5 allowed the President to fulfil a more symbolic, non-executive role as the supreme 
moral judge and national arbiter. Executive power would be dominated by the Prime Minister. 
Practical implementation of the presidential role of 'arbitre' set out in article 5, however, revealed 
that such a term was open to two quite different interpretations. The first relates to the concept of 
an arbitrator who acts as a referee, ensuring that rules are complied with and any disputes 
resolved, but without taking part in the game. In this respect, it is perhaps closest to the style of 
presidency which developed under the Third Republic. The second sense of 'arbitre' which 
derived from the Roman term 'arbitrium,' meaning will or command, implies a President who is 
the primary national decision-maker. The CCC's concept of the presidency seems to sit 
Somewhere between the two definitions. For although they were prepared to sanction an 
increase in presidential powers so that the President was no longer hostage to an Assembly-
based regime, they did not wish to see the emergence of the opposite scenario in which 
government and Parliament would find themselves subordinate to a very powerful President. De 
Gaulle, on the other hand, clearly favoured the second definition which would allow the Head of 
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State 'to always have the capacity to intervene at will, even if he generally avoided doing so in 
normal circumstances,.89 
As one of the defining aspects of the presidential function, it may be argued that the interpretation 
of 'arbitrage' has played a key role in determining the way in which power is distributed between 
President and Prime Minister under the Fifth Republic. Depending on the definition accorded to 
this term, either actor may be seen as the head of the French executive. It follows, therefore, that 
the divergence between de Gaulle and the eee's interpretations of presidential 'arbitrage' meant 
that they did not share the same institutional vision. Both wanted to see a greater separation of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers, but within the executive itself, their notion of an ideal 
balance of power necessarily differed as a result of contrasting interpretations of presidential 
arbitration. The two possible readings of the term 'arbitre' were not apparent at the founding of 
the Fifth Republic. Thanks to de Gaulle's assurances that 'Ie President de la Republique [ ... ] est 
un personnage impartial. II est un arbitre; if n'a pas a s'occuper de la conjoncture politique et c'est 
la raison pour laquelle [ .. ]/e Premier ministre et Ie Gouvernement n'ont pas a etre responsables 
devant lui', most members of the eee were convinced that he did not intend to exploit the 
ambiguity of term 'arbitre' in order to intervene in government affairs under normal 
circumstances.9o As de Gaulle's presidency evolved, however, particularly after the 1964 press 
conference, which will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, it became increasingly 
evident that he did not accept the President's exclusion from any aspect of the political decision-
making process. 
In a debate, which took place in February 1964, constitutional experts Georges Vedel and 
Fran<;:ois Goguel supported de Gaulle's interpretation of 'arbitrage' as a notion which would allow 
the President to participate in all areas of executive decision-making.91 By selecting a leader (be 
it directly or indirectly) to fulfil this function, they argued that the electorate automatically imposed 
an authority upon that individual to govern in its name. Whether the President opted to restrict his 
involvement to the resolution of institutional conflicts, or whether he decided to influence day-to-
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day government business would be entirely at his own discretion. This point was first made 
during the CCC debates by M. Sour, who noted that 'Ie President de la Repub/ique - et cela 
dependra de sa personnalite - sera un arbitre ou ne Ie sera pas, selon qu'il pesera sur la 
politique du pays,.92 For Vedel there was no doubt that 'arbitrage' meant action; without the 
ability to over-rule other sources and impact directly upon national affairs, he maintained that the 
President's arbitrational function would be devoid of meaning. Philippe Ardant also accepts that 
'arbitrage' offers the President the possibility to participate in direct political decision-making, but 
he argues that the wording of article 5 of the Constitution 'retire (du President) toute initiative en 
absence de conflit,.93 Therefore, Ardant contends that far from being 'I'arbitre regulateur de toute 
activite po/itique', the President is simply there to 'assurer la continuite de I'executif', which only 
requires his direct intervention if an incident threatens the stability of French institutions. As a 
result, his definition is much closer to the parliamentarian's interpretation of the presidential role 
whereby the Head of State is 'Ie juge supreme de /'interet nationaf,94 whilst it remains the 
government's task to determine policy orientations. 
1.2.3 Shared powers: President and Prime Minister 
The question of 'who rules?' is a major problematic for analysts of the Fifth Republic due to the 
lack of clarity concerning the respective roles of the President and Prime Minister in the 
Constitution. In some areas, most notably those of defence and diplomacy, the text appears to 
grant the same powers to both actors,95 whilst in others, ambiguous wording has allowed 
institutional conventions to develop which impose interpretations upon aspects of the 
constitutional text. The nature of such conventions and how and why they arose will be dealt with 
in greater detail in the next section. Our main concern here is to discuss the views of all those 
involved in drafting the Constitution in order to gain a better understanding of the concept of 
executive power which informs the text. 
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Most political analysts agree that the 1958 Constitution seems to set out some form of executive 
power-sharing arrangement between President and Prime Minister, which has been variously 
described as a dyarchy, bifurcated executive and even 'une aigle a deux tetes', to quote 
Duverger's more aggressive metaphor.96 However, as we have seen from the previous 
discussion, members of the CCC wanted the President to occupy a primarily symbolic role within 
the executive, whilst the Prime Minister determined and directed executive policy-making. 
Questions were put to Raymond Janot by members of the CCC at various points in the drafting 
process concerning the relationship between President and Prime Minister, and each time Janot 
affirmed that 'Ie chef du pouvoir executif c'est bien Ie premier ministre,.97 Prime ministerial 
dominance even appeared to extend to those areas where there was a definite overlapping of 
constitutional prerogatives, such as defence policy. In a meeting of the Council of State's 
Constitutional Committee in August 1958, Rene Cassin asserted that, although the President was 
the nominal head of the armed forces (as detailed in article 15), real control over defence lay with 
the government, headed by the Prime Minister (article 21).98 These statements set up 
expectations that the President's role would be primarily that of a national figurehead, who was 
required to oversee, but not actively participate in, the determination of government policy. 
In his study of the 1958 constitutional debates, Leo Hamon presents evidence to counter this 
assumption. He argues that de Gaulle continued to favour the strongly, authoritarian presidency 
he had advocated at 8ayeux and Epinal, even if he avoided explicitly acknowledging this before 
the parliamentarians of the CCC. On re-examining the transcripts of discussions between de 
Gaulle and members of the CCC, Hamon discovered that de Gaulle had preferred the original 
wording of articles 20 and 21, which stated that 'assiste du gouvernement, Ie President de la 
Republique detinit I'orientation politique interieure et exterieure du pays et en assure la 
continuite,.99 Not only does this version attribute ultimate responsibility for the elaboration of 
national and international policy objectives to the Head of State, it allows him to decide the extent 
to which the government is involved in such decision-making. It also fails to acknowledge the 
eXistence, let alone the superiority, of the Prime Minister within the cabinet, by including him 
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under the general term 'gouvernement'. It is hardly surprising then that the CCC opted to reject 
de Gaulle's favoured version. Yet such attention to grammatical detail had little bearing on the 
way in which the Constitution was interpreted in practice - it certainly did not prevent de Gaulle 
from intervening increasingly in government affairs, particularly after the 1962 constitutional 
amendment, whose impact upon the evolution of presidential power under the Fifth Republic 
cannot be over-estimated. 
1.2.4 Political and public reactions to the 1958 Constitution 
Following de Gaulle's official presentation of the constitutional text before the electorate on 4 
September 1958, political parties were obliged to define their own positions in time for the 
referendum, which was due to take place some two weeks later. Of the 23 political formations 
entitled to actively campaign on the radio or on advertising billboards, 17 came out in favour of a 
'yes' vote in the referendum; this figure included all the main political parties, with the exception of 
the Communists. 10o Such strong support for the Constitution is, at first sight, quite deceptive, 
since it conceals the divisions and splits which occurred within certain movements as a result of 
the official party line taken. It also glosses over the complete turnabout in Socialist and Radical 
party attitudes, from determined opposition to de Gaulle's return to power in May 1958 to majority 
backing for the proposed Constitution in September - a point to which we shall shortly return. In 
addition, it should be acknowledged that the decision by some parties to back de Gaulle's project 
was influenced by a desire to court public opinion which, according to polls conducted before the 
ballot, was strongly pro de Gaulle. 101 But perhaps the most important factor in uniting pOlitical 
forces behind the Constitution was the absence of viable alternatives; with the government clearly 
unable to cope with the Algerian crisis, de Gaulle seemed to be 'Ie seul arbitre possible' in an 
ever-worsening situation. 102 
Once de Gaulle had been granted exceptional powers and the process of drafting a new 
Constitution got underway, hostility on the Left and centre-Left lessened. Guy Mollet, General 
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Secretary of the SFIO, and Pierre Pflimlin of the MRP, were amongst those invited to help draw 
up the Constitution, a role which allowed them to actively oppose aspects of the text with which 
they disagreed. This helped to calm fears on the Left that de Gaulle was trying to impose a 
dictatorship. The MRP soon joined with the Gaullists, Social Republicans and other smaller 
factions of radicalism in declaring its support for the Constitution. Mollet's participation in the 
constitutional debates also succeeded in winning over the Socialists - with 69.3% approving a 
'yes' vote at the party's fifth National Congress in September 1958. 103 However, the decision to 
back de Gaulle's Constitution was not without consequence, since it brought about a split within 
the party and some prominent members broke away to form the Parti socialiste autonome. The 
Radicals suffered a similar split, the only difference being that it was the leaders of the party who 
declared themselves 'unaniment hostiles aux declarations du general de Gaul/e,.104 Thus, when 
56.8% of Radical party members voted in favour of the constitutional text in the hope that it would 
improve the chances for a more liberal policy in Algeria,105 the leadership resigned. The party 
went on to elect a new President, Felix Gaillard, whilst its former leader, Pierre Mendes-France, 
joined with forty other left-wing opponents of the new regime, amongst them Daniel Mayer (SFIO) 
and Fran<;:ois Mitterrand (UDSR) to form a cartel, on 7 July 1958, which was duly named '!'union 
des forces democratiques,.106 
Both of these breakaway movements became active forces within the so- called 'cartel des non', 
which comprised a broad spectrum of political groupings from the ultra conservative Poujadists to 
members of La Ligue des droits de !'homme. These smaller factions were overshadowed by the 
Communist party, which was the largest force opposing de Gaulle's Constitution. The PCF had 
vehemently attacked de Gaulle as 'Ie chef des ultras', 107 following his refusal to condemn the 
actions of the putschistes in Algeria. At the end of May, the PCF joined with the CGT to organise 
mass demonstrations in France's major cities in the name of 'Ia defense republicaine'. Despite 
the presence of the Communist party amongst its ranks, however, the 'cartel des non' still lacked 
a coherent strategy of opposition, as well as 'money, resources, newspapers and activists',108 and 
as a result, it failed to make much of an impression upon public opinion. Polls carried out after 
41 
the ballot reveal a great deal about the principal motivations of the 79.25% of the electorate which 
approved the Constitution in the September referendum. Far from reflecting a general belief in 
the principles behind the constitutional text, those who voted 'yes' had been primarily influenced 
by other factors, most importantly faith in the person of de Gaulle and fear of civil war in 
Algeria. 1oe 
1.3 The introduction of universal suffrage 
One of the greatest paradoxes characterising the nature of presidential power under the French 
Fifth Republic derives from the 1962 amendment, which introduced the direct election of the 
President by universal suffrage. For although this constitutional change did not involve any 'real' 
increase in the formal powers accorded to the President, its symbolic value transformed the 
presidency into the most powerful position in the French polity. Any President chosen by the 
people would be forced to transcend party pOlitical divides to appeal to the nation as a whole. As 
Duverger notes, 'situe aux carrefour de plusieurs systernes de valeurs, qu'i/ curnule sur sa 
personne rnalgre leur contradictions, Ie president investi par Ie peuple Mneticie de to us, parce 
qu'il incame de fagon incontestable Ie principal entre eux,.110 This notion of the President as the 
'elu de la nation' was strengthened by the need to proceed to a second ballot, if no candidate 
emerged with an absolute majority of votes in the first round of voting. 
Although it is not clear exactly when de Gaulle first became convinced of the need to establish a 
system whereby the President of the Republic would be elected by universal suffrage,111 he was 
certainly conscious of the potential opposition to such a project, even amongst his closest 
advisors and most ardent supporters. No attempt was made to tackle this issue when the 
Constitution was being drawn up in 1958; de Gaulle had learned from his Bayeux speech that the 
mere allusion to universal suffrage could lead to accusations from left-wing movements that he 
was harbouring dictatorial ambitions. Instead, de Gaulle approved Debre's proposal for a 
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President designated by an electoral college, made up of some 80,000 deputies, senators and 
local authority representatives. 112 In April 1961 , however, encouraged by an upturn in the political 
climate as the Algerian conflict moved closer to resolution, de Gaulle publicly broached the 
subject of universal suffrage, by expressing his concern that the current method of presidential 
election would prove inadequate for his successor.113 An attempt on his life in August 1962 
provided de Gaulle with precisely the opportunity he needed to argue that the direct election of 
the President by the people would be required to ensure institutional continuity. As the nation's 
saviour in 1940, de Gaulle maintained that he had gained a special historical legitimacy which 
justified his appointment as President of the Republic in 1958. This was, however, an exclusive 
type of legitimacy which he would be forced to take to the grave, and the remaining void could 
only be filled by a President elected by popular suffrage, described by Julliard as 'Ie seul substitut 
imaginable, Ie seul equivalent de la legitimite historique,.114 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that de Gaulle's 1962 amendment was not simply 
motivated by the will to institutionalise the concept of a President above party divides, but also by 
the desire to secure his own future legitimacy as President of the Republic. In a letter to John 
Rohr, Franc;ois Luchaire drew upon his own experience working alongside de Gaulle during the 
drafting process to contend that the General did not believe his power came from an extended 
electoral college, but that it was based upon the combination of his historical legitimacy and the 
result of the referendum which approved the 1958 Constitution.115 Indeed, de Gaulle's 
declaration to the French, on 18 October 1962, did appear to turn the referendum into a vote of 
confidence in his leadership, as he threatened to resign if the amendment was rejected. As 
Malibeau explains, 'il suffit qu'au meme moment une personnalite domine la scene politique pour 
que I'electeur plebiscite la personne du leader et se prononce beaucoup plus sur elle que sur Ie 
probleme politique qui lui est pose.,116 When only 62% of the electorate approved the change, de 
Gaulle was reportedly so disappointed that he contemplated resigning - such was his belief in 
popular sovereignty as a gauge of his legitimacy.117 
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Only too aware of the impact which de Gaulle's project would have upon the already ambiguous 
balance of power under the new Republic, Parliament overwhelmingly opposed the idea. There 
was considerable anger in the National Assembly towards what was generally interpreted as a 
transparent attempt by de Gaulle to use the threat of assassination as a means of justifying the 
elimination of 'Ie dernier verrou qui protegeait la sQuverainete parlementaire' .118 Some critics 
claimed that the project would see the Republic replaced by a kind of 'enlightened 
Bonapartism',119 whilst other former advocates of constitutional reform, such as Paul Coste-
Floret, rejected the amendment in favour of an US-style presidency. Pierre Mendes-France also 
saw the introduction of universal suffrage as unnecessary, claiming that 'the French have no 
natural inclination to place unlimited power in the hands of a single individual' .120 Even amongst 
those who agreed with the principle of popular election there were seeds of doubt as to the effect 
which such a change would have upon the regime. Vedel, for example, was in favour of universal 
suffrage, but he felt it would increase presidential power to such an extent that de Gaulle should 
renounce his right to dissolve the National Assembly in order to re-establish the balance of power 
between President, Government and Parliament. 121 
Parliamentary animosity was heightened by de Gaulle's deliberate miSinterpretation of the 
constitutional text, which ensured that the amendment could not be rejected by a hostile 
Parliament. Instead of article 89, which requires any proposed amendment to the Constitution to 
be voted by both Chambers, de Gaulle chose to hold a popular referendum on universal suffrage 
according to article 11, which was inappropriate in this instance.122 He justified the use of article 
11 by means of article 3 and 'Ie peuple SQuverain, ' even going so far as to accuse the parties of 
attempting to rob the electorate of their right to decide the nation's fate. 123 Since de Gaulle 
himself was shielded by article 68 of the Constitution, it was the government which felt the full 
force of parliamentary wrath when, on 4 October, a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister 
Pompidou's government was passed. De Gaulle's willingness to violate the letter of the 
Constitution which he had championed, and the inability of Parliament to directly sanction such 
preSidential abuse set a precedent for other unconstitutional practices,124 ably proving Ardant's 
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point that 'Ie gardien du texte en est necessairement l'interprete,.125 These conventions, which 
had a considerable and lasting impact upon the balance of power between President and 
Premier, were the subject of some debate in the French press and will be discussed in more 
detail at the end of this section. 
ObseNers like Andre Hauriou, regarded the 1962 amendment as the ultimate realisation of the 
presidentialist regime set out by de Gaulle in his Bayeux address. According to this 
interpretation, the official 1958 text represented a sufficiently vague temporary compromise which 
was agreeable to de Gaulle and the parliamentarians of the CCC. 126 Indeed, there is a strong 
case to argue that had de Gaulle not been willing to reassure the CCC that the President would 
not be able to dominate executive decision-making, it would have increased suspicions that he 
intended to manipulate the Constitution in order to establish a dictatorship and the whole drafting 
process may have been jeopardised. What Hauriou is suggesting, therefore, is that de Gaulle 
was consciously appeasing the cec in 1958, knowing that once the Constitution had been 
adopted, he would be able to finesse it to fulfil his institutional objectives. It is certainly true that 
after de Gaulle's 1946 Epinal address, Blum had predicted that what the General meant by 
executive power was a President elected by universal suffrage. De Gaulle's contempt for the 
party system was consistent, as was his insistence upon the need for a President who could 
remain above the party fray. In theory, universal suffrage offered a means of ensuring the 
election of a President who would be both impartial and independent and, providing he had the 
right qualities, would become a true 'homme d'Etat,.127 
Other commentators such as Nicholas Wahl dispute claims that de Gaulle was being duplicitous 
when he dismissed the possibility of a popularly elected President during the constitutional 
debates of 1958. He maintains that until 1962 de Gaulle had always been highly sceptical as to 
the possible merits and suitability of such a system within a French context.128 Vedel and Goguel 
also reject the idea that the 1962 amendment was the fulfilment of a long-term political strategy 
which de Gaulle had pursued since 1946, but for a different reason - they look upon it as a logical 
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progression, given the way in which the regime had been evolving during its first four years of 
existence. 129 Both these arguments are undermined by de Gaulle's own admission, in the 
second volume of his memoirs, that he had always had universal suffrage in mind when he first 
began to draw up his institutional vision, but chose not to incorporate it into the 1958 Constitution 
for fear of damaging the popular consensus which had crystallised around his leadership at the 
time: 'if est vrai que, parlant a 8ayeux en 1946 [ ... J puis en dirigeant en 1958 les travaux et les 
debats ou s'elaborait la Constitution, je n'avais pas encore specifie que Ie chef de fEtat devrait 
etre elu au suffrage universel. C'est qu'en effet je jugeais preferable de ne pas tout faire a la fois 
[ ... J, je jugeais bon de tenir compte des preventions passionnees que, depuis Louis Napoleon, 
!'idee de plebiscite soulevait dans maintes secteurs de fopinion,.130 
1.3.1 Conventions 
'II y a bien une gestion des Constitutions, distincte de leur elaboration, et qui revele des virtua/ites 
insoupgonnees de leurs auteurs memes et qui en font une rea/ite vivante,.131 
Rene Remond . 
Political conventions constitute another crucial element in the development of modern French 
presidentialism, although it should perhaps be added that these are by no means unique to de 
Gaulle's Fifth Republic. 132 The notion of a convention or custom may be used to describe any 
exercise of political power, which has come to be accepted as the 'norm', even though it does not 
clearly conform to constitutional guidelines. Conventions may be quickly established, one single 
instance is often enough to set a precedent for the repeated exercise of the same prerogative. 
Likewise, conventions themselves may, in certain circumstances, be replaced either by new 
conventions or by a return to the original interpretation of the constitutional text. The example 
touched upon in our earlier discussion concerned de Gaulle's misuse of article 11 to hold a 
referendum in 1962 on the introduction of universal suffrage. 133 There are, however, other 
instances when de Gaulle's interpretation of his powers was not supported convincingly by 
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constitutional guidelines,134 the most important of which concern the division of responsibilities 
between President and Prime Minister. As we will see, de Gaulle's determination to impose his 
own presidential reading of the Constitution upon the regime transformed the Prime Minister into 
little more than an executor of presidential orders or, as Georgel puts it, 'un executant qui paie les 
pots caSSeS'.135 
The supreme authority of the Head of State over foreign affairs and defence policy is not only the 
most widely recognised of all presidential prerogatives, it also represents the area of greatest 
political continuity under the Fifth Republic. The notion of the 'domaines reserves', as these fields 
of policy-making have come to be known, dates back to the first Gaullist party conference in 
1959. In a speech to party delegates, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, then President of the National 
Assembly, declared that all political activity could be divided into two separate categories. The 
first, which he referred to as the presidential 'domaine reserve', covered Algeria, the Community, 
foreign affairs and defence. The second, much broader category encompassed all other fields of 
political decision-making. Chaban-Delmas summarised the level of government initiative in each 
area as follows: 'dans Ie secteur numero 1, Ie gouvernement execute, dans I'autre if congoit,.136 
The constitutional reality of presidential power in the fields of foreign affairs and defence is, 
however, rather less clear-cut than Chaban-Delmas' statement implies. Although article 15 does 
assert that 'Ie president de la Republique est Ie chef des armees ... if preside les conseifs et les 
comites superieurs de la Defense nationale', it appears to be contradicted by articles 20 and 21, 
which state respectively that 'Ie gouvernement dispose de la force armee' and 'Ie Premier 
ministre est responsable de la Defense nationale'. The same apparent division of powers 
between President and Prime Minister applies to diplomacy; the President controls the 
negotiation and ratification of international treaties (article 52), whilst the Prime Minister heads the 
government which 'determine et conduit la politique de la nation' (article 20). In reality, de Gaulle 
soon established a convention whereby in matters of national security or international relations, 
his authority was undisputed. This is consistent with the view expressed by de Gaulle in his 1932 
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publication, Le Fit de I'Epee, in which he argued that military questions were far too important to 
be decided by politicians, whose judgement would be determined by political affiliations.137 The 
symbolic value of the 1962 amendment bestowed a unique political legitimacy upon the President 
of the Republic which, Duverger rightly asserts, transformed the nature of the regime set out in 
the 1958 Constitution.138 As the only member of the executive to be directly chosen by the 
electorate, de Gaulle was able to justify his control of foreign and defence policy on the grounds 
that these were areas requiring the kind of continuity and vision that only he had the mandate to 
provide. It also allowed him to extend his interventions to include domestic policy-making. 
Returning to the fundamental question of the appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister 
raised in the previous section, it may be argued that the introduction of universal suffrage also 
provided de Gaulle with a means of defending his ability to dismiss the Prime Minister despite 
constitutional language to the contrary, as his legitimacy now equalled that of Parliament. As 
Prime Minister between 1958 and 1962, Debre maintained that he had enjoyed a 'free hand' in all 
matters of internal affairs, holding regular meetings of the Cabinet Council from which the 
President was absent, to discuss government policy objectives. 139 Following. Debre's 
resignation,140 however, de Gaulle's grip upon the government tightened, Cabinet Council 
meetings were abandoned and the Prime Minister became increasingly subordinate to the will of 
the President. The starkest confirmation of this increase in the level of preSidential control over 
the executive came during a press conference held by de Gaulle in 1964. 
1.4 The 1964 press conference 
In retrospect, it is easy to regard members of the CCC, who believed that the 1958 Constitution 
alone would determine the scope of presidential power under the Fifth Republic, as politically 
naive. If we cast our minds back to the repeated assurances given by de Gaulle and his advisors 
during the drafting process, however, we may begin to understand why many parliamentarians 
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failed to appreciate fully the Constitution's potential for manipulation. Setting out his conception 
of the respective roles of Head of State and government at a press conference in January 1964, 
de Gaulle painted a radically different picture of the French polity to that anticipated by the 1958 
constitutional committee. His comments put paid to any notion of an executive dyarchy since the 
President, or 'I'homme de la nation', as de Gaulle modestly put it, had become the centre of 
political power following the 1962 constitutional reform - 'I'esprit de la Constitution nouvelle 
consiste, tout en gardant un Parlement legislatit, a faire en sorte que Ie pouvoir ne soit plus la 
chose des partisans, mais qu'i/ procede directement du peuple, ce qui imp/ique que Ie chef de 
I'Etat, elu par la nation, en soit la source et Ie deteneur'. The Prime Minister was depicted as a 
quasi-chief of staff, who owed his position to the President and, therefore, could not resist a 
presidential request for his resignation - 'soit parce que se trouve achevee la tache qu'i/ lui 
destinait [ .. J, soit parce qu'i/ ne I'approuverait plus,.141 De Gaulle also went on to state that it was 
the President's role to appoint members of the government, disregarding the official wording of 
article 8 of the Constitution, which clearly attributes this formal responsibility to the Premier. 
In his press conference, de Gaulle justified his interpretation of the Constitution, whereby 'Ie 
President est seul a detenir et a deleguer I'autorite de I'Etat', by stating that the theory behind the 
text would necessarily differ from its practical implementation due to the personal style and 
political agenda of the President himself - 'il est vrai que, concurremment avec I'esprit et avec Ie 
texte, il y a eu la pratique. Celle-ci a naturellement tenu pour une part aux hommes. Pour ce qui 
est du chef de I'Etat, i/ est bien evident que son equation personnelle a compte et je doute que, 
des I'origine, on ne s'y attendTt pas'. The last part of this statement is especially significant 
because it appears to confirm the point made earlier on in our discussion that de Gaulle had 
never intended to remain faithful to a parliamentary reading of the Constitution, despite his 
assurances to the CCC in 1958. His rejection of the possibility that anyone could have been 
surprised by the way in which the regime had worked in practice may be interpreted as an indirect 
admission that he had always known he would be able to manipulate the text to extend the 
powers of the President so that he became the undisputed head of the French executive. 
49 
Pre-empting demands for the introduction of a US system of checks and balances that would 
prevent such an over-concentration of power in the hands of one individual, de Gaulle was careful 
to point out that such a system was incompatible with the nature of French politics. 142 Critics, 
however, found these explanations unsatisfactory; some felt that they had just witnessed the 
definition of an entirely different Constitution to that which had been democratically adopted six 
years previously. As Lacouture notes, 'on ne peut pas avoir entendu ce chef de !'Etat [ ... ] sans 
avoir ressenti fa comme une immense restauration de siecfes de pouvoir monarchique' .143 
One of the first parliamentarians to openly denounce de Gaulle's remarks was Franyois 
Mitterrand, a well-respected politician and member of the UDSR movement. In a vehement 
attack, which appeared the following day in the pages of Le Monde, Mitterrand accused de Gaulle 
of extreme complacency in his adherence to 1958 constitutional guidelines. Furthermore, he 
maintained that the press conference was nothing short of 'une apofogie du pouvoir personnef 
and likened de Gaulle's concept of presidential power to a modern day manifestation of 
Bonapartism. 144 Mitterrand's contempt for the style of regime which was emerging under de 
Gaulle's presidency prompted him to publish a scathing assault upon de Gaulle 'and his 
'exploitation' of French institutions, entitled Le Coup d'Etat permanent. In this book, Mitterrand 
sought to expose what he saw as de Gaulle's seduction of the French nation by means of 
patriotic rhetoric and the glorification of his role in the Second World War. Mitterrand argued that 
parliamentary prerogatives had been sufficiently reduced under the Fifth Republic so as to render 
the President 'politically infallible', and able to impose his will upon all aspects of French political 
Iife.145 This criticism included de Gaulle's control over government affairs and, more specifically, 
his dismissal of Premier Debre who was proving too independent. It also extended to de Gaulle's 
refusal to consult or inform ministers of important decisions which he had taken, before 
announcing them publicly.146 Quite simply, Mitterrand considered such a highly personalised 
regime as a threat to civil liberties, as the French no longer identified de Gaulle with France, but 
had begun to associate France with de Gaulle.147 
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De Gaulle's press conference in January 1964 received an equally hostile reception from the left-
wing press. Both Liberation and Le Populaire attacked his concept of presidential power for 
being 'aucunement democratique,.148 Even supporters of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, like Maurice 
Duverger, had not fully anticipated de Gaulle's interpretation of the presidential role. 149 One 
could, of course, argue that de Gaulle's forceful personality, as well as his earlier public remarks 
that 'Ia nature des choses est plus forte que les textes constitutionnels', all strongly suggested 
that his participation in French political life would not be strictly limited to the arbitrational role set 
out in the 1958 Constitution.150 For politicians like Fran90is Mitterrand, who had challenged 
highlighted the problematic ambiguity of the Fifth Republic's Constitution from the moment it was 
presented to Parliament, de Gaulle's comments merely confirmed their worst fears - that the 
unofficial, 'verbal' Constitution of 1964, depicting a politically powerful President and a submissive 
Prime Minister, would henceforth become the accepted model for the relationship to power of 
successive Presidents under the Fifth Republic. 
1.5 Concluding remarks 
Our discussion has shown how de Gaulle's power as the President of the Fifth Republic was 
originally based upon his so-called 'preSidential' interpretation of constitutional guidelines and the 
unique personal authority conferred upon him by both the French people and political parties in 
the 1958 referendum. Having witnessed the negative political reactions to his calls for a strong 
presidency at Bayeux and Epinal, de Gaulle had to ensure that his 1958 Constitution sufficiently 
enhanced the powers of the President, but without arousing parliamentary concern that this might 
threaten the supreme sovereignty of the National Assembly. Our examination of those key 
presidential prerogatives debated by the CCC showed how de Gaulle and his ministers 
succeeded in convincing sceptical parliamentarians that this strengthening of presidential power 
would in no way allow the Head of State to dominate executive decision-making. This resulted in 
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a constitutional text which managed to place a form of presidential politics into a long-standing 
parliamentary system, in which the offices of Prime Minister and government remained 
constitutionally responsible to Parliament. Thanks to the inherent interpretability of Constitution, 
however, de Gaulle had at his disposal the basic foundations on which to build his presidential 
power, whilst the dramatic political situation created by the Algerian crisis offered him the means 
of justifying his reading of the text. And with the political backing of the Gaullist party to support 
his actions, de Gaulle's long-standing vision for a strong, authoritative presidency finally became 
an institutional reality despite left-wing expectations to the contrary. 
The 1962 amendment lent the presidency a new symbolic dimension which not only transcended 
constitutional guidelines, but also extended beyond de Gaulle's persona ensuring that 
presidential pre-eminence became a permanent feature of the Fifth Republic. The President's 
symbolic authority was undoubtedly enhanced by the way in which de Gaulle presented himself 
to the French as an exceptional individual whose unique visionary qualities justified his 
supremacy within the regime. His depiction of the presidential role was an important factor in 
shaping the nature of presidential power within the regime as it brought to the centre of the 
political system a view of leadership which was highly personalised and quasi-mythical. As we 
will see the following chapter, it was a model to which contenders for the presidency were obliged 
to conform in order to compete effectively for power in the new presidential regime. 
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Chapter 2 
OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND (1958-1969) 
If de Gaulle's return to power in June 1958 and the inauguration of the Fifth Republic's 
institutions received the support of the majority of deputes in the National Assembly, a minority 
of politicians refused to rally to de Gaulle and his new regime. Amongst the more prominent 
members of this opposition group was Fran<;:ois Mitterrand, leader of the small and somewhat 
heterogeneous UDSR movement and former minister under the Fourth Republic. 1 From 1958 
onwards, Mitterrand quickly emerged as one of de Gaulle's most vociferous critics. A closer 
examination of his relationship to de Gaulle's institutions, however, reveals a more complex 
picture, with Mitterrand being forced to continually reassess and modify the nature of his 
opposition to the regime between 1958 and 1968. At the outset, Mitterrand's criticisms were 
highly personalised, centring mainly upon what he viewed as the illegality of de Gaulle's 
accession to power during the Algerian crisis, and the dictatorship which he aimed to impose 
upon the French by means of a highly ambiguous Constitution. Following the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 1962, however, Mitterrand was forced to accept the permanence of the 
regime. As a result, the focus of his opposition changed and he began to combat the new 
presidential system from within, by actively involving himself in the Fifth Republic's public and 
parliamentary debates, as well as national consultations. This revised stance brought with it 
problems of clarity and coherence; for although Mitterrand continued to denounce the 
Constitution's presidential bias, he was obliged to embrace some of the highly-personalised 
practices to which it gave rise, in order to compete effectively for the power to change the 
regime. These tensions and ambiguities, which characterised Mitterrand's strategy of 'opposition 
through participation', were brought to the fore during his 1965 presidential campaign and again 
in May 1968, when the climate of social unrest and political chaos provided Mitterrand with an 
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opportunity to offer France an alternative to Gaullist rule. Despite being unsuccessful in both 
instances, Mitterrand nonetheless gained a valuable insight into the nature and dynamics of 
presidential politics. 
This chapter will trace the evolution of Mitterrand's relationship to the Fifth Republic during its 
first decade in existence. Focusing principally upon his speeches, interviews and writings from 
this period, we will also examine political and public reactions to Mitterrand's opposition and the 
way in which these may, in turn, have influenced his views or actions. In this way, we may 
understand how Mitterrand, whose initial reaction to the Fifth Republic's inauguration had been 
one of condemnation and rejection, gradually began to adapt to the regime, and eventually 
emerged as an ardent defender of the presidential Constitution he had formerly opposed. 
2.1 1958: Mitterrand and republican resistance 
'Lorsque, Ie 10 septembre 1944, Ie general de Gaulle s'est presente devant I'Assemblee 
consultative issue des combats de I'exterieur ou de la Resistance, if avait aupres de lui deux 
compagnons qui s'appelaient I'honneur et la patrie. Ses compagnons d'aujourd'hui [ ... J se 
nomment Ie coup de force et la sedition'. 
Franyois Mitterrand, 1 June 1958, address before the National Assembll 
These strong words, spoken by Franyois Mitterrand in the National Assembly on the day of de 
Gaulle's official investiture, clearly convey his sense of outrage concerning the circumstances 
surrounding de Gaulle's return to power. Unlike 1944, when de Gaulle's heroic leadership of the 
Resistance movement had earned him the right to head the provisional government, Mitterrand 
believed that de Gaulle had used the threat of military insurrection in 1958 as a means of holding 
the nation's representatives to ransom, so that they were faced with an ultimatum: '/'inteNention 
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des parachutistes ou Ie soutien a de Gaulle,.3 It is for this reason that Mitterrand claims he told 
de Gaulle that he could not support his bid to assume the powers of the Republic, unless he 
publicly condemned the comites de sa/ut public and the military insubordination taking place in 
Algeria. 4 When de Gaulle replied that his primary concern was to draft a new Constitution, 
Mitterrand felt his fears had been confirmed: de Gaulle was less concerned with ending the 
Algerian conflict than he was about establishing a regime based on the 'to ute-puissance d'un 
homme,.5 This began Mitterrand's battle to defend the Republic against the General's 'coup de 
force' and the threat of a right-wing dictatorship.6 
Mitterrand has repeatedly affirmed that if he voted against de Gaulle's new Constitution in 
September 1958, it was 'davantage contre Ie contexte que contre Ie texte, cependant 
discutable,.7 In this respect, we would argue that Mitterrand's initial opposition to de Gaulle was 
primarily personal and focused upon de Gaulle, the individual, and his motives for regaining 
power. The General's 'exploitation' of his former role as leader of Free France as a means of 
justifying his return in 1958 incensed Mitterrand, who saw it as a cynical and opportunistic 
attempt to seize power by oversimplifying the Resistance legacy in order to claim it for himself.8 
Of course, some might contend that Mitterrand's opposition was a calculated move to further his 
own political career. However, this seems unlikely given that both popular and political opinion 
at the time favoured de Gaulle's return. It seems more probable that Mitterrand's hostility was 
motivated by a genuine desire to protest against a move which he felt constituted an assault 
upon France's republican institutions.9 On the day of de Gaulle's official inauguration, Mitterrand 
had been one of only 22 deputes willing to sign a petition calling for the rejection of de Gaulle's 
premiership in the name of 'Ia resistance republicaine'. But, as Mitterrand himself ironically 
recalled, even this number had to be revised when it was noticed that one of the pledged 
signatures was missing, only to appear the following day amongst the list of individuals 
appointed by de Gaulle to form the new government. 10 
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Perhaps the only benefit to be reaped from this early decision to oppose de Gaulle was that it 
differentiated Mitterrand from representatives of the Fourth Republic, who had sanctioned the 
General's return, thus enabling him to break with the past and forge a new political identity. As a 
newly elected member of the Senate, Mitterrand did not hesitate in criticising former colleagues 
who had facilitated de Gaulle's return to the political centre stage in 1958. Although he may 
have appeared to many as a symbol of the Fourth Republic's Assembly regime, Mitterrand's 
criticism of those who approved de Gaulle's investiture should not be misinterpreted as an 
indirect defence of France's former institutions. In 1946 Mitterrand had not voted for the 
proposed Constitution and, like Mendes-France, he had consistently called for a reform of the 
Fourth Republic's institutional framework throughout the regime's relatively short life. Whilst the 
Algerian ultras were responsible for publicly launching the idea of de Gaulle's return, Mitterrand 
believed that the realisation of such demands was only made possible by what he scornfully 
referred to as 'I'effondrement d'un gouvernement et d'une assemblee qui, apres une debauche 
d'exercices oratoires dans Ie style Mroi'que, se sont mis a genoux devant Ie sauveur supreme'. 11 
A number of factors made it initially difficult for Mitterrand to oppose de Gaulle from a 
constitutional perspective, not least the aforementioned fact that he had been an advocate of 
constitutional reform under the Fourth Republic, and his admission that the Fifth Republic's 
Constitution was, indeed, an improvement on the previous regime. 12 According to Mitterrand, 
the Fourth Republic 'ne s'etait pas dotee d'institutions politiques a la mesure de ses 
obligations'; 13 it suffered from excess bureaucracy and a lack of party discipline which resulted in 
'I'etouffement de la democratie,.14 It was this institutional instability, epitomised by the inability of 
successive governments to deal with the worsening situation in Algeria, which Mitterrand 
maintained attracted the electorate to the prospect of a new regime headed by an authoritarian 
figure like de Gaulle. 15 
But if Mitterrand was able to highlight the dubious circumstances surrounding de Gaulle's return 
to power, he could not claim that the General had imposed the new regime upon the French 
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because the Constitution had been democratically approved by the electorate in the September 
referendum. Neither could he simply denounce the text as the representation of one man's 
vision, since it was the product of three months of careful deliberations between de Gaulle, his 
advisors, jurists and representatives from various Fourth Republican parties. Above all, it was 
the involvement of leading parliamentarians, such as Guy Mollet and Pierre Pflimlin, and the 
concessions they achieved during the drafting process, which served to reassure the French that 
de Gaulle could not establish a dictatorship. The adoption of an ambiguous Constitution did not, 
therefore, provide a very sound basis for an attack upon the Fifth Republic's institutions in 1958, 
since only the future would tell what impact the practical implementation of constitutional 
prerogatives would have upon the balance of power under the new regime. Consequently, 
Mitterrand was obliged either to oppose the Constitution on the grounds that de Gaulle had come 
to power under false pretences with the help of right-wing movements and the army, or risk 
vOicing unsubstantiated claims that what appeared to set out the framework for a parliamentary 
regime would, in fact, evolve into one of personalised power as a result of ill-defined 
constitutional guidelines. This may partly explain why Mitterrand's more detailed comments on 
the adoption of the Constitution are largely confined to retrospective writings and speeches. It 
might also be argued that commenting upon events with the benefit of hindsight allowed 
Mitterrand to credit himself with a greater political clairvoyance than was actually the case at the 
time. i6 
2.2 Constitutional opposition and the reversion principle 
As the Fifth Republic got underway, Mitterrand was able to turn his attention the exercise of 
presidential power in order to attack de Gaulle's violations of constitutional guidelines and to 
expose the threat which such abuses posed to civil liberties. It may seem paradoxical that 
Mitterrand, who voted against the new Constitution when it was presented to the electorate in 
1958, should soon seek to defend its principles. This may be explained by Mitterrand's repeated 
assertions that, in theory, the Constitution should have established a balanced parliamentary 
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system,17 but that de Gaulle's interpretation of his powers had resulted in a presidentialist regime 
which naturally 'penche du cote du pouvoir personnel',18 According to Mitterrand, de Gaulle had 
not achieved the Constitution he would ideally have liked; 19 the text itself constituted a 
compromise that he had been obliged to accept in order to appease his opponents,20 Practical 
experience, however, soon proved that de Gaulle had succeeded in keeping the text sufficiently 
ambiguous so as to allow him to manipulate it to his advantage,21 As early as 1959, Mitterrand 
denounced the evolution of a regime in which the electorate was being encouraged to identify 
one policy, one party and one person with France's best interests as both undemocratic and a 
threat to national unity,22 He dismissed as nonsense de Gaulle's claims that he had favoured the 
election of a balanced Parliament in November 1958, as opposed to the overwhelming right-wing 
majority, on the grounds that 'Ie pMnomene de Gaulle n'a de sens que s'i! est accompagne du 
pMnomene parti majoritaire tendant au parti unique',23 In other words, Mitterrand believed that 
the power de Gaulle enjoyed as President of the Republic was not only dependent upon his own 
popular mandate, but also upon the Gaullist parliamentary majority, It is important to note that 
by concentrating his criticisms on de Gaulle's application of the Constitution, Mitterrand was able 
to avoid directly defining his own institutional philosophy which, as we will see, allowed him a 
considerable margin of manoeuvre during his 1965 electoral campaign,24 
Although his four-year membership of the Senate provided fewer opportunities for Mitterrand to 
criticise de Gaulle's exercise of power,25 his speech before the eleventh UDSR Congress in 
January 1959, clearly showed that he remained totally opposed to de Gaulle's 'regime 
autoritaire', Speaking on behalf of all republican!;>, Mitterrand fearfully predicted that the Fifth 
Republic would move gradually towards either 'Ia forme plebiscitaire de la primaute d'un homme' 
or 'Ies formes d'oppression et de totalitarisme d'une administration, d'une police et d'une armee 
qui ne voudront plus rendre de comptes au peuple',26 Ultimately, Mitterrand argued, the 
electorate would cease to identify with such an oppressive, right-wing regime and this would lead 
to the resurgence of Communism as a powerful political force,27 In an article published in 
L'Express two years later, however, Mitterrand acknowledged that de Gaulle could not be held 
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entirely responsible for the way in which the regime was developing. Even the prospect of a 
constitutionally respectful President, he claimed, would not change the fact that the 1958 
Constitution was fundamentally flawed. In his view, any Head of State elected under the Fifth 
Republic would find it difficult to resist the temptation to 's'accrocher au pouvoir'.28 This 
statement seems to undermine Mitterrand's previous claims that had it not been for de Gaulle's 
authoritarian style of leadership, the Constitution would have been applied correctly to produce a 
parliamentary regime. In fact, Mitterrand still maintained his earlier conviction that de Gaulle's 
personality and political agenda had facilitated the establishment of a predominantly presidential 
regime, but he now recognised that the ambivalence of the Constitution was also a contributory 
factor in this process - one which would not automatically be eradicated by de Gaulle's departure 
from the presidency. Having so far focused his opposition entirely on de Gaulle and his exercise 
of power, Mitterrand was beginning to acknowledge that were other dimensions to the question of 
presidential pre-eminence. 
It was the Algerian question in particular which provoked some of Mitterrand's most notable 
attacks upon de Gaulle and his new regime between 1958 and 1962. In November 1961, 
Mitterrand accused de Gaulle of having cynically profited from the Algerian crisis in order to 
seize, consolidate and retain power.29 Later, in his celebrated 1964 publication, Le Coup d'Etat 
permanent, Mitterrand claimed that de Gaulle had deliberately rejected all possible means of 
bringing the conflict to a swift conclusion, 30 so as to prolong the crisis long enough to adequately 
secure his power base. 31 By alternating between a strategy of fear and reassurance throughout 
the Algerian crisis, de Gaulle had managed to secure the continued support of the electorate. 32 
Furthermore, by apparently promising all things to all parties, de Gaulle curried favour with both 
Algerie frangaise and the independence movement. 33 Mitterrand criticised de Gaulle's 
domination of decision-making during the crisis and,34 in particular, his use emergency powers 
which gave rise to the controversial 'tribunaux d'exception,.35 In addition, he deplored de 
Gaulle's preference for popular referenda to back his leadership, as opposed to the use of 
parliamentary procedures. For Mitterrand such a political system 'qui pretere les ovations 
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populaires aux votes de confiance du Parlement [ ... J, qui tient compte de la menace des foules 
plus que de la loi votee n'est pas un regime parlementaire, n'est pas la Republique,.36 
Such criticism must be placed in context. Bearing in mind that the direct election of the 
President had not yet been introduced, it is important to note that Mitterrand, like many other 
opponents of de Gaulle, subscribed to the view that once the Algerian conflict was over, there 
would no longer be sufficient justification or means for de Gaulle to remain in office. Even if he 
did remain President, it was generally assumed that de Gaulle would not be able to sustain the 
same level of executive power. This point is illustrated by Mitterrand's reference to the 8 
February 1962, when the Evian peace agreements were signed, as 'Ie point culminant de sa [de 
Gaulle] puissance', concluding '/'ultime phase de sa course,.37 This belief that the Fifth Republic, 
'despite its contingent presidential characteristics, would be restored or would converge upon the 
republican norm once the Algerian emergency had been resolved' is what Gaffney refers to as 
the reversion principle.38 However, this did not mean that Mitterrand and other critics of de 
Gaulle's regime wanted to see a return to the institutional framework of the Fourth Republic. 
Instead, they looked forward to the end of the Algerian crisis (and possibly de Gaulle's departure) 
as an opportunity to establish a true system of rationalised parliamentarianism. 
Following the electorate's approval of the 1962 constitutional amendment, however, hopes that 
de Gaulle would return to the political wilderness disappeared. Not only had he succeeded in 
guaranteeing his short term future as Presiaent of the Republic, but it seemed unlikely that de 
Gaulle's dominance of executive power would change given the electoral support accorded to 
him in the referendum. The reversion principle, though still arguable, could not, therefore, be 
envisaged until after de Gaulle's withdrawal from the political arena. 39 As Decaumont rightly 
notes, 'Ie chef de FEtat estimait, pour sa part, que son mode personnel de gouvernement utilise 
dans une situation exceptionnelle valait pour les jours ordinaires'. 40 Mitterrand was thus forced to 
accept de Gaulle's enduring presence and begin to take a more constructive approach to 
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opposition, by participating in the processes of the Fifth Republic in order to actively challenge 
de Gaulle from within his own regime. 
2.3 Opposition through participation 
De Gaulle's call for the direct election of the President as the means of ensuring the continuity of 
the Fifth Republic was denounced by Mitterrand as a 'fausse necessite which aimed not only to 
'faire durer I'aventure presente',41 but also to provide de Gaulle with 'Ie pouvoir absolu de faire ce 
qu'illui pIaTt de faire,.42 It was a move that Mitterrand regarded as blatant confirmation of the 
plebiscitary nature of the regime. 43 In an article published in L'Express, Mitterrand challenged de 
Gaulle's argument that universal suffrage was needed to guarantee the future of the Fifth 
Republic's institutions, insisting that de Gaulle already had all the 'real' powers he could ever 
require, as well as others which had no constitutional foundation. 44 Had the President's actual 
powers been insufficient, Mitterrand argued, de Gaulle would not have been able to instigate the 
introduction of universal suffrage in the first place.45 Universal suffrage, he maintained, 'ne lui 
apporterait, a lui, rien de plus,.46 
This last statement could not be further from the truth. As we noted in our opening chapter, the 
1962 amendment had a massive impact upon the status and influence of the President. As the 
only individual to be directly elected by the French to act on their behalf, de Gaulle could lay 
claim to an unrivalled legitimacy within the ,regime, which would henceforth allow him to 
dominate all aspects of executive power. The wave of opposition to which the proposed 
constitutional reform gave rise, clearly showed that many observers understood only too well the 
way in which universal suffrage would permanently alter the balance of power under the Fifth 
Republic. In this respect, Mitterrand's reason for opposing the amendment - on the grounds that 
it was superfluous and would not increase the President's powers as set out in the Constitution -
is either extremely na'lve or deliberately contrived. Given his reputation as a shrewd political 
operator, it seems inconceivable that Mitterrand should have so profoundly misunderstood the 
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significance of the 1962 amendment. We would argue, therefore, that he chose purposely to 
distort the issue in order to mount an opposition which directly contradicted de Gaulle's 
justification for the reform. Our view that Mitterrand did anticipate the potential impact of 
universal suffrage upon the abstract notion of presidential power as a whole is, in fact, borne out 
by a speech he made before the Senate on 17 July 1962. In this address, Mitterrand argued that 
if, as the proposed reform suggested, the regime was moving towards a US-style regime, then 
such an amendment should be accompanied by a renunciation of the power of dissolution. He 
warned that failure to do this would result in 'Ia suppression du regime representatif, regime 
qu'ont voulu les republicains restes fideles a la grande tradition franrtaise,.47 
As we have already stated, the outcome of the 1962 amendment obliged Mitterrand to re-
examine the nature of his opposition to the regime. Even prior to the outcome of the 
referendum, however, political movements had begun to withdraw their support for the 
constitutional practices which were emerging under de Gaulle. Mitterrand's UDSR and other 
anti-Gaullist movements were joined by the SFIO which, having previously supported de Gaulle 
and collaborated with his advisors to produce the new Constitution, wholly opposed the reform. 
But despite the added backing of the SFIO, the opposition movement still failed to persuade the 
electorate to reject de Gaulle's proposal. Mitterrand, by his own admission, was far too much of 
a political pragmatist not to have realised that such an overt public endorsement of de Gaulle's 
institutions would require him to rethink his strategy of opposition, following his re-election to the 
National Assembly in November 1962.48 
In their study of the evolution of the French Socialist Party, Bell and Criddle rightly identify 
Franyois Mitterrand as the first politician on the Left to recognise the implications of presidential 
pOlitics for the future of left-wing parties under the Fifth Republic. 49 From October 1962 
onwards Mitterrand acknowledged that the only way to combat de Gaulle effectively was through 
a strategy of opposition by participation, starting with his re-election to the National Assembly.5o 
FOllowing his return to Parliament, Mitterrand once again targeted specific aspects of the political 
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system emerging under de Gaulle. Like many of de Gaulle's critics, Mitterrand was principally 
concerned by the increasing personalisation of the regime which, he argued, was beginning to 
threaten the independence of both the media and the judicial system.51 In one parliamentary 
debate, Mitterrand's assessment of presidential power led him to embark upon a scathing 
commentary of Prime Minister Oebre's inability to prevent de Gaulle from encroaching upon his 
prime ministerial role set out in articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution. 52 By permitting the 
transfer of authority from a government responsible before Parliament to a politically 
irresponsible President, Mitterrand maintained that Oebre had effectively deprived France's 
deputes of the power to regulate governmental decision-making.53 Mitterrand also challenged 
the notion of so-called presidential 'domaines reseNes', which he denounced as an entirely 
artificial concept, but one which provided the President with another means of excluding 
members of Parliament from influencing 'Ies questions qui conditionnent I'existence meme de la 
France,.54 Above all, it was de Gaulle's dominance of defence policy that concerned Mitterrand; 
he maintained that prime ministerial responsibility for this area of policy-making had not altered 
since the 1946 Constitution.55 He rejected de Gaulle's argument that presidential pre-eminence 
in defence derived from the symbolic powers defined in article 5, since such powers were 'vides 
de tout moyen d'execution par les dispositions speciales (articles 20 and 21) qui accordent au 
Premier ministre les pouvoirs dont if aurait besoin pour accomplir sa mission,.56 By 1964, 
Mitterrand concluded that Gaullist defence policy amounted to little more than 'Ie prestige d'un 
homme et [ ... ]/a capacite de destruction de sa bombe magique,.57 
Participation in the regime not only required Mitterrand and the Left to actively oppose de Gaulle 
and his government in the National Assembly, it also involved presenting a candidate to stand 
against de Gaulle in the forthcoming presidential election in 1965.58 Having seen how the 1962 
referendum had succeeded in uniting the Left in opposition to de Gaulle,59 Mitterrand recognised 
the need to build upon this singular moment of solidarity in order to transform the Left into a 
coherent, unified force capable of mounting a challenge to de Gaulle's presidential leadership.6o 
Therefore, whilst it would be excessive to claim that Mitterrand openly began to embrace the 
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regime from 1962, he certainly foresaw the potential longevity of the Fifth Republic and was 
anticipating his future role within it. 51 This role would require Mitterrand to indirectly accept the 
political practices emerging under the regime and stand as the Left's candidate in the first direct 
presidential election under the Fifth Republic. 52 
2.4 The 1965 presidential election: 'f'annee fondatrice de fa 
Cinquieme Repub/ique' 63 
In many ways, Nicholas Wahl is correct when he asserts that 1965 was the founding year of the 
Fifth Republic, for it witnessed several important events which were unprecedented in the 
regime's short history. Firstly, it was the first time that the French electorate had a chance to 
exercise their newly acquired power to elect the French President. Secondly, it provided the Left 
will the first opportunity to effectively challenge de Gaulle's position as Head of State, since 
parliamentary elections and motions of censure only ever risked destabilising the government as 
opposed to de Gaulle himself. 1965 also marked the beginning of the Left's reconciliation to the 
regime and its adaptation to presidential politics. Finally, on a more personal level, it may be 
viewed as an inaugural year for Mitterrand who, following Gaston Defferre's withdrawal from the 
presidential race, launched himself as the Left's presidential candidate. As we will see, 
Mitterrand's rather impulsive decision to stand for election ultimately paid off. For although he 
was defeated, Mitterrand succeeded in proving that, given the opportunity, the Left were capable 
of mounting a credible challenge to Gaullism. It was this ability to unite the various movements 
of the Left, including the powerful Communist Party, behind his candidature, that ensured 
Mitterrand's future emergence as the de facto leader and candidate of the Left under the Fifth 
Republic. 
In Ma part de verite, Mitterrand denies that he had any plans to become a presidential contender 
in 1965, having been one of the few parliamentarians originally informed of Defferre's decision to 
stand as the official left-wing candidate. 54 But when Defferre's attempts to build 'une grande 
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federation' based upon a Centre-Left alliance failed, and his presidential bid subsequently 
collapsed,55 the way was left open for new contenders to come forward. Mitterrand maintains 
that he knew then that he was 'pret a prendre Ie relais car je pensais depuis longtemps que rien 
n'etait possible sans I'Union de la gauche,.55 Assured of Mendes-France's backing and having 
received confirmation from the Communists that they would not present a candidate to run 
against him,57 Mitterrand held secret meetings over the next two days with Defferre, Mayer, 
Faure and Mollet to discuss his intentions. With Edgar Faure and Daniel Mayer agreeing to 
withdraw and Defferre offering his full support, Mollet was alone in asking Mitterrand to think 
things over for a few more days.58 Characteristically, Mitterrand went ahead despite Mollet's 
reticence, and on 9 September issued a brief statement announcing his candidature. 
'A moins de trois mois de I'election presidentielle, les republica ins resolus a combattre Ie pouvoir 
personnel - et je pense d'abord a ceux qui, par tradition et par ideal se reconnaissent dans la 
gauche franc;aise - sont dans !'incertitude. [ ... J J'ai donc decide de solliciter les suffrages des 
Franc;ais et des Franc;aises Ie 5 decembre prochain. " appartiendra aux organisations politiques 
comme a chaque citoyen de se determiner en fonction des options fondamentales qui 
commandent ma candidature'. 
Franc;;ois Mitterrand, 9 September 1965.59 
As these remarks clearly show, France was, for the first time, witnessing what Chapsal referred 
to as 'Ie nouveau pMnomf!me de decision individuelle' or as Jean-Claude Colliard simply put it, 
'autoproclamation,.7o Without having received 'the official backing of any specific party or 
movement, Mitterrand announced his candidature independently. This was a tactical move, 
which enabled Mitterrand to indirectly impose his candidature on the Left. Far from generating 
enthusiasm, Mitterrand's announcement met with a rather frosty reception from press and parties 
alike. Giesbert attributes such hostility to public perceptions of Mitterrand as 'un personnage de 
roman, un maraudeur de la politique, un chevalier errant de la Quatrieme Republique,.71 This 
view is echoed by Pierre Viansson-Ponte, who wrote in Le Monde that Mitterrand had been 'de 
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toutes les combinaisons, de tous les cabinets ou presque,.72 Even Mitterrand himself has 
acknowledged this initial failure to arouse positive interest, noting that 'Ia gamme d'opinion des 
gens a la mode alia de 'ce n'est pas un bon candidat' a 'c'est franchement Ie plus mauvais,.73 
Undeterred, Mitterrand forged ahead. The day after his communique was issued, the Federation 
de la gauche democratique et socialiste (FGDS) was formed and immediately accorded 
Mitterrand its support. 74 Mitterrand was careful to point out that the creation of the FGDS was 
not simply to back his presidential campaign, rather it was 'une formation politique a vocation 
permanente', whose objectives to 'reformer et a renouveler les structures de la gauche 
democrate et socialiste [ ... ] vont evidemment plus loin que ma candidature,.75 Its principal task 
was to prepare a programme of government in the event that Mitterrand defeated de Gaulle and 
used his power of dissolution to call new legislative elections. 76 In this respect, it may be 
regarded as one of the first and most important steps taken by Mitterrand in his quest to build a 
united Left under the Fifth Republic. Mitterrand's description of FGDS objectives also reveals 
something about his perception of the presidency in September 1965; by stressing the 
importance of the movement, not as a presidential campaign machine, but as a permanent body 
dedicated to restructuring the Left and defining a future government programme, Mitterrand 
seems to be implying that it is not the President's role to dictate government policy. His 
comments may also be interpreted as an attempt to avoid associating himself too closely with 
any political formation, thus conforming to Gaullist notions of a Head of State above party 
affiliations. 
2.4.1 Mitterrand and the Communists 
By the end of September 1965, Mitterrand had received the backing of the SFIO and, most 
importantly, the PCF, which had agreed to support his candidature without demanding the 
elaboration of a Common Programme as it had done for Defferre. It is impossible to say exactly 
what brought about this change of stance, since evidence indicates that several different factors 
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influenced the Communist party's decision. In his analysis of the 1965 presidential campaign, 
Georges Suffert contends that the Communists softened their attitude towards Mitterrand's 
candidature because they had begun to face up to the political realities of the Fifth Republic. 
Opinion polls consistently showed that the electorate, including traditional PCF voters, accepted 
the fundamental framework of the new Constitution and the institutional stability which it 
apparently provided.77 The public were resistant to PCF demands for a new Constitution based 
upon the notion of a Constituent Assembly, since such a regime bore obvious similarities to the 
discredited Fourth Republic. 78 Suffert argues, therefore, that the PCF was faced with the 
following choice: either to support Mitterrand, who seemed to offer greater guarantees for 
institutional change than Defferre,79 or to continue to demand the abolition of de Gaulle's 
Republic and risk forcing the party permanently into the political cold. Having long abandoned 
any notion of presenting a candidate because it did not wish to be seen as participating directly in 
a system which it had consistently opposed,8o the PCF's best chance of securing its future as a 
powerful political force was to support Mitterrand's presidential bid. Having said that, there can 
be little doubt that the decision was also influenced by the friendship forged between Mitterrand 
and PCF leader Waldeck-Rochet during their days in the Resistance. 
Whilst Mitterrand's proposals to limit presidential power were a far cry from the PCF's original 
calls for a new Constitution,81 his consistent opposition to de Gaulle's personalised regime gave 
the Communists an additional reason to back his candidature. Waldeck-Rochet had privately 
signalled his support for Mitterrand provided he presented 'une plate-forme acceptable' and 
declared his support for 'I'union sans exclusive des 'partis de gauche', which was regarded by the 
PCF as the only means of justifying their backing in the absence of a Common Programme. 82 
Following private discussions behind the scenes between representatives from both camps, 
Mitterrand responded positively and courteously to Waldeck-Rochet's demands in his first press 
conference. Two days later, on 23 September, the PCF voted unanimously to support 
Mitterrand's presidential bid.83 
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Other smaller political formations such as the PSU later rallied to Mitterrand's campaign, but 
having received the go-ahead of the two main left-wing parties, Mitterrand had already been 
transformed from 'I'homme d'un combat [ ... ] d'une esperance,84 into 'Ie candidat unique de la 
gauche,.85 Asked why he felt he had succeeded in uniting the Left where Defferre had failed, 
Mitterrand replied that the key was the formation of a broad, flexible and forward-looking political 
Federation with a truly left-wing agenda, which would then be able to establish a solid alliance 
with the Communist Party.86 According to Mitterrand, 'il existait un electorat de gauche qui 
aspirait a se reconnartre dans un programme coMrent et con forme a ses aspirations, cet 
electorat etait demoralise par Ie spectacle, devenu rituel, de gouvernements de gauche 
pratiquant une politique de droite'. 87 
An analysis of Mitterrand's writings and speeches appears to suggest that it was primarily for 
pragmatic reasons that he decided to anchor his candidature firmly on the Left in 1965, 
particularly if one considers his strongly anti-Communist views during the Fourth Republic. 88 
Unlike Defferre, who had publicly derided the PCF during his abortive presidential campaign,89 
Mitterrand appreciated the importance of securing Communist backing - indicating his preference 
for a candidature embracing Communist Party voters long before announcing his official decision 
to stand. gO The PCF still wielded considerable electoral force as the second largest political 
formation within the Fifth Republic. Therefore, by adopting a truly left-wing agenda, Mitterrand 
and the Federation would potentially be able to steal back some of the ideological ground which 
it had lost to the Communists as a result of earlier flirtations with the Centre.91 It follows from 
this that if, as Mitterrand had predicted in 1959,92 there was a popular backlash against de 
Gaulle's arbitrary exercise of power, it was essential for the non-Communist Left to improve 
relations with the PCF, which might well be the main political beneficiary of such a mood of 
public discontent. 
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2.4.2 Mitterrand's campaign 
Although Mitterrand's first presidential campaign lacked nothing in the way of determination and 
dynamism, the scope of his actions was limited by his position as candidate of the Left. Even if 
Mitterrand had had time to draw up a detailed set of policy objectives, which was not the case 
prior to November 1965, the need to maintain the support of all the parties that had rallied to his 
candidature required him to restrict his presidential platform to a few broad proposals which 
accommodated all the different viewpoints within the Left alliance. But this was not Mitterrand's 
only consideration; he also had to ensure that, however general, the proposals still constituted a 
cogent and coherent programme in the eyes of the electorate. The first stage of Mitterrand's 
programme was clearly preoccupied with this double souci of responding to the demands of the 
collective Left and the public alike. 93 It took the form of seven main 'options' covering the 
following areas: institutions, civil rights, Europe, the French nuclear force, economic planning, 
social policy and, most importantly, education.94 As one might expect from the author of Le 
Coup d'Etat permanent, Mitterrand opened his address with a critique of the regime, likening de 
Gaulle's exercise of power to the 'systeme plt7Jbiscitaire comme on I'a connu sous Ie Second 
Empire,.95 This was followed by calls for a return to 'Ia Repub/ique des citoyens', although 
Mitterrand failed to define exactly what he meant by such a notion, or how it might be achieved. 
He did, however, go so far as to demand the abolition of article 16 of the Constitution and the 
amendment of other articles 'qui concernent Ie contr61e constitutionnef in his section on 
institutions. But once again the details and implications of such reforms were not discussed. 
Imprecision was, in fact, a feature of all seven options, which included opposition to the 
development of the French nuclear armoury, the promotion of greater European integration,96 
the elaboration of a system of regional, economic planning and, finally, the review of social 
policy and education funding. 97 Although Mitterrand's programme provoked a disappointed 
reaction from members of the press, who called for a more developed platform to be drawn Up,98 
it nonetheless represented a significant achievement in the quest for greater left-wing co-
operation. As Jean-Luc Parodi correctly pOints out, 'il [Mitterrand] fait plus que contenter 
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chacune des formations politiques qui Ie soutiennent, il parvient a faire accepter par tous les 
choses que chacun, pris separement, aurait eu du mal a enteriner'.99 
Michele Cotta affirms that Mitterrand, 'tres sensible au reproche qui lui a ete fait de rester dans Ie 
vague',100 expanded upon his seven options in order to produce a programme of twenty-eight 
'propositions', which he presented at a second press conference two months later. 101 Once 
again, Mitterrand took sole responsibility for the elaboration of these proposals,102 ignoring calls 
from the Communists for a Common Programme in order to avoid any 'precipitation maladroite' 
that might risk shattering an already fragile union. 103 The most interesting aspects of this 
extended programme for our study are those which deal with institutional reform. To his earlier 
proposal to suppress the President's emergency powers, Mitterrand added the abolition of article 
11. There can be little doubt that this decision was influenced by a desire to prevent a 
recurrence of de Gaulle's blatant violation of constitutional guidelines in 1962, when he used 
article 11 to facilitate the introduction of universal suffrage. Mitterrand also recommended 
amending those articles concerning the Conseif superieur de la magistrature, the High Court, the 
Economic Council and, finally, the Constitutional Council, which he described as little more than 
'/'instrument de I'executif au lieu d'etre un arbitre entre les pouvoirs' .104 Other measures, which 
Mitterrand proposed to reduce the risk of presidential dominance, included the drafting of a new 
statute for radio and television,105 the abrogation of all 'legislation d'exception' and the repeal of 
1964 texts restricting workers' freedom to strike. As a result of these amendments, Mitterrand 
hoped that a new style of regime would emerge - one which represented a synthesis between the 
Fourth Republic which he described as 'indiscutablement democratique qui a echoue par 
absence de stabilite politique', and the Fifth, 'qui s'est donne les moyens du pouvoir et peut-etre 
de la stabi/ite mais a verse du cote ou if penchait, c'est-a-dire du cote du pouvoir personner .106 
Mitterrand was not, therefore, campaigning for a new Constitution; he was proposing a set of 
measures which, once implemented, would guarantee a fresh and more balanced interpretation 
of the 1958 text. In this respect Mitterrand's position had shifted from one of intransigent 
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opposition to de Gaulle's Republic and, in particular, to the introduction of universal suffrage, to 
one of conditional acceptance, subject to realisation of the aforementioned institutional reforms. 
As Duhamel rightly notes, 'apres avoir souhaite changer de regime, la gauche, et d'abord ses 
dirigeants les plus novateurs, ne voulut plus que changer Ie regime. L'acceptation revisionniste 
se fit retormiste,.107 This observation, however, fails to touch upon another important 
consequence of the Left's participation in the 1965 presidential election. For it was not only 
Mitterrand who no longer challenged the permanence of the Fifth Republic; in agreeing to back 
Mitterrand's candidature, the Communist Party also appeared to be signalling an increased 
willingness to participate in the regime. 10B One can only speculate as to the role which 
Mitterrand's amicable relations with Waldeck-Rochet may have played in securing PCF 
support. 109 It is, however, doubtful that this factor alone would have persuaded the party to back 
Mitterrand's candidature. It seems much more plausible, therefore, that the Communists had 
finally begun to accept that the permanence of the Fifth Republic left them with only one way to 
effectively combat de Gaulle - through the democratic channels of the regime itself. 
The evolution in Mitterrand's attitude towards the Fifth Republic is reflected in the two central 
themes running through his campaign: the struggle to restore democracy (often referred to in 
terms of libertes menacees),110 and the fight against de Gaulle's personalised use of power (Ie 
pouvoir personnel). Mitterrand's criticisms tended, once again, to focus largely upon de Gaulle 
and the way in which he had directly manipulated the Constitution to establish an authoritarian 
regime. As Mitterrand put it, 'puisque je combats Ie pouvoir personnel, je combattrai celui qui 
l'incarne' .111 
Mitterrand called upon those 'qui ne se resignent pas a I'abandon de leurs responsabilites 
civiques' to use their votes effectively in order to challenge de Gaulle's system of government. 112 
He later explained that his intention had been to 'demystifier les Frangais, leur dire qu'ils avaient 
Ie droit, Ie devoir, Ie pouvoir de gerer eux-memes leurs propres affaires, qu'il etait indigne d'eux 
d'abandonner Ie soin a un seul, tot-il Ie general de Gaulle,.113 The presidential election, he 
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argued, should not be reduced to the simple designation of a personality, who then guides the 
country for the next seven years according to his own undisclosed political and personal agenda. 
Rather it should be an informed decision based upon a well-defined programme of policy 
objectives. 114 That is not to say that Mitterrand considered the choice of individual to be 
irrelevant, but it was secondary to the political platform endorsed by each candidate. 115 As we 
will see, Mitterrand's efforts to focus his presidential campaign upon programmes, as opposed to 
personalities, constituted one of the more problematic aspects of his candidature in 1965. 
2.4.3 Tensions and ambiguities 
The whole notion of direct presidential elections posed enormous problems for the Left, whose 
doctrinal base had always been strongly anti-personalist. 116 Naturally, this placed Mitterrand in 
an awkward predicament when choosing a campaign strategy. Not only did he have to justify his 
decision to stand in an election whose very rationale he had always opposed, but he had to be 
able to compete effectively against de Gaulle - 'Ie candidat au-dessus des parfis' - without 
emulating the President's lofty rhetoric. It is hardly surprising to note, therefore, that some 
ambiguities arose as a result of Mitterrand's attempts to satisfy these opposing criteria. These 
inconsistencies centre on Mitterrand's interpretation of executive power; he shifts between a 
parliamentary and a presidentialist reading of the Constitution at different pOints during the 
campaign, which leaves us unclear about his precise understanding of the presidential role within 
the regime. 
In a speech before the Senate in 1961, Mitterrand declared that 'if faut autant que possible, 
lorsqu'on choisit Ie chef de I'executif, eliminer les elements passionnels, irraisonnes, accidentels. 
Les electeurs doivent etre appeles a voter sur des idees, sur des programmes, sur des grandes 
orientations avant de se prononcer sur un homme,.117 Up until the second ballot of the 1965 
presidential campaign, his speeches displayed a marked willingness to remain as faithful as 
Possible to this earlier stance. During this period, Mitterrand repeatedly affirmed that, as 
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candidate of the Left, he was campaigning on the basis of a broad set of policy orientations 
which would inspire the actions of a future Left-wing government. 118 Addressing meetings and 
rallies of supporters, Mitterrand stressed that his election as President was merely the first step 
towards the Left's ultimate goal - to win a parliamentary majority.119 Once elected, Mitterrand 
promised to immediately dissolve the National Assembly in order to allow all-important 
legislative elections to take place. 12o At one stage, he even cast doubt on the permanence of 
universal suffrage as a mode of presidential election if he were to gain power, commenting that 
'pour felection du President de la Republique, il appartiendra aux organisations democratiques 
de se prononcer si une retorme est urgente,.121 
Mitterrand's statements assigning greater importance to parliamentary elections are somewhat at 
odds with his assertion that as a presidential candidate, his role was to 'fixer les objectifs, detinir 
les options fondamentales qui rendront indiscutables les choix politiques. ,122 These remarks 
appear to recognise the hierarchical framework of the Constitution, and more specifically, the 
supremacy of the President over political decision-making. On the one hand, Mitterrand seems 
to be saying that Parliament has the power to decide the future of the presidency, whilst on the 
other, he claims that the President has the power to impose his political choices on Parliament. 
The two views are clearly contradictory. 
The second ballot brought new dilemmas for Mitterrand. Having so far based his campaign on a 
strongly Left-wing agenda, he had to try and appeal beyond the boundaries of his own natural 
electorate and woo voters whose candidates had been defeated in the first round. Above all, it 
was the 15.78% of votes for the centrist, Jean Lecanuet, which Mitterrand hoped to attract. In 
his study of the 1965 presidential election, Schwartzenberg asserts that Mitterrand was faced 
with two possible courses of action following the first ballot: he could attempt to win over 
Lecanuet's voters by calling for the formation of a united and coherent centre-left opposition 
movement, or alternatively, he could invite right-wing voters to rally to his camp in the name of 
anti-Gaullism. 123 In the end, Mitterrand refused to consider either option, allowing defeated 
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candidates to make the choice for him. This was a tactical risk which, on this occasion, did not 
really work to Mitterrand's advantage, mainly as a result of Lecanuet's reluctance to declare his 
support for either candidate in the second round. 124 By the time Lecanuet finally did announce 
that 'je ne voterai pas pour Ie general de Gaulle et je demande ames electeurs de ne pas voter 
pour lut, 125 voters had already had plenty of time to make up their own minds. Lecanuet's 
comments also introduced a new dimension to the campaign, by transforming the election into a 
vote for or against de Gaulle's leadership. This undermined Mitterrand's efforts to combat de 
Gaulle from a predominantly political perspective, and turned the opposition campaign into what 
Schwartzenberg calls a 'contre- plebiscite' .126 Floating voters were not being urged to vote for 
Mitterrand on the basis of his personality or policy objectives, but because he was the only 
means of ousting de Gaulle from the presidency.127 
This would undoubtedly have suited de Gaulle, whose campaign had a characteristically 
plebisicitary tone from the moment he announced his long-awaited intention to stand for re-
election. 128 Claiming to be the only individual capable of guaranteeing the future of the Fifth 
Republic, de Gaulle had warned the electorate that if they did not renew his mandate, France's 
institutions would crumble, plunging the nation into a state of chaos. 129 Rather surprisingly, de 
Gaulle did not attack Mitterrand on the basis of his hastily prepared political manifesto and the 
undeniable tensions and contradictions within the Left's alliance, instead he took a more personal 
and retrospective approach, labelling Mitterrand as the incarnation of 'Ie regime du passe' and all 
its problems. 13o Mitterrand, too, was conscious of the potential advantages to be reaped from 
exploiting the weaknesses of opponents and highlighting his own personal qualities. The Left's 
slogan, 'un President jeune pour une France moderne', plus the various photographs and posters 
showing a dynamic and determined Mitterrand on the campaign trail, were undoubtedly deSigned 
to accentuate de Gaulle's image as 'un veillard prestigieux accrocM a un passe revolu,.131 
Having been forced to accept the logic of the second ballot and broaden his electoral appeal, 
Mitterrand began campaigning not simply as 'Ie candidat de la gauche', but as 'Ie candidat de 
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tous les republicains,.132 This opened him up to criticism from de Gaulle that he was 'Ie candidat 
de la gauche et de la droite [ ... J, if est Ie candidat des partis, voila la verite!,133 Mitterrand 
challenged de Gaulle's accusations, insisting that it did not matter if a presidential candidate 
emanated from the ranks of a political movement or alliance because once he had been elected 
President, his sole task would be to 'respecter les regles fondamentales qui font qu'une 
democratie reste une democratie,.134 This depiction of the President as a non-partisan 
constitutional judge leads our discussion on to another area of ambiguity which characterised 
Mitterrand's 1965 campaign, that of his changing perception of the presidential function. 
At different stages of the election campaign, Mitterrand's interpretation of the presidential role 
appeared to shift between that of an arbitre-juridique, whose interventions were purely concerned 
with respect for constitutional guidelines, and that of an arbitre-actif, who had a role to play in 
determining the main aspects of government policy. In his analysis, Schwartzenberg notes a 
marked tendency for Mitterrand to advocate a more passive definition of the presidency during 
the first five weeks of campaigning. 135 Throughout this period, he found that Mitterrand 
defended a strictly parliamentary reading of the Constitution, on the grounds that it would 
'remettre a I'executif sa vraie place et [ ... ] garder a I'arbitrage du President sa valeur 
permanente' .136 This does appear to be consistent with Mitterrand's previous assertions that the 
1958 text should have established a parliamentary regime, and with his proposals to revise 
specific aspects of the Constitution in order to eliminate the ambiguities which had made de 
Gaulle's violations possible. What it fails to define, however, is exactly what Mitterrand 
interprets as '/a vraie place de I'executif'. This becomes clearer when we examine Mitterrand's 
proposals for a 'contrat de legislature', 137 which he discussed before a meeting of the Convention 
des Institutions Republicaines (CIR) in early October 1965. 138 Such a contract would, Mitterrand 
asserted, allow the electorate to indirectly designate 'I'homme qui a la tete d'un parti, d'une 
coalition de partis, d'une majorite gouvernera,.139 In other words, it would be incumbent upon the 
President to nominate such a figure to the post of Prime Minister. Evidently, this style of regime 
bears a striking similarity to the British parliamentary system, whereby the leader of the newly 
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elected parliamentary majority automatically accedes to the premiership. But if, as Mitterrand's 
comments suggest, he was recommending that the French Prime Minister be restored as the 
head of executive power, it was not a line of argument that he chose to pursue before a wider 
audience. 
There are, of course, reasons why Mitterrand did not commit himself to this particular institutional 
vision for the duration of the election trail, not least the fact that it contradicted the very nature of 
his own presidential campaign. As the Left's official candidate, campaigning on a political 
platform of seven options which broadly set out the policy objectives of a future left-wing 
government, Mitterrand effectively undermined the notion of a politically disengaged President. 
We might also consider Parodi's explanation that Mitterrand's calls for a return to a 
parliamentary-style regime before the CIR, were primarily designed to satisfy the institutional 
expectations of those left-wing parties which had agreed to back his candidature. 14o If this is the 
case, then the same reasoning may be applied to his comments stressing the primacy of 
legislative over presidential elections: '/a batail/e que nous menons continuera son deroulement 
jusqu'aux prochaines elections legislatives, car c'est aux elections legislatives de 1966-67, apres 
i'election presidentielle que Ie peuple aura a decider son destin' .141 
Between 20 October and 5 December, when the first round of voting took place, Mitterrand's 
campaign centred on a slightly different concept of presidential power, whereby the Head of 
State was not only a constitutional judge, but was also France's guide, intervening to 'preciser les 
grandes options' of a future government progral1)me. 142 In his second press conference, 
Mitterrand confirmed that if elected, he would ensure that the policy objectives detailed in his 
presidential manifesto were implemented by the new government. 143 He was, however, careful 
to defend such interventions on the grounds that they formed part of the President's symbolic 
duties set out in article 5: 'tout en restant fidele a ma conception d'un chef de i'Etat arbitre, je 
ferais en sorte que cet arbitre remplisse son r61e en veil/ant au respect des engagements pris et 
en stimulant la mise en reuvre des options fondamentales' .144 What this statement fails to 
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clarify is exactly who would be responsible for setting these objectives - the President or 
government. The answer to this question is surely crucial if we are to fully comprehend 
Mitterrand's interpretation of the President's role within the regime. 
It is also worth noting that this notion of a President-actif, which characterised Mitterrand's 
campaign during this period, was accompanied by a gradual abandonment of his original 
proposals for constitutional reform. Having launched his campaign by calling for the abolition of 
article 16 and various other constitutional amendments, Mitterrand's revisionist aspirations 
quickly lost momentum, until even the suppression of article 16 was replaced by its non-
application. Roger-Gerard Schwartzenberg attributes Mitterrand's increasing acceptance of the 
1958 Constitution to three separate elements: a fundamental respect for the law which made it 
difficult for Mitterrand to justify challenging a popularly approved Constitution, the realisation that 
institutional reform could actually prove a vote-loser and, finally, a fundamental appreciation of 
the merits of the institutional framework provided by the Fifth Republic. 145 What Schwartzenberg 
fails to explore, however, are the more self-serving motives which may have prompted 
Mitterrand to abandon his promises to reform the regime. By leaving the Constitution in its 
original state, he would have stood to inherit the same level of power enjoyed by de Gaulle had 
his presidential bid proved successful. In a closer run contest than had been predicted, this may 
have been a temptation which the ambitious Mitterrand would have found difficult resist. 
After the first round of voting, Mitterrand returned to a more passive definition of the presidential 
role. This shift was influenced by an entirely differ~nt agenda; one which only came into play 
once the first ballot had taken place. By assuring the electorate of his commitment to a non-
interventionist style of presidency, Mitterrand was more likely to attract voters from the Centre 
and the Right, some of whom would perhaps prefer the prospect of a constitutional guide 
emanating from the Left to another seven years of de Gaulle. 146 Interestingly, Mitterrand even 
flirted with the idea of reducing the duration of the presidential mandate in a bid to convince 
undecided members of the electorate of his commitment to this conception of the presidency.147 
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Suffert also recognises the considerable influence which the public's interpretation of the 
presidential function had upon the comportment of candidates. He argues that both Mitterrand 
and de Gaulle were obliged to modify their images before the second ballot in order to 'devenir 
ce que /e pays souhaitait obscurement qu'i/s fussent.148 In de Gaulle's case, this meant 
abandoning his Olympian heights and descending into the political arena to answer questions on 
government policy on national television. For Mitterrand, it involved adopting a more 
'presidential' style by appealing to the electorate as a whole and focusing upon issues, such as 
the exercise of power and the correct application of the Constitution. 149 
Far from producing a clearer picture of Mitterrand's interpretation of the President's role, our 
discussion has revealed how he shifted between two contrasting readings of the Constitution. As 
a result, it is difficult to establish whether Mitterrand favoured a President who would be an 
active political leader or a passive constitutional guide. One could, however, argue that the 
ambiguities and contradictions which characterised Mitterrand's institutional vision, are less 
important than the confirmation they provide of Mitterrand's de facto conversion to a certain 
basic conception of presidentialism under the Fifth Republic. For although Mitterrand originally 
proposed to introduce some amendments to the Constitution in order to regulate the power 
available to the President, his candidature in 1965 demonstrated a fundamental acceptance of 
the Constitution and, most importantly, the presidential powers of arbitrage, surveillance and 
direction. Mitterrand's decision to stand as the representative of a common left-wing ideology is 
further evidence that he had begun to adapt to the norms governing presidential politics. Not 
only did he realise that it was imperative for the parti.es on the Left to unite in order to have any 
chance of competing successfully in a two ballot majority voting system, but he was also 
prepared to personalise his campaign in order to appeal to a wider electorate than his own party 
members. 15o Though Mitterrand's score of 45% in the second ballot failed to win him the 
presidency, it should be viewed as a relative success. He had never expected to beat de Gaulle; 
he had merely wanted to show that the General was not the incarnation of national unity and 
could be effectively challenged within the framework of his own regime. 151 In reality, Mitterrand 
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achieved much more, transforming the Left into a credible force and beginning the irreversible 
process of adaptation to the institutions of the Fifth Republic. 
2.5 Mitterrand and the events of May 1968 
De Gaulle's re-election in December 1965 signified the consummation of the President's powers. 
Following in the wake of this popular consultation, the parliamentary elections of 1967 once 
again provided de Gaulle with a majority on which to rest his interpretation of the presidential 
office. The events of May 1968 constitute the next major episode in Mitterrand's developing 
relationship to the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Our study of Mitterrand's speeches and 
actions throughout this period of social unrest will reveal the deep ambiguity, which was now an 
integral part of his relationship to the French presidency. 
As one of de Gaulle's most tenacious critics and his principal political adversary after 1965, 
Mitterrand may have seemed ideally placed to profit from the growing mood of public 
disillusionment which precipitated the dramatic events of May 1968. 152 Far from emerging as the 
champion of student demands, however, he retained a remarkably low profile throughout most of 
the month, preferring to 'commenter les evenements au jour Ie jour' from the sanctuary of the 
National Assembly.153 Joffrin makes a valid point when he suggests that Mitterrand, like many 
other key political figures on the Left and Right, needed time to assess the evolving situation 
before defining his position. 154 Mitterrand himself later admitted having been caught off guard by 
the speed at which the crisis had broken and he was not alone in this respect. 155 Most of the 
leaders on the Left, with the exception of Pierre Mendes-France and Michel Rocard, were 
reluctant to involve themselves in a student movement over which they had no direct control. 156 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that Mitterrand, who as leader of the Left Federation had 
named education as 'Ia priorite des priorites' in his 1965 election manifesto,157 should have 
chosen to remain relatively detached from events during the first three weeks of May. 
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This initial decision to distance himself from the actions of the demonstrating students reaffirms 
an important aspect of Mitterrand's political philosophy, that of pragmatism. Although he 
sympathised with the students' critique of the regime, as an experienced parliamentarian 
Mitterrand was reluctant to give his backing to any spontaneous movement without careful 
consideration, particularly when the actions of that group were conceived outside of the legal 
framework of the Constitution. Earlier in the chapter it was argued that, from 1962 onwards, 
Mitterrand's opposition to de Gaulle was based upon a strategy of participation in the regime. In 
other words, he accepted that the only effective and legitimate way to challenge the political 
system in place was via the institutional procedures provided by the Constitution. Whilst 
Mitterrand may indeed have understood the depth of frustration which drove students onto the 
streets in May 1968,158 theirs was a form of protest which he considered naive, irresponsible and 
ultimately self-destructive because it rejected traditional political parties and practices: 'Je 
comprends cette rigueur (qui pousse I'homme a recuser toute solidarite avec un style de vie qu'i/ 
veut changer). Je comprends moins les erreurs de jugement qui ont conduit Ie mouvement de 
mai a s'aventurer dans une strategie d'autodestruction,.159 In any case, it would have been 
pOlitically perilous for Mitterrand to have backed the students, only to find that he was on the 
lOSing side when the conflict was finally resolved. One might also contend that having finally 
accepted the permanence of de Gaulle's institutions and the political stability which the new 
regime had so far guaranteed, Mitterrand would not have wanted to associate himself too closely 
with a movement whose autonomous and anarchic nature threatened to upset this 
arrangement. 160 Therefore, instead of endorsing the actions of the rioting students or attempting 
to capitalise upon the tense political climate to t~ and bring down de Gaulle's Republic, 
Mitterrand limited his interventions to a few well-chosen words in Parliament. This strictly 
constitutional approach did little to endear him to the leaders of the student movement, who saw 
it as confirmation of Mitterrand's assimilation to the regime they so vehemently opposed. As 
Mitterrand himself would later comment ruefully, 'puisque je n'avais pas fait sauter I'Elysee a la 
dynamite, j'(Jtais complice de I'Elysee,.161 
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Initially, Mitterrand focused his criticisms upon the failure of successive governments to listen 
and respond to the needs of the younger generation. 162 As the situation worsened and workers 
joined student demonstrators bringing the country to a virtual standstill, he began calling for the 
government's resignation on the grounds that it was incapable of controlling the crisis and no 
longer had the support of the electorate. 163 In a parliamentary debate on 14 May, Mitterrand 
attacked what he saw as the increasing vacuum of power; Premier Georges Pompidou had been 
on an official visit to Iran and Afghanistan at the beginning of the crisis, and Mitterrand 
demanded to know who had been in charge of government action in the Premier's absence. 164 
In this speech, Mitterrand accused Pompidou and the Education Minister, Alain Peyrefitte, of 
failing to take responsibility for resolving the crisis and allowing de Gaulle to impose his will upon 
them privately.165 For although the President may have avoided interfering publicly in the day to 
day management of the crisis prior to the announcement of a referendum on the issue, 
Mitterrand claimed that he had been determining government action from behind the scenes. 166 
The following week Mitterrand intensified his attacks on the government's ineffectuality, 
delivering a pOinted critique of a political system based upon 'Ia decision politique d'un seul 
homme' .167 He concluded his address by confirming his support for a motion of censure tabled 
by the opposition which, he hoped, would result in the dissolution of the National Assembly and 
fresh parliamentary elections. 
Dansette asserts that towards the end of the month Mitterrand believed that the government 
could fall, and so began testing the ground with unions and other left-wing organisations in 
preparation for a possible election campaign. 168 The increased likelihood of an electoral battle 
would partly explain the sudden politicisation of Mitterrand's discourse, which was doubtless 
intended to convince workers and students that the Left Federation did understand their concerns 
and could offer a real alternative to de Gaulle's oppressive, capitalist regime. 169 When the 
motion of censure was narrowly defeated,170 Mitterrand and the Federation were once again left 
without any obvious means of recovering the initiative in a crisis that they had largely allowed to 
pass them by. De Gaulle's announcement that a referendum would be held 'sur la renovation 
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universitaire, sociale et economique,171 provided precisely the justification and the incentive 
Mitterrand needed to launch a new offensive against the regime. 172 It came in the form of a 
press conference and, as we will see, it proved to be a disastrous error of judgement, which left 
Mitterrand out in the political wilderness until his fortuitous election as First Secretary of the 
French Socialist Party in 1971. 
2.5.1 The press conference of 28 May: 'Mitterrand I'ambitieux devenu 
putschiste?,173 
Assuming that de Gaulle would be defeated in the forthcoming referendum and would 
subsequently vacate the presidency, Mitterrand held a press conference on 28 May to explain 
how he would ensure the continuity of the Fifth Republic following de Gaulle's departure. 174 He 
began by declaring that once de Gaulle had withdrawn from office, Pompidou and his cabinet 
would also resign in order to make way for the formation of a ten-man provisional government, 
headed by himself or, more preferably, Pierre Mendes-France. 175 This temporary administration, 
chosen 'sans exclusive et sans dosage', would be required to fulfil three short-term objectives: to 
restore the authority of the State and begin a dialogue with student and workers' organisations, to 
respond to the reasonable demands of various professional groups and, finally, to organise new 
presidential elections. Just as he had done in 1965, Mitterrand then took the opportunity to 
publicly announce his intention to stand as a presidential candidate, without having informed any 
of the leaders of the Left of his decision. 176 An edited version of the conference, excluding 
journalists' questions which elaborated upon some of the more ambiguous aspects of the 
proposals, was then broadcast on national television the same evening. But, as Mitterrand was 
soon to discover, far from dealing the fatal blow to a crumbling administration, his press 
conference only served to resuscitate de Gaulle and his supporters, who were able to exploit it 
as a means of regaining control of the political situation. 
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There is a certain irony in the fact that Mitterrand, a politician who had spent his entire career 
under the Fifth Republic denouncing de Gaulle's violation of constitutional guidelines, should 
himself become the target of such accusations in May 1968. It is even more surprising that 
Mitterrand should have risked opening himself up to such charges in the first place, by 
presenting to the public a series of measures which were clearly not written into the 1958 
Constitution. Firstly, the assertion that 'Ie depart du general de Gaulle au lendemain du 16 juin 
[00'] provoquera naturellement la disparition du Premier ministre et de son gouvernement,177 had 
no constitutional foundation, and was pure suggestion (or possibly wishful thinking) on 
Mitterrand's part. According to article 7, 'en cas de vacance de la presidence de la Repub/ique 
pour quelque cause que ce soit [00'] les fonctions du President de la Repub/ique [00'] sont 
provisoirement exercees par Ie president du Senat'; no mention is made of the interim President 
having the constitutional right or obligation to dismiss the current government, let alone name a 
replacement administration. As a result, Mitterrand's proposals for a provisional government, 
presided over by Mendes-France, were wholly unconstitutional - a fact which his opponents 
wasted no time in pointing out. Robert Poujade, secretary general of the u.o. va Repub/ique 
(Gaullist Party), scathingly remarked at the time that 'Ie soi-disant gouvernement provisoire de M. 
Mitferrand ne pourrait [00'] resulter que d'un coup d'Etat. A vrai dire, M. Mitferrand, a qui 
personne ne faisait appel depuis les graves evenements qui ont secoue notre pays, pretend faire 
a la France Ie don de sa personne et, loin de vouloir atfenuer ses malheurs, reve d'en faire 
!'instrument de sa carriere'. 178 
Even on the Left, Mitterrand's comments were not uf1iversally welcomed. The Communist Party 
opposed his plans for a government headed by Mendes-France on the grounds that the latter 
was 'coupable d'avoir temoigne sa sympathie aux gauchistes en se rendant au stade Charlety,.179 
In addition, Waldeck-Rochet, issued a public statement which was evidently designed to correct 
what he saw as Mitterrand's lack of recognition regarding PCF participation in the proposed 
interim administration. 180 As far as many students were concerned, Mitterrand's declaration 
came too late to be taken seriously, and was regarded as a cynical attempt to use Mendes' 
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popularity to further his own presidential ambitions. This is, in part, borne out by Alexandre's 
account of an exchange between Mitterrand and Waldeck-Rochet after the fateful press 
conference, during which Mitterrand attempted to reassure the Communist chief as to his 
reasons for calling upon Mendes-france to lead the provisional government. According to this 
source, Mitterrand admitted privately to Waldeck-Rochet that 'dans la Constitution actuelle, 
/'important c'est Ie President de la Repub/ique'. Notre objectif doit etre I'election presidentielle,.181 
In other words, he was indirectly acknowledging that the temporary premiership was simply a 
means of side-tracking Mendes in order to allow another candidate, namely himself, to campaign 
for the real source of executive power within the regime, that of the presidency. 
Mendes-france's supporters considered that Mitterrand's 'participation' in de Gaulle's regime, 
even though this had involved consistently opposing the General's style of leadership, was in 
itself sufficient cause to reject him. Mendes' refusal to embrace the fifth Republic had given 
him a kind of political purity to which none of the other leading opposition figures could lay 
claim. 182 finally and arguably most important was the bad impression which Mitterrand's press 
conference made upon those members of the electorate who watched it on television. As Joffrin 
notes, this adverse public reaction was not so much a comment upon the actual proposals put 
forward by Mitterrand as the result of 'un montage ma/icieux' in which the leader of the fGDS, 'Ie 
menton en avant, la voix coupante' came across as '/'incarnation parfaite du factieux,.183 Even 
Mitterrand himself admitted that he appeared 'sous les traits d'un apprenti-dictateur, mal rase, 
fanatique' .184 This unflattering television appearance clearly had some bearing upon the Gaullist 
resurrection and their landslide victory in the legislative elections of June 1968, just as it did 
upon the Left's decision to shun Mitterrand, when it came to selecting a candidate for the 
presidential elections in 1969. 185 
As with his declaration of.candidature in 1965, Mitterrand claimed that his decision to propose a 
plan of action in May 1968 was largely motivated by the desire to disprove the 'moi ou Ie neant' 
ultimatums which had become an inherent feature of de Gaulle's referenda. 186 This is wholly 
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consistent with one aspect of opposition since 1962, based upon his determination to prove to 
the French that the Fifth Republic would still exist without de Gaulle and that the nation would 
not be thrown into a state of chaos in the event of the General's departure. The widespread 
condemnation of de Gaulle's referendum as yet another plebiscite upon his leadership gave 
Mitterrand every reason to believe that it was the ideal time for the leader of the opposition to 
make a decisive move. 187 Indeed, he claims that he was encouraged to do so by all those 
around him.188 But, as we have noted, the presumptuous and dictatorial tone of his televised 
press conference enabled the Gaullists to denounce him as a political opportunist trying to seize 
power before that power had even been vacated. In solemnly laying down a set of conditions 
and announcing his presidential candidature prematurely, Mitterrand seemed to many observers 
to be adopting the same imperious style as the man he had spent ten years opposing. 
It is difficult to see how Mitterrand might have handled things differently in May 1968. He could, 
of course, have omitted proposals for a provisional government from his press conference, thus 
preventing allegations that he was attempting to mount some form of coup. Yet the options open 
to him throughout the crisis were severely limited. Had he taken the initiative and involved 
himself more directly with the students from the beginning of the conflict, it is still doubtful 
whether they would have welcomed his involvement. 189 This was clearly a view shared by 
Mitterrand when he stated that 'aucun des hommes politiques qui detenaient des responsabi/ites 
a I'heure ou la revolte a eclate n'etait en mesure de la dominer ou de I'attirer a lui' .190 It is 
certainly true that the FGDS would have found it particularly difficult to harness the student and 
Worker movement since it was an organisation created for purely electoral purposes, without any 
real university or trade union networks. 191 Therefore, it would appear that Mitterrand, like almost 
every other political figure at the time, was quite simply overtaken by the events of that month; 
both his speeches before the National Assembly and his ill-fated press conference reveal that he 
was simply reacting to daily developments as opposed to pursuing any fixed political strategy. 
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Unfortunately for Mitterrand, his apparent disregard for constitutional guidelines met with 
considerable criticism from all sides; political commentators agree that this incident was partly 
responsible for the crushing defeat suffered by the Left in the June parliamentary elections. In 
the long term, however, the events of May 1968 were to have a positive effect upon the Left, 
forcing it to reassess its political objectives and, more specifically, to re-organise itself into a 
movement with which the disillusioned global Left could identify. Mitterrand would play an 
important role in this process, endeavouring to capture the spirit of the May uprising within the 
agenda of a mainstream political party, that of the newly formed Parti Socialiste. In the words of 
R.W. Johnson, Mitterrand strove to re-structure the Left in order 'to give orthodox political form 
to the great spontaneous assertion of 1968'.192 As the next chapter will now show, this was to 
provide the ideological backdrop against which the Left and the Right would seek to define 
themselves and their relationship to the presidency throughout the 1970s. 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have seen how factors affecting the development of the modern French 
presidency also impacted upon the actions of those who sought to challenge de Gaulle's 
exercise of power. Focusing on Fran90is Mitterrand, who quickly emerged as one of de Gaulle's 
strongest challengers within the regime, our discussion has shown how he was continually 
obliged to adapt the nature of his opposition to reflect the way in which presidential power was 
evolving under de Gaulle's leadership. 
Previously, we saw how the involvement of leading left-wing parliamentarians and the 
concessions they achieved during the drafting process led the majority of parties and politicians 
on the Left to approve the 1958 Constitution which, they believed, would produce a 
predominantly parliamentary regime. In 1958 Mitterrand clearly shared this view that the 
guidelines set out in the constitutional blueprint WOUld, under normal circumstances, ensure that 
the President would not be able to dominate executive decision-making. The fact that de Gaulle 
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was enjoying an exceptional degree of power was, in Mitterrand's view, highly undesirable. But, 
he assumed that this was temporary arrangement which would cease once the crisis in Algeria 
had been resolved and de Gaulle could no longer justify remaining in office. Thanks to the 1962 
referendum, however, we have seen how de Gaulle not only succeeded in renewing his own 
legitimacy, but he also ensured that the presidency acquired a uniquely symbolic status within 
the regime. Consequently, Mitterrand had to re-think his opposition strategy to take account of 
the fact that the presidency was emerging as the central organising principle of political activity 
under the Fifth Republic; parliamentary majorities (and, therefore, alliances) were needed to 
support the President and his policies. Having seen how Defferre's attempts to build a Centre-
Left alliance had failed, Mitterrand recognised that the only way to challenge the Gaullist 
Federation was by anchoring his candidature firmly on the Left and securing the support of the 
powerful Communist Party. 
Our discussion of the 1965 election highlighted some of the difficulties faced by Mitterrand as he 
strove to reassure left-wing voters of his commitment to a parliamentary reading of the 
Constitution, whilst taking part in an election whose very rationale seemed to contradict this 
stance. We saw how Mitterrand was forced to modify the way in which he presented himself as 
a candidate in order to participate effectively in an electoral contest which placed as much, if not 
more emphasis on personalities than it did on programmes. Although this gave rise to a number 
of inconsistencies in his campaign, it nevertheless showed that Mitterrand was beginning to 
acquire a more sophisticated appreciation of presidential politics and the restrictions it imposed 
upon his own political comportment and discourse. 
Mitterrand's actions in May 1968 also provided an important insight into his evolving relationship 
to the institutions of the Fifth Republic. For whilst he may have attacked the failure of de Gaulle, 
Pompidou and the government to bring the crisis to a speedy conclusion, never once did he call 
into question the existence of the regime. Indeed, it could be argued that Mitterrand did almost 
everything within his power to ensure its continuity from the motion of censure, designed to 
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restore State authority by forcing the formation of a new government, to his press conference, 
which aimed to show the electorate that the Republic would remain intact after de Gaulle had left 
the political arena. The fact that Mitterrand was prepared to bend the Constitution in his press 
conference for his own purposes showed that he not only understood the potential benefits to be 
reaped from an ambiguous Constitution, but he was willing to blatantly exploit this ambivalence 
for his own ends. What he had under-estimated, however, was the importance of extra-
constitutional factors, such as party support and public expectations, in determining the success 
of any challenge to the presidency. As we will see, Mitterrand spent the following decade 
ensuring that he built up the strong political base and public image he needed to compete 
successfully for power within the regime. 
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Chapter 3 
PRESIDENTIALISM AND THE FRENCH SOCIALIST 
PARTY (1971-1981) 
De Gaulle's sudden departure from the presidency in April 1969 did not throw France into a 
state of institutional crisis, nor did it bring about a return to the political chaos of the party-
dominated Assembly regime as he had so often warned it would. In accordance with 
constitutional guidelines, the President of the Senate, Alain Poher, stepped in to fill the 
temporary power void at the Elysee, whilst preparations were made for a fresh presidential 
contest to elect de Gaulle's successor. Two months later, former Prime Minister, Georges 
Pompidou, beat rivals from other parties to become the second popularly elected President of 
the French Fifth Republic. With the smooth transfer of power completed, the question still 
remained whether the process of presidentialisation, which had been underway for more than 
a decade, would be reversed now that de Gaulle had been removed from the constitutional 
equation. In other words, would this 'retour ala normale',1 as Pompidou called it, bring about 
a different interpretation of the Constitution, one which would allow the Fifth Republic to 
discover what Mitterrand had argued was its true nature, that of a parliamentary regime? 
It soon became apparent that, in de Gaulle's wake, no such transformation would occur. 
Instead Pompidou's presidency ushered in an important phase in the development and 
consolidation of presidential prerogatives. After Pompidou's unexpected death in 1974, the 
election of a non-Gaullist candidate, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, brought significant new 
dimensions to the ongoing debate over the extent and limits of presidential power within the 
regime. For although Giscard favoured a presidential reading of the Constitution,2 political 
factors came into play, which restricted the President's authority; not least the fact that 
Giscard's hold over the majority in the National Assembly was substantially weakened after 
1976. This imposed constraints upon his exercise of power and forced him to explore new 
ways of asserting his presidential supremacy. 
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As a result, historians and political analysts differ in their representation of Giscard d'Estaing's 
septennate; some regard it as a period of increased presidential control, others as one of 
greater institutional balance. None, however, dispute the fact that when viewed as a whole 
the years 1969-1981 confirmed the predominantly presidential nature of the Fifth Republic. It 
was during this period that Mitterrand also began to accept the advantages of the regime's 
institutional hierarchy. Whilst this reconciliation to the merits of presidentialism may not have 
been easily acknowledged by Mitterrand, it was implicit in his both public speeches and his 
direction of the Socialist Party between 1971 and 1981. The function of this chapter is to map 
the transition between two critical periods in Mitterrand's appreciation of the presidency, that 
of his early opposition to the 1958 Constitution as discussed in chapter two and his election 
as President of the Republic in May 1981. Beginning with a discussion of the notion of 
presidential power taking shape throughout the 1970s, the chapter will go on to examine its 
effects upon the newly-formed Parti socialiste which, under Mitterrand's leadership, embarked 
upon its own internal 'presidentialisation' in order to compete effectively for power within the 
evolving regime. 
3.1 1969-1974:' la mise en place du presidentialisme T3 
During his first three months in office, Pompidou's apparent readiness to grant his Premier, 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, control over domestic affairs seemed to signal a shift towards a 
more balanced reading of the Constitution.4 However, this period of enhanced prime 
ministerial autonomy turned out to be short-lived, and it was not long before the President 
undertook 'Ia reprise en main des leviers de commande,.5 Having initially been content to 
keep a fairly low-profile at the start of his mandate",6 Pompidou became concerned that the 
growing confidence and popularity of the team at Matignon were undermining his position as 
'chef supreme de l'Executif.7 In particular, it was Prime Minister Chaban's 'New Society' 
project which Pompidou found most threatening from an institutional perspective. This 
programme of reforms not only appeared to call into question the policy choices of the past 
eleven years of Gaullist government (including those of Pompidou's own premiership) but, as 
Knapp rightly points out, it also offered a set of broad, long-term objectives more akin to a 
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presidential manifesto than a prime ministerial agenda.8 Chaban's failure to provide the 
President with a copy of these proposals before announcing them before Parliament, was 
also interpreted by the Elysee as a sign that the Premier was becoming too independent.9 
In order to regain his presidential initiative, Pompidou took every opportunity to reaffirm 
publicly his pre-eminence within the regime. Retrospectively, he even went so far as to deny 
that Chaban had ever exercised any real power as Prime Minister: 'Chaban? /I croit qu'if a ete 
Premier ministre pendant trois ans. Pas du tout: if a ere ministre du travail pendant trois 
mois,.l0 Pompidou also began to intervene with increasing frequency in day to day 
government business until presidential control had extended well beyond the 'domaines 
reSeNeS' evoked by Chaban in 1959, to encompass all areas of policy-making. 11 By the time 
Chaban resigned in July 1972, very few decisions could be taken without first receiving the 
presidential seal of approval. It was this practice of presidential dominance and ministerial 
effacement which analysts of the Fifth Republic began to refer to increasingly as 
'presidentialism' . 
In his 1978 study of presidential power under Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, Jean Gicquel 
defines presidentialism as 'Ia preeminence du chef de l'Etat reposant, tels des propylees 
majestueux, sur /'investiture populaire et un constant soutien parlementaire. O'Otl une 
structure hierarchisee des pouvoirs et une exaltation de la fonction presidentielle d~nt Ie 
champ d'application recouvre tout I'espace politique' .12 As a result of the President's 
institutional supremacy, Gicquel notes that the presidential office soon became the key 
objective for all political parties within the regime. Presidentialism did not, however, begin to 
characterise the political culture of the Fifth Republi,c until Pompidou took over the presidency 
in 1969.13 Prior to this date, Gicquel contends that the regime was so closely bound up with 
the person of de Gaulle that it was impossible to determine its real nature; it was only after de 
Gaulle's withdrawal that the institutions could be properly assessed. 14 
Most commentators, however, do not regard presidentialism as the exclusive product of 
Pompidou's presidency, but trace its origins back to the 1962 constitutional amendment, 
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which produced what Franc;:oise Decaumont has described as 'une extension de la fonction 
presidentielle aut~ur de laquelle s'ordonne tous les autres pouvoirs' .15 Gicquel and 
Decaumont's views, though divergent, provide useful pointers towards the different elements 
which form the basis of a presidential power, namely the direct election of the President and 
the range of constitutional powers available to the Head of State, which allow him to dominate 
political decision-making. A further factor, we could add, would be the existence of a stable 
parliamentary majority to secure the President's position as the undisputed head of the 
executive. Bonnard regards this as the decisive factor in determining the extent to which the 
President is able to control government and, more importantly, prime ministerial action: 'sous 
la Cinquieme Republique, quand Ie President peut s'appuyer sur une majorite parlementaire, 
Ie Premier ministre n'existe que par la volonte du President'.16 What he fails to acknowledge, 
however, is that differences in the composition of the parliamentary majority supporting the 
President can affect his exercise of power. This was not an issue for de Gaulle and 
Pompidou, since both received the backing of a so-called 'majorite presidentielle'. Giscard 
d'Estaing, on the other hand, came from a minority movement within the right-wing majority 
and, as our later discussion will show, this affected the way in which he was able to impose 
his presidential authority from 1976 onwards. 
Unlike Gicquel, who takes a rather dim view of Pompidou's exercise of power,17 Decaumont 
argues that the Fifth Republic owes its continued stability to its second President, who 
ensured the successful transformation of the regime from a highly personalised vision into a 
permanent set of institutions. 18 Consequently, she firmly rejects the way in which some 
POlitical analysts have employed the term 'presidentialism' negatively, in order to refer to what 
they see as the degeneration of the parliamentary regime established by the 1958 
Constitution.19 Presidentialism in the French context, she argues, is a coherent political 
system in its own right, one which combines important aspects of both parliamentary and 
presidential regimes to produce a dominant Head of State: 'du regime presidentiel, il (Ie 
President) tire la vigueur du pouvoir executif par l'intermediaire du suffrage populaire; du 
regime parlementaire, if Mneticie du soutien constant de la coalition majoritaire. Regime 
finalise, Ie presidentialisme est avant tout au service du Chef de I'Etat,.20 
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This interpretation was shared by Pompidou himself, who clearly regarded the ambiguous 
nature of the Fifth Republic as its greatest strength: 'notre systeme, precisement parce qu'it 
est Mtard, est peut-etre plus souple qu'un systeme logique: les «corniauds» sont souvent 
plus intel/igents que les chiens de pure race,.21 Roussel asserts that Pompidou was so 
attached to this notion of institutional flexibility that he intervened in the CCC debates to 
ensure that certain articles of the Constitution relating to the presidential function retained 
their ambivalence?2 This was not because Pompidou wished to reduce the level of power 
enjoyed by the Head of State; on the contrary, Pompidou's writings and his actions as 
President of the Republic strongly suggest that, like de Gaulle, he favoured flexibility precisely 
because it facilitated the establishment of a powerful presidency. Moreover, this would 
explain why Pompidou rejected the possibility of a US-style presidency for France, since such 
a system would almost certainly have made the Head of State more accountable to 
Parliament than under the 1958 Constitution?3 
According to Duverger, there is little to distinguish Pompidou's exercise of power from that of 
his predecessor, and he refers to their collective mandates as 'un bloc de pouvoir homogene, 
en forme de monarchie presidentielle,.24 Georgel takes this one step further by labelling the 
whole period from 1959 to 1986 as that of 'une demonarchie,.25 Although one may 
understand the reasoning behind such an assessment, it must be said that Georgel's notion 
of the Gaullist period as an unbroken continuum, unaffected by events, is oversimplified. De 
Gaulle's ambivalent approach to the 1965 presidential election campaign is one good 
illustration of the extent to which the boundaries of presidential intervention remain flexible. 
Prior to the first round of voting, de Gaulle favoured a non- interventionist approach, allowing 
his election team, led by the Prime Minister, to campaign on his behalf. During the run-up to 
the second ballot, however, de Gaulle descended into the political arena to explain and 
defend government policy. Similarly, we observed how Pompidou had initially allowed 
Chaban-Delmas to assume full control over national affairs, before opting to re-appropriate 
this area of policy-making, when the Premier's high public profile threatened to detract from 
his presidential authority. What Duverger and Georgel fail to take into account, therefore, is 
that the way in which presidential power is exercised under the Fifth Republic will also be 
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determined by factors outside of the Constitution, which are unique to each presidency. In 
her analysis of the Pompidou presidency, Decaumont acknowledges that constitutional theory 
and practice do give rise to different degrees of presidentialism because the level of 
ministerial subordination will depend upon the agenda, personality and public perceptions of 
each President. It will also, she might have added, depend upon the political conjuncture 
within each presidency operates. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, a distinction may be made between Pompidou's 
style of leadership and that of de Gaulle; whereas the General had been happy to delegate 
considerable responsibility for domestic policy-making, routine administrative decisions and 
relations with the parliamentary majority to his ministers in order to focus upon foreign policy 
and defence,26 Pompidou sought to bring all areas of government business under presidential 
control. 27 It is this crucial difference which must be borne in mind when distinguishing 
between de Gaulle and Pompidou's preSidencies. For all their similarities, it is undeniable 
that their exercise of preSidential power differed. Not that Pompidou's early presidential 
declarations indicated that he intended to govern any differently from de Gaulle?8 As time 
passed, however, it became increasingly clear that he did not share de Gaulle's view of the 
President as an 'arbitre au-dessus des partis', but favoured a more politically-engaged Head 
of State. The consolidation of presidential power, which took place under the Pompidou's 
leadership, is neatly encapsulated by Viansson-Ponte's description of the regime as one of 
'hypergaul/isme',29 and his assertion that 'il [Pompidou] gouveme la ou de Gaulle Ie plus 
souvent se contentait de regner. 3D 
Pompidou's extension of presidential control only a few months after his election in 1969 was, 
we have argued, sparked by the feeling that his institutional pre-eminence was being 
undermined by Premier Chaban Delmas. We would also contend that this decision may have 
been partly influenced by his experience as Prime Minister under de Gaulle. After six years at 
Matignon, Pompidou had a greater knowledge of governmental dossiers than any of his 
appointed ministers, which automatically placed him in a commanding position and made him 
unwilling to relinquish control as Head of State. Backed by the massive parliamentary 
112 
majority returned in the 1968 elections, Pompidou had no difficulty imposing his style of 
government upon the members of his administration. 
Arguably one of the best illustrations of what Hayward and Wright refer to as Pompidou's 
'hyper-presidentialist' interpretation of the Constitution was his proposal to shorten the 
presidential mandate from 7 to 5 years, so that it coincided with that of the legislature.31 This 
was justified by the President on the grounds that 'Ia regIe du septennat ne correspond plus 
au r61e que Ie President de la Repub/ique joue dans la definition des orientations generales 
de la po/itique nationale,32 Such was the increase in the level of presidential intervention in 
government affairs that Pompidou felt a five-year mandate would be more appropriate. 
Moreover, it might reduce the likelihood of voters electing a majority which opposed the 
President - one of the burning issues, and indeed the greatest presidential concern, of the 
1973 legislative campaign.33 Far from becoming a public vote-catcher, however, the project 
ended up being abandoned due to insufficient parliamentary support.34 
3.2 'Le systeme jusqu'au bout de sa logique?'35 
In a hastily organised electoral contest following Georges Pompidou's sudden death in April 
1974, Valery Giscard d'Estaing narrowly beat his main left-wing rival, Frangois Mitterrand, to 
become the first non-Gaullist to be elected President of the Fifth Republic.36 As candidate 'de 
la continuite et de la nouveaute', Giscard made clear his intention to remain faithful to a 
presidentialist interpretation of the Constitution. This message was implicit in his first 
campaign press conference, when he chose to appear alongside a picture of Georges 
Pompidou. In addition to constituting an obvious mark of respect for the late President, this 
set-up was designed to establish a sense of continuity between Pompidou's exercise of 
power and Giscard's interpretation of the presidential role. Nevertheless, Giscard did 
acknowledge the need to strengthen the role of Parliament and the Constitutional Council, as 
well as to increase the level of co-operation between government and opposition parties.37 
Therefore, although he clearly endorsed the President's position as head of the French 
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executive, Giscard's early statements seemed to suggest that his would be a more open style 
of presidency with the possibility for greater institutional balance.38 
Despite these pre-election assurances, there is ample evidence to support the view that, 
during his first two years in office, Giscard tightened the presidential grip upon government 
and behaved more like a 'super-president'?9 From the very first cabinet meeting following his 
election, Giscard indicated that he did not share the view that the Head of State should act as 
a kind of constitutional monarch, but that he intended to govern effectively in order to 
implement his preSidential programme - 'J'exercerai pleinement ma fonction presidentielle et 
les responsabi/ites qui en de co ulent. Je travaillerai directement avec mes ministres,.40 
Giscard's decision to exploit his powers to the full resulted in an increase in presidential 
interference in policy-making, proving that he was just as willing as his predecessors to adopt 
a presidential reading of the Constitution. 
The publication of so-called presidential 'Iettres directives' designed to orient government 
action is just one example of the way in which Giscard used his position to undermine that of 
Premier Jacques Chirac. Prior to 1974, these policy directives had remained confidential, and 
were sent exclusively to the Prime Minister, who would then liase with the Ministers 
concerned. 41 This gave, at least, some semblance of government autonomy. By abandoning 
this practice and opting to render such letters public, Giscard aimed to show that, contrary to 
article 20 of the Constitution, it was the President of the Republic, and not the government, 
Who decides and directs government policy. Furthermore, by addressing these directives to 
the Ministers concerned, without having first informed the Prime Minister, Giscard disregarded 
any notion of government hierarchy set out in article 21. 
The number of preSidential 'conseils restreints' also increased, as did the appOintment of 
personal advisors (often without a parliamentary mandate), in particular those concerned with 
POlitical and media issues.42 By 1978, there were 23 members of the preSidential 'secretariat 
generaf, compared to only 17 when Giscard came to power.43 This rise in the number of 
Elysee staff stands in direct contrast to the President's request in May 1974 that his ministers 
reduce 'leur cabinet ministeriel et [ ... jl'intervention entre eux des services administratifs,.44 At 
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the time, this was portrayed as part of the Giscardian plan to modernise France's institutions, 
by stripping away excessive administration to produce a more up-to-date and efficient system 
of government. In retrospect, however, it may be argued that Giscard sought to encourage 
the down-sizing of government administration, whilst at the same time expanding his own 
team of advisors, in order to enhance the level of presidential control over decision-making. 
Giscard also nominated ministers who had not first received prime ministerial approval, as 
dictated by article 8 of the Constitution. In January 1976, for instance, he decided to reshuffle 
the cabinet without involving Prime Minister Chirac in the decision-making process. 45 For the 
Gaullist Premier, the nature and extent of Giscard's interventions, which were short-circuiting 
government action, became intolerable.46 Following a final disagreement with the President 
over the date of the next legislative elections, Chirac seized the initiative and resigned, 
issuing a short statement to the press which left no doubt as to the principal reason for his 
departure: 'je ne dispose pas des moyens que j'estime aujourd'hui necessaires pour assurer 
efficacement mes fonctions de Premier Ministre et, dans ces conditions, j'ai decide d'y mettre 
fin'.47 
It is certainly ironic that a Gaullist should have become the first Premier to reject the 
convention of prime ministerial subordination, by demanding 'un renforcement sans 
equivoque de I'autorite du Premier ministre,.48 Not since the inauguration of the regime in 
1958 had there been such an overt condemnation of presidentialism from a departing 
Premier, nor such a public display of ministerial insubordination. Giscard's refusal to grant 
Chirac greater autonomy, though hardly unique in the history of the Fifth Republic, was also 
somewhat paradoxical given his former criticism of de, Gaulle's exercise of preSidential power 
and his defence of parliamentary powers before his election to the Elysee. However, as Avril 
observes, Giscard did not appoint Chirac in order to share executive power, but because his 
nomination satisfied Gaullist Party expectations that its support for Giscard be appropriately 
rewarded. 49 Having decided not to dissolve the National Assembly in 1974 for fear of 
reducing the right-wing majority, Giscard's 'presidential majority' depended upon the 
disciplined backing of the Gaullists, as his own party, the Independent Republicans, had only 
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54 deputes compared to the UDR's 185.50 By appointing Chirac to Matignon, Giscard was 
able to win the confidence of the Gaullists and, consequently, a stable parliamentary majority 
upon which to rest his power. After his acrimonious split with Chirac, however, Giscard could 
no longer rely on the unreserved support of the UDR to pass government legislation. The 
effective loss of this presidential majority would have an important impact upon the nature and 
extent of Giscard's power between 1976-81. 
Until Chirac's resignation, the President had played a leading role in policy orientation, secure 
in the knowledge that Gaullist party loyalty to the Premier would guarantee his reform 
programme a smooth passage through Parliament. But without the automatic backing of the 
Gaullists from August 1976 onwards, government legislation risked being defeated unless 
negotiations managed to produce sufficient parliamentary support. To avoid becoming too 
closely associated with such party political bargaining and possible government defeats, 
Giscard revised his highly interventionist political strategy in favour of a more arbitrational 
interpretation of the presidency. The nomination of the economist, Raymond Barre, as 
Chirac's replacement, was the first step in Giscard's re-definition of his presidential role: 'Le 
Premier minisfre a efe nomme pour redresser /'economie', he stated, 'c'esf sa ffJche 
principale,.51 Having handed over control for economic affairs to his Prime Minister at the 
very moment when France was entering a period of severe recession, Giscard ensured that 
Barre bore the brunt of public disenchantment with unpopular government policy decisions. 
Furthermore, the choice of a 'non-polifique' as Premier provided the President with an 
opportunity to remind the majority that he alone had the power to make ministerial 
appointments and would not be held to ransom by any political party.52 Finally, Giscard 
transferred responsibility for co-ordinating gover~ment relations with the now fragile 
parliamentary majority from the Prime Minister to three Ministers of State, Olivier Guichard, 
Michel Poniatowski and Jean Lecanuet, each of whom represented different currents within 
the majority - another move designed to distance the presidency from any inter-party 
squabbling. 53 
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3.2.1 La derive monarchique 
For the rest of his mandate Giscard sought refuge in the orthodox Gaullist notion of a Head of 
State above the party fray. In a lengthy press conference at the headquarters of Radio-
France, on 21 November 1978, Giscard reminded journalists that 'Le President de la 
Republique ne s'occupe pas des partis. /I s'occupe de la vie institutionnelle de la France [ ... ] 
Le President est celui qui veille sur Ie pont du navire [ ... ] son r61e est de se preoccuper de la 
duree et de ce qu'jf adviendra de la France,.54 Presenting himself as a symbol of continuity 
and vision,55 however, Giscard was obliged to abandon his electoral pledge to reduce the 
presidential mandate to five years.56 Similarly, his new-found mistrust of the party system, 
though somewhat at odds with his political background as leader of the Republicains 
Independants (RI), forced him to renounce his former plans to introduce proportional 
representation, which would have favoured the multiplication of parties within Parliament. To 
those listening to Giscard's speech commemorating the Fifth Republic's twentieth 
anniversary, it must have seemed as if time had stood still; the President's words could easily 
have been those of de Gaulle two decades earlier: 'Mon r61e comme President de la 
Republique est de ne laisser aucun de ces partis faire Ie moindre pas vers I'affaiblissement 
des institutions, et notamment de celles qui exercent Ie pouvoir executif.57 
Yet Giscard's position was politically much weaker than de Gaulle's had ever been. Not only 
had he effectively lost his hold over the preSidential majority in the National Assembly, but 
polls in the run-up to the 1978 parliamentary elections forecast a left-wing victory as an 
increasingly likely prospect. Furthermore, in attempting to nurture a more aloof, 
contemplative image as national judge, Giscard risked creating the impression that political 
power was slipping away from the Elysee, as he no longer appeared to be directly 
determining and animating government action. At the time, this move away from 
'I'interpretation maximaliste de la fonction presidentielle' was interpreted as a threat to 
presidential supremacy within the regime. Some commentators warned that a 'crise du 
presidentialisme' was taking place under Giscard's leadership. 58 One such observer was 
former Gaullist Prime Minister, Michel Debre, who publicly questioned whether Giscard 
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possessed the right temperament to be President of the Fifth Republic, before going on to 
predict a potential 'crise du commandement politique' if Giscard did not begin to govern with 
greater vision, clarity and dynamism. 59 Duverger also criticised Giscard for eroding the 
President's image by over-involving himself in personal rivalry over the Paris mayoral 
election, in which Jacques Chirac was standing. In an article published in Le Monde, 
Duverger reminded the President that: 'Ie rai ne doit jamais se mettre au niveau d'un feodal, 
si puissant qu'i/ soil' and urged him to rise above such matters and regain the presidential 
heights.60 
Debre and Duverger's comments pOint to the emergence of a different experience of 
presidentialism from 1976 to 1981. For without the guaranteed support of the Gaullist 
parliamentary majority, Giscard began to exploit certain privileges attached to his function. 
This included appointing political allies, friends and family to key posts throughout French 
administration and ousting his adversaries from such positions, as a means of counteracting 
the damaging effect which this loss of political security was having upon his presidential 
authority.61 But while this may have been a reflection of presidential vulnerability, it 
nevertheless showed that any President, who found his political position weakened, could fall 
back upon the more monarchical trappings of the presidency to regain and even to extend his 
hold over the State. Political commentators have come to refer to this interpretation of 
preSidential power, which relies increasingly upon symbolic props and lofty rhetoric, as 'Ia 
derive monarchique'. 
It may seen somewhat paradoxical that Giscard's transformation from the highly 
interventionist President of 1974-76 to the figurehead of 1976-81 attracted criticism, given that 
this style of presidency bore striking similarities to the one championed by de Gaulle from 
1958 to 1969. If we cast our minds back to Giscard's 1974 election campaign, when he 
presented himself as young, progressive and above all committed to listening to the needs of 
ordinary people, however, we may understand the reason for this reaction to Giscard's 
increasingly imperious preSidential style towards the end of the 1970s. Voters had expected 
Giscard to breathe new life into the presidency, so when he began to behave in a distant and 
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authoritarian manner it sat uneasily next to his earlier image of dynamism and 'decontraction'. 
Furthermore, unlike de Gaulle, whose grandiose political style was consistent with the 
historical and visionary role he played during the Second World War, Giscard's lofty 
behaviour seemed inappropriate and at odds with the kind of presidential leadership he had 
initially promised. 
This negative impression was compounded by revelations of political scandals implicating the 
President and by the increasing frequency of questionable governmental practices, in 
particular the use of article 49-3 of the Constitution. By invoking this article, which Giscard 
described as 'un element central de notre dispositif constitutionnel',62 the Prime Minister was 
able to turn a vote upon a piece of legislation into a vote of confidence. It proved an effective 
means of pushing through unpopular policies without fear of defeat, as both Giscard and 
Barre knew that it was not in the interests of the Gaullist party to provoke an institutional crisis 
by joining with the Left to bring down the government. Nevertheless, the repeated use of 
article 49-3 was perceived by parliamentarians as an abuse of the Constitution since it 
prevented key issues from being democratically debated. In addition, the ever-worsening 
economic climate eventually led the Barre administration to introduce harsh policies in the 
fields of law and order and immigration, conservative policies which sat uneasily amongst the 
promises of 'ouverture' and 'liMra/isme' that had brought Giscard to power.63 
Whatever the public and political perceptions of Giscard, his period in office demonstrates 
that presidential power within the French context is a flexible notion, dependent upon 
variables outside of the Constitution, including the composition of the parliamentary majority, 
the nature of presidential-prime ministerial relations, the personality and agenda of the 
President and the expectations of the electorate. It was this capacity to adapt presidential 
power to changes in the political conjuncture, which enabled Giscard to create an overall 
impression of continued (and some might argue enhanced) control during his last years in 
office, despite the fact that his position had been effectively weakened by the split in the 
majority. In this respect Giscard's mandate, more than those of his two predecessors, 
confirmed the presidency as the ultimate political goal for any party seeking power under the 
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Fifth Republic. It is not surprising then to find that during his period in office the Parti 
socialiste began to rethink its electoral strategy and restructure its internal organisation 
according to a broadly presidential agenda. Ironically for Giscard this process of 
presidentialisation, which gained significant momentum after his election to the Elysee in 
1974, ultimately ended in defeat when his hopes of a second mandate were dashed following 
the election of his socialist rival, Franc;:ois Mitterrand, on 10 May 1981. 
3.3 Mitterrand and the 'presidentialisation' of the French 
Socialist Party 
As leader of the Parti socialiste (PS) from 1971 until his presidential election ten years later, 
Franc;:ois Mitterrand continued to be a major critic of the exercise of presidential power under 
the Fifth Republic. Throughout this period, he attacked what he perceived as the growing 
tendency for French Presidents to abuse their authority in order to control all aspects of 
political life. In particular, Mitterrand focused his attentions upon Giscard d'Estaing, whom he 
held responsible for the regime's decline into a quaSi-dictatorship by the end of the 1970s: 
'/'actuel President concentre entre ses mains les trois pouvoirs traditionnels, executif, legislatif 
et judicia ire et Ie pouvoir modeme de !'information, if gomme les institutions, tire sur toutes les 
cordes, extrait des textes tout leur jus, cree un regime qui n'a d'equivalent nulle part, un 
regime non-dit ou la demo era tie formelle couvre une marchandise importee du bric a brac des 
dictateurs ,.64 Giscard's extension of the presidential sphere of influence was, he argued, 
eroding parliamentary power, mainly as a result of the repeated use of article 49-3 to push 
through government legislation, which risked being defeated due to the lack of a presidential 
majority in Parliament. Mitterrand denounced the regular application of article 49-3 on the 
grounds that this undermined the role of Parliament.65 Nevertheless, he clearly appreciated 
the potential merits of such a mechanism, as he showed no desire to incorporate a proposal 
to restrict its application into the Left's plans for constitutional reform. 
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Mitterrand also accused both Giscard and Pompidou of being overly partisan in their exercise 
of power. In a parliamentary debate in February 1973, Mitterrand took the opportunity to 
remind Pompidou that 'Ie r61e du president de la Repub/ique n'est pas de creer Ie desordre 
mais d'harmoniser les inevitables contradictions commandees par un grand peuple,.66 Four 
years later, he launched a similar attack upon Giscard, whom he believed was too closely 
involved in day to day political affairs to represent the interests of the country as a whole - '/a 
France a besoin d'un President pour les Frangais et non d'un parfisan,.67 Such comments 
seem to indicate that Mitterrand favoured a return to a more arbitrational interpretation of the 
presidential function, whereby the Head of State is the guardian of the Constitution and a 
symbol of national unity, as opposed to the driving force behind government policy. This was 
certainly the message conveyed by his assurances that 'un President de la Repub/ique 
socia/iste aura pour mission de faire respecter la Constitution dans sa lettre, de verifier que 
les usages n'ont pas devie I'esprit de la Constitution [ ... ], et faire que I'on trouve un moment 
ou Ie Parlement devra retrouver sa fonction qui a aujourd'hui pratiquement disparu,.68 
Yet this reading of the Constitution was at odds with Mitterrand's own position as a 
presidential candidate, whose main political objective was to ensure the implementation of the 
Common Programme. For just as he criticised Giscard for protecting the interests of those 
right-wing voters who brought him to power, so Mitterrand was open to accusations that, as 
PreSident, his actions would be determined by the social, economic and political concerns of 
the Left. Given his role as one of the key actors in the elaboration of the Left's joint electoral 
programme in 1972, it was hard to believe that Mitterrand would be prepared, or indeed able, 
to withdraw from domestic politics to a position above the party fray if he were elected. In this 
case, one might suggest that his rejection of Giscard's attempts to be '8 la fois arbitre et 
capitaine' was unrealistic.69 Without de Gaulle's historical legitimacy, all 'presidentiables', 
including Mitterrand, were now the products of party machines. Consequently, it seemed 
likely that the presidency would take on a more party political dimension in de Gaulle's wake 
even if, as Mitterrand pointed out, this was not explicit in the Constitution.7o 
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As the above discussion shows, Mitterrand's interrogation of the Pompidou and Giscardian 
administrations did not always help to produce a clearer picture of what he considered to be 
the correct parameters of presidential power. More often than not, it added to the 
contradictions and ambiguities that had come to characterise his interpretation of the 
presidency since the 1960s. This confusion was certainly not helped by Mitterrand's sporadic 
assertions that 'Ia France n'est pas [ ... ] dans un regime presidentiel, elle est dans un regime 
parlementaire,.71 For although he may have been correct in claiming that a balanced reading 
of the Constitution should have established a parliamentary regime, with the Prime Minister at 
the head of the French executive,72 Mitterrand's argument was substantially undermined by 
the fact that none of the institutional changes put forward by the Left seriously threatened to 
alter the Fifth Republic's presidential bias. In fact, one such reform, that of the reduction of 
the Head of State's mandate to five years, seemed more likely to reinforce the presidency as 
the main source of political power. This was, after all, Pompidou's principal motivation for 
wanting to shorten the presidential term of office in 1973. 
On the one hand, Mitterrand continued to demand a more faithful application of the 
Constitution, with less preSidential intervention and enhanced prime ministerial autonomy. On 
the other, he proposed only limited measures aimed at achieving this objective. The 
Common Programme did include some elements of institutional reform, but on the whole it 
was a party political document concerned with instigating far-reaching social and economic 
change. In spite of his bitter criticism of presidential politics during the 1970s, therefore, all 
the evidence pOints to the fact that Mitterrand had begun to accept and adapt to the 
predominantly preSidential nature of the regime. This reconciliation became much clearer in 
1981 when, having been successfully elected as the first socialist President of the Fifth 
Republic, he made the following declaration: 'J'exercerai dans leur plenitude les pouvoirs que 
me confere la Constitution. Ni plus ni moins [ ... ]. Les institutions n'etaient pas faites a mon 
intention. Mais elles sont bien faites pour moi'. 73 
Mitterrand's historic victory brought an end to over two decades of opposition for the French 
Left; opposition not only in the sense that it had been deprived of executive power within the 
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regime, but also in terms of its hostile attitude towards the presidency since the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 1962. Certainly, Mitterrand still acknowledged that the balance of power 
within the Republic was far from perfect, but as the above remark illustrates, he no longer 
questioned the legitimacy of de Gaulle's institutions, nor did he show much inclination to 
fundamentally challenge the principle of presidential supremacy inherent in the Constitution. 
In the following examination of Mitterrand's leadership of the Socialist Party between 1971 
and 1981, we will show how this acceptance of presidential politics saw the party transformed 
from an essentially anti-personalist movement, primarily driven by the quest for local 
representation and parliamentary power, into a mass rally around Mitterrand's persona or, as 
Mitterrand himself described it - 'un certain rayonnement lie a ma personne,.74 
3.3.1 Sowing the seeds of change: the Epinay congress 1971 
The roots of this reconciliation to French presidentialism date back to the Epinay Congress of 
June 1971, when Mitterrand re-emerged as the central figure in the non-Communist Left's 
quest for power. At this meeting of PS delegates, Mitterrand's calls for 'un front de classe' 
based upon the union of the Left and, more specifically, the definition of a joint PS-PCF 
electoral programme, won him the support of an unlikely alliance of factions within party.75 
Collectively, their votes were enough to see his motion narrowly carried and his appointment 
as Socialist Party First Secretary followed. 76 Once installed at the helm of the PS, Mitterrand 
set about shaping it into a credible presidential party, as well as a party of government, 
something he had never attempted to do as leader of the old FGDS. 
Interestingly, the Epinay debates themselves provid~ little evidence to suggest that those who 
backed Mitterrand at the time were consciously servicing a presidential strategy. In his 
keynote speech, Mitterrand focused almost entirely upon 'Ia vocation majoritaire' of the PS 
and the need to re-conquer 'Ie terrain perdu aux communistes' by means of a joint electoral 
Platform, without making any direct reference to the presidency. Considering that this office 
was now firmly embedded in the political culture of the Fifth Republic, it is perhaps surprising 
that Mitterrand chose to exclude it from what he must have known would be one of the most 
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important speeches of his career. This omission is all the more striking if one considers that 
so much of Mitterrand's political discourse from 1958 onwards had been preoccupied with the 
question of presidential 'pouvoir personnef. 
There are, however, several reasons why Mitterrand might have avoided alluding to the 
presidency at Epinay. Firstly, any acknowledgement of the importance of presidential power 
could have potentially been misconstrued, resulting in the same accusations of hypocrisy and 
personal ambition that he had encountered in May 1968. Some factions within the Left were 
still highly uncomfortable with the personalist aspects of presidential politics. It would, 
therefore, have been ill-advised for Mitterrand to broach such a sensitive subject, if he wanted 
to rally support for his leadership. Secondly, Epinay may be seen as an exercise in political 
realism, with Mitterrand tackling the Left's problems in order of perceived priority; there was 
no pOint in broaching a contentious subject like the presidency, when the PS had yet to agree 
upon an effective electoral strategy and a detailed legislative programme. This interpretation 
is implicit in Mitterrand's remarks that 'i! n'y aura pas d'al/iance electorale s'i! n'y a pas 
programme electoral. "n'y aura pas de majorite commune s'i! n'y a pas de contrat de 
majorite. "n'y aura pas de gouvernement de gauche, s'i! n'y a pas de contrat de 
gouvernement'.77 Finally, it could also be argued that the presidency was no longer an 
institution which Mitterrand actively sought to challenge. It is not without significance that 'Ie 
monopole [. . .] de I'argent' had apparently replaced de Gaulle's presidential omnipotence as 'Ie 
veritable ennemf of French society in Mitterrand's Epinay speech. 78 
If, as Portelli maintains, delegates were simply selecting a strategy for legislative elections 
with no hidden presidential agenda,79 the question remains why so many opted to support 
Mitterrand, who was not even a card-carrying member of the PS when the congress 
opened?8o Given that there was very little ideological ground separating Mitterrand's Epinay 
motion from that of his main rival, the incumbent PS leader, Alain Savary,81 there is a case to 
argue that those PS members who backed Mitterrand did so because he had a proven track 
record as a presidential contender. This is certainly the view of Schneider and Du Roy, who 
describe the real objective of the Epinay Congress as one of leadership selection, as opposed 
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to policy elaboration.82 In his account of events at Epinay, Giesbert also acknowledges the 
partial validity of this assessment, but he contends that it was also 'en voulant terrasser Guy 
Mollet que Ie congres a foudroye Alain Savary, son al/ie,.83 In other words, Giesbert sees 
Mitterrand's victory as more indicative of a rejection of the enduring influence which Mollet 
exercised over party decision-making and organisation via his colleague Savary, than a 
positive endorsement of Mitterrand's leadership qualities, political agenda or presidential 
chances. 84 It could, however, be argued that this in itself signalled an awareness amongst 
delegates that the party had to break with the past in order to build successfully a new and 
unified socialist movement around an electable personality. Having listened to Mitterrand's 
speech at Epinay, few could have been in any doubt that he shared this long term vision of a 
rejuvenated party or that he possessed the strong leadership qualities needed to turn such an 
objective into a political reality.85 
Mitterrand had learned two important lessons from his political battles of the 1960s, the first 
being that the PS needed to adapt its electoral strategy to the bipolarising tendencies of the 
regime; the second that political power under the Fifth Republic was first and foremost 
presidential, The most effective means of gaining control of the State to bring about the 
change of society proposed by the Left was, therefore, through the election of a socialist 
PreSident. To achieve this, Mitterrand realised that any candidate would require the backing 
of a strong and unified movement over which he had full control. In the following analysis we 
will see that these preoccupations played a significant role in determining the way in which 
the PS evolved throughout the 1970s. Under Mitterrand's leadership the party went through a 
gradual process of structural and ideological change that reflected an implicit acceptance of 
this new presidential reality and the imperatives which it imposed. A fact which Mitterrand 
Would eventually admit in the run-up to 1981: 'Ie chef de l'Etat dispose de grands pouvoirs 
qUe nous ne lui contestons pas [ ... 1, que nous ne lui contestons d'autant moins que nous 
entendons no us-memes exercer ces pouvoirs,.86 
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3.3.2 'Une revolution silencieuse~7 
From an organisational perspective, the presidentialisation of the PS brought about a 
redistribution of decision-making powers, which established a hierarchy within the party 
closely resembling that of the Fifth Republic.88 Far from serving as 'the mouthpiece for a 
collective leadership' as had originally been envisaged when the party was formed in May 
1969,89 Mitterrand soon acquired a pseudo-presidential status as First Secretary, which 
enabled him to impose his political ideology upon the PS. This is ably illustrated by the nature 
of the party's relationship to the PCF throughout the 1970s; the PS-PCF alliance and the 
signature of the Common Programme in June 1972 were the result of Mitterrand's personal 
conviction that the Communist Party had to be recognised as a political and sociological 
reality (and potentially fertile territory for PS recruitment), but nothing more. This was not a 
view shared by other key groups within the party, such as CERES, which regarded the PS 
and PCF as equal partners, and the PSU, which wholly disapproved of the Left Alliance. By 
the end of the 1970s, Mitterrand's endeavours to manoeuvre himself into an unassailable 
Position as party leader left him open to the same criticisms of monarchical comportment 
being levelled at Giscard d'Estaing. Not only did the structure of the PS come to parallel that 
of the regime, but so Mitterrand's leadership too took on certain characteristics associated 
with traditional presidential practices under the Fifth Republic. 
Whilst the Socialist Party's adaptation to presidential politics ultimately dates back to Epinay 
When Mitterrand was elected First Secretary, it was not until after the 1974 presidential 
election that its effects upon the internal workings of the party became more apparent. 
Despite the fact that Mitterrand failed to beat Giscard in the second ballot in 1974, the 
closeness of the contest was generally interpreted as evidence of his effective leadership of 
the party since Epinay.9o Mitterrand was able to seize upon the subsequent surge of support 
for him within the party to strengthen his control over the internal workings of the PS. He 
began this process by calling for a great gathering of socialist forces, including those smaller 
left-wing movements which had so far chosen to retain their independence from the PS, in a 
bid to broaden its electorate.91 This meeting, known as the 'Assises du socialisme', took 
place at Nantes in October 1974. Described by Johnson as 'a stage-managed consecration 
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to the presidential Mitterrand',92 it had a positive impact upon his immediate efforts to 
presidentialise the PS; the readiness of groups like the PSU and CFDT to respond to such an 
appeal further endorsed Mitterrand as the central rallying point for the whole of the French 
Left, and its best chance of overcoming ideological divergences in order to win power. In the 
long-run, however, the Assises proved more problematic for Mitterrand, mainly due to its role 
in precipitating the PSU's decision to join Socialist Party ranks.93 Not only has this been 
generally regarded as a major contributory factor in the gradual disintegration of the PCF-PS 
alliance, but rather ironically, it also led to the emergence of PSU leader, Michel Rocard, as a 
serious rival for control of the party in 1979. As we will see, Mitterrand's determination to 
protect himself from such challenges led him to become increasingly manipulative and 
authoritarian in his leadership of the PS.94 
Arguably the most important changes to the structure of the PS occurred around the time of 
the Pau Congress in 1975, when Mitterrand successfully evicted CERES from the party 
leadership (Ie secretariaf).95 Having helped him secure victory at Epinay, the presence of 
CERES representatives at executive level had become an irritation to Mitterrand; not only due 
to their known leadership aspirations, but also because they intended to assume the role of 
arbiter between the PS and PCF, and this did not feature in Mitterrand's strategy for relations 
with the Communists. The departure of CERES cleared the way for the First Secretary to 
sUrround himself with loyal supporters, who would not question his political strategy or vision 
for the party's future. 
The creation of so-called 'delegations generales et nationales' and 'rapporteurs speciaux' 
may be seen as the next important stage in Mitterrand's domination of the PS. In his study of 
the party's evolution throughout the 1970s, Salomo'n notes that these groups and individuals, 
Who were personally appointed by the First Secretary to fulfil specific missions or to examine 
certain areas of policy-making, were under no obligation to work with the party 
representatives assigned to the same tasks, since their posts lay outside of PS statutes. This 
unofficial status did not, however, prevent such 'special advisors' from participating (with 
increasing frequency) in meetings of the Executive Bureau and Secretariat.96 Salomon notes 
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that their presence swelled the size of these bodies to such an extent that they ceased to fulfil 
their intended roles effectively. It is more than mere coincidence that around the same time, 
Mitterrand began to hold more informal, private meetings, where important issues would be 
discussed and decided amongst advisors, before being presented as quasi faits-accomplis to 
these official bodies.97 Without CERES to challenge decisions within the Secretariat, 
Mitterrand had no trouble imposing them upon the executive. 
Mitterrand's appointment of advisors and committees answerable to him alone formed part of 
a strategy designed to enable him to oversee all aspects of decision-making within the party. 
For whilst there may have been an expectation that the First Secretary would not concern 
himself with the day to day running of the PS when he was first elected, by the mid 1970s it 
was clear that he intended neither ideology, nor organisation to escape his control. As Bizot 
remarked, 'il sait toujours tres bien qui fait quoi, il se mele des choses dont il se preoccupait 
peu auparavant, rapide comme un papil/on et tres precis - c'est un renforcement de la 
presence de Mitterrand,.98 Mitterrand even called upon the services of two management 
Consultants to advice him on the best way of restructuring the party to compete effectively 
within the regime. The framework they proposed bears a striking similarity to that of the Fifth 
Republic and imposed strict limits upon the power of militants and party representatives, 
whilst according 'une liberte infiniment trop grande a la personnalite qui se trouve a la tete du 
partt. 99 
Mitterrand's success in transforming the PS into a movement centred round his leadership is 
illustrated by the fact that his efforts to place his supporters in key positions throughout the 
party met with relatively little opposition. As one party member remarked 'Ie renforcement de 
son pouvoir nous paraissait dans I'evolution naturelie des choses' - most delegates saw it as 
a logical progression or necessary response to the political norms imposed upon the party by 
the regime. 10o However, some concerns were voiced regarding Mitterrand's increasingly 
authoritarian leadership style. At the Pau Congress, for instance, Bizot recalls an anonymous 
letter being circulated amongst delegates drawing their attention to the fact that every issue 
Was being turned into a vote for or against Mitterrand. 101 Following the Left's defeat in 1978, 
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Pierre Mauroy, one of Mitterrand's most loyal colleagues, also began to question what he 
perceived as the exercise of a 'pouvoir personnel a la tete du parti'.102 He disapproved of 
Mitterrand's manipulative style of leadership. Instead of endeavouring to eradicate factional 
rivalry within the party, for example, observers have noted that Mitterrand actively sought to 
exploit the ideological differences between groups in order to maintain his supremacy as First 
Secretary in a classic display of divide and rule. 103 In so doing, Mitterrand was able to portray 
himself as the great unifier without whom the party would be bound to fragment, in the same 
way that de Gaulle had presented his leadership as a choice between coherence and chaos. 
Mauroy regarded such actions as damaging to the party and a sign that Mitterrand had 
become too powerful. Like CERES, he also disapproved of the 'pMnomene de GOur', which 
was growing up around the First Secretary, with individuals competing against one another for 
attention and promotion. 104 
Questioned by the author about these negative appraisals of Mitterrand's leadership style 
towards the end of the 1970s, former socialist President of the National Assembly and loyal 
Mitterrandiste, Louis Mermaz struggled to provide a convincing explanation. Conveniently 
ignoring the fact that it was Mauroy who chose to break with Mitterrand in 1978, Mermaz 
claimed that such criticisms were motivated by envy, as Mauroy found himself outside of 
Mitterrand's inner circle. 105 When pressed to justify the increasing personalisation of the PS 
and the domination of party structures by Mitterrand and his supporters, Mermaz was clearly 
uncomfortable. He contended that it was only natural that any party leader should want to 
sUrround himself with people he trusted, and who shared his political views, before going on 
to repeatedly assert that such actions were part and parcel of 'Ie jeu du pouvoir'. Although 
careful to avoid reproducing the term 'presidentialisation' employed by the author in her 
questions, Mermaz did admit that Mitterrand was 'omnipresent' within the party and 
Understood how best to prevent challenges to his leadership from rivals: 'il savait qu'iI ne 
fal/ait pas les Gombattre, iI fal/ait les enfermer'. This would appear to corroborate Salomon's 
findings that Rocard's membership of the Secretariat enabled Mitterrand to keep a closer eye 
on him, especially as his every move was overseen by Jacques AttalL 106 It also supports our 
OWn view that Mitterrand succeeded in fighting off Rocard's leadership bid at Metz by 
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radicalising his policies and discourse in order to pigeon-hole his challenger into the role of 
party traitor and divider. Unsurprisingly, Mermaz rejected this interpretation of events, 
arguing that Mitterrand had never sought to sabotage Rocard's attempts to become the 
Official PS presidential candidate, but felt such moves were precipitous. 107 This is certainly 
not borne out by opinion polls carried out in the run-up to the 1981 contest, which confirmed 
Rocard as the public's favoured choice for PS candidate. 1D8 If Mitterrand's leadership really 
was about winning State power for the party rather than himself, one questions why he did not 
allow Rocard to stand in 1981, since surveys clearly indicated that he had a better chance of 
Victory. 
Rocard's leadership bid may also be seen as additional evidence of Mitterrand's successful 
transformation of the PS into a presidential machine, since it demonstrates the extent to 
Which factions within the party had adapted to the increasing importance of personalism in 
left-wing politics. Any group wishing to take over the leadership of the party had to first find a 
potential presidential candidate to lead that challenge. Without such an individual, a faction 
stood little chance of attracting the majority backing required to realise its objective. Even 
then Success was not guaranteed, as shown by Rocard's failure to unseat Mitterrand at Metz 
in 1979. Despite his high public profile as a credible 'presidentiab/e', Rocard did not have the 
backing of a majority of factions within the PS itself. This not only prevented him from 
mOunting a successful leadership challenge but, as a result of Mitterrand's efforts to cultivate 
his image as the personification of modern French Socialism, Rocard's actions were easily 
portrayed by Mitterrand's supporters as 'a disloyal attack on the party,.109 
Clearly, the above account provides a very general overview of the impact which presidential 
pOlitics had upon the organisation of the PS during Mitterrand's decade as First Secretary. 
What most commentators, with the notable exception of Olivier Duhamel, fail to underline 
about this process of restructuring is that it was never explicitly acknowledged by the party. 
On the contrary, it was something 'understood' or implied - a kind of tacit agreement 
undertaken by PS members which granted Mitterrand the power to transform the party into a 
movement focused around his leadership. Therefore, although one may agree with Gaffney 
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when he concludes that, during the 1970s, the Socialist Party came to realise that 
personalism was a necessary ingredient in the quest for the presidencY,11o it should be 
pOinted out that this 'realisation', and its effects upon the power structure within the party, 
were not easily admitted or discussed by the PS. As our interview with Louis Mermaz 
showed, the mere mention of 'presidentialisation' still provokes an uneasy reaction from 
senior PS figures, who remain uncomfortable with this highly individualist aspect of Fifth 
Republican politics. 
Mitterrand was certainly well aware of the contentiousness of this issue within the PS. In an 
interview with Le Nouvel Observateur in 1973, he acknowledged that although his election as 
First Secretary did inject an element of personalism into the PS leadership which had 
previously been missing, such a dimension would, in the long-run, prove detrimental to the 
party.111 This statement may, of course, have reflected genuine concern on Mitterrand's part 
that PS policy objectives should not be over-shadowed by the attention being given to his 
leadership. The increasingly personalised nature of Mitterrand's discourse and leadership 
after 1973, however, seems to indicate that it was most likely designed to counter any 
accusations of selfish ambition, which might have jeopardised his position within the party. 
The 'silent revolution', which transformed the internal workings of the PS was also manifest on 
an ideological and discursive level. Mitterrand's speeches and manifestos from the 1974 
presidential contest, for instance, strongly indicate that a reconciliation between the 
presidency and its self-appointed adversary in-chief had already been underway for some 
time. Ten years after Le Coup d'Etat permanent, the question of institutional change had 
ceased to be the burning issue that it had been in 1965.112 From 1969 onwards, voters were 
being asked to make a more traditional political choice between the types of society proposed 
by the Left and the Right. Therefore, although constitutional reform still featured as part of 
Mitterrand's 1974 presidential platform,113 it was largely overshadowed by the economic and 
SOCial policies that he was advocating.114 This reorientation of the Left's priorities was evident 
in the five broad themes on which Mitterrand chose to centre his campaign. 115 No separate 
category was created for 'Institutions' as had been the case for the 1965 election and the 
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1972 Common Programme. When Mitterrand did broach the subject of presidential authority, 
it was not to contest the President's position at the head of the French executive, but to 
highlight the fact that the election of a Socialist to that office would simply guarantee a more 
democratic distribution of power within the existing hierarchy of the Fifth Republic -'if taut que 
Ie President de la Repub/ique soit Ie premier dans I'Etat mais qu'if ne doit plus etre Ie seul'.116 
This constituted a veiled reference to those aspects of the Common Programme, which aimed 
to enhance the powers of Parliament and the judiciary, so that the State no longer ran the risk 
of being wholly incarnated in one individual. 117 
Mitterrand's campaign strategy in 1974 also suggested that he had acquired a sophisticated 
appreciation of French presidential culture. Rather than declare his candidature 
independently as he had in 1965, Mitterrand waited until the parties on the Left called upon 
him to stand as their official candidate before announcing his decision to run.118 As a result, 
his candidacy acquired a legitimacy which had been missing from his first presidential bid, 
and it allowed Mitterrand to present himself as a leader capable of uniting the main political 
movements on the Left towards a common goal. Having been democratically selected as the 
'candidat commun de la gauche', Mitterrand then resigned his post as leader of the PS to 
focus upon his election campaign. Instead of conferring responsibility for its co-ordination 
upon either the PS or the PCF, however, he appointed his own team of advisors, most of 
whom were trusted friends and associates as opposed to leading figures in left-wing 
politics. 119 It was essential for Mitterrand to create a distance between himself and his party 
in order to cultivate a suitably presidential image. This explains his decision to condense the 
Complexities of the Common Programme into a more general platform of themes in the run-up 
to the first round of voting, as well as the readiness on the part of the PS to grant him such a 
margin of manoeuvre.120 It also accounts for the congruence between Mitterrand's and 
Giscard's remarks, as both candidates sought to rise above the party fray in order to attract 
the maximum number of floating voters before the decisive second ballot. After the first round 
of voting Giscard d'Estaing commented that 'if taut que ce soit la France qui gagne', whilst 
Mitterrand said he hoped to 'taire gagner /a France'. Similarly Giscard's chosen slogan in his 
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poster campaign - 'Le President de tous les FranQais' was barely indistinguishable from 
Mitterrand's 'Un president pour tous les FranQais,.121 
Further evidence of Mitterrand's reconciliation to presidential politics may be found in his 
increasingly positive reflections upon de Gaulle's political legacy. During the 1970s, 
Mitterrand's opposition to de Gaulle's exercise of power clearly mellowed, to the point where, 
at times, he seemed to have completely forgotten the bitter attacks on de Gaulle and Gaullist 
Party policy, which characterised his discourse throughout the 1960s - 'moi qui n'ai jamais eM 
gaulliste, j'ai toujours refuse d'etre antl.122 By 1981, Mitterrand readily conceded that de 
Gaulle had been more respectful of constitutional guidelines than either of his successors.123 
In some instances, he even went so far as to liken himself directly to de Gaulle, both in terms 
of his ability to attract cross party support as 'Ie candidat de tous les Francais' and his role in 
the Resistance during the Second World War.124 Of course, it may be the case that having 
experienced the evolution of presidentialism under Pompidou and Giscard, Mitterrand really 
did regard de Gaulle as the least of three evils. It seems more probable, however, that the 
Ps leader's growing affinity with the language and political choices of the regime's founder 
reflected his new understanding of the norms governing of presidential politics. In other 
words, Mitterrand accepted that de Gaulle's eleven years as the first President of the Fifth 
Republic had established certain unofficial criteria, both discursive and behavioural, to which 
any potential presidential contender had to comply. This need to construct an appropriately 
preSidential image for the electorate would explain Mitterrand's attempts to highlight links 
between himself, the Left and de Gaulle. As the leader of the PS, it was difficult for Mitterrand 
to convince voters that he was capable of rising above party political allegiances to govern in 
the interests of all the French. However, by reflecting positively upon de Gaulle's period in 
office and incorporating traditional Gaullist concepts like 'rassemblement', national unity and 
grandeur into his discourse,125 Mitterrand was able to construct a credible presidential 
persona. 
It is here that an important distinction must be made between Mitterrand's national addresses, 
for example television interviews and press conferences (particularly when he was speaking 
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as a presidential candidate), and those delivered before an audience of loyal PS supporters. 
For whilst the former increasingly included classic Gaullist rhetoric,126 the latter remained 
overtly partisan, with a great deal of emphasis placed upon both the PS' identity and 
ideology.127 It is this difference between Mitterrand's public and party discourse which best 
illustrates the dilemma he faced throughout the 1970s, as he sought to reconcile two 
apparently contradictory roles - those of Socialist Party leader and presidential candidate. On 
the one hand, Mitterrand had to tone down the party political references in his national 
speeches in order to convince a wider audience that he possessed the necessary vision and 
statesmanlike qualities to be Head of State - 'je serai I'homme de la reconciliation [ ... ], du 
rassemblement, du dialogue,.128 On the other, he had to reassure the Left of his commitment 
to the Common Programme, by employing a highly partisan language and regularly 
acknowledging his dependency upon the party for his power - 'il ne s'agit pas de moi. C'est Ie 
parti tout en tier qui s'engage maintenant dans la bataille decisive qui deb ute aujourd'hui. 
Sans vous, je ne suis rien,.129 
In his public speeches, Mitterrand sometimes managed to accommodate the dual 
requirement to be both partisan and presidential by using slogans which combined the two 
notions, such as 'Ie rassemblement populaire pour Ie redressement nationaf. 13o 
Nevertheless, it is true to say that his campaigns in both 1974 and 1981 were more politicised 
than any previous presidential bids. As PS First Secretary and one of the leading architects 
of the Common Programme, there was never any doubt that Mitterrand's appointment as 
Head of State would not only bring about a change of leadership, but also a change of 
Political direction for France. 131 Moreover, it was clear to the electorate that this 'changemenf 
Was much more than just vague, political rhetoric; by 1981 it had become '110 propositions 
Pour la France',132 the most detailed presidential m'anifesto that the Fifth Republic had seen. 
It Would seem, therefore, that Mitterrand's appointment as Head of State in 1981 was likely to 
deliver a new style of presidency; not as a result of the institutional reforms he was proposing 
(since they were unlikely to bring about any major changes in the balance of power within the 
regime), but because he appeared determined to make full use of his presidential 
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prerogatives in order to implement the Socialist Party programme - 'je souhaite gagner 
('election presidentielle, je pense la gagner, mais quand je ('aurai gagnee, je ferai tout ce qu'il 
conviendra de faire, dans Ie cadre de la loi, pour gagner les elections legislatives,.133 Never 
before had a presidential contender chosen to associate himself so closely with the political 
objectives of a specific party. In doing so, Mitterrand risked linking his own fate to the 
SUccess or failure of those policies, providing he received the parliamentary majority required 
to realise them. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
Our discussion of the evolution of French presidentialism during the 1970s has shown how 
this period witnessed a consolidation of the presidential interpretation of the Constitution 
which characterised de Gaulle's presidency. In the case of Pompidou, this was hardly 
Surprising; not only had he displayed an acceptance of presidential pre-eminence as de 
Gaulle's Premier between 1962 and 1968, but he also inherited de Gaulle's 1968 landslide 
parliamentary majority to support his presidential leadership. 
That said, it should be acknowledged that, in the early stages of his presidency, Pompidou did 
not restrict the scope of prime ministerial action. There are several possible reasons why he 
decided initially to grant Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas greater pOlitical authority. On the 
one hand, this may have been a conscious choice on the part of the new President, who 
Wanted to make his own mark on the regime by breaking with de Gaulle's style of leadership. 
On the other, one could argue that in the period immediately after an election the President's 
legitimacy is so strong that he does not need to closely involve himself in domestic affairs to 
bOlster his authority. A third explanation may also be put forward which relates to factors 
Outside of presidential control, namely public and prime ministerial expectations concerning 
the balance of power under the regime. Pompidou was certainly aware that the level of 
POpular disenchantment with de Gaulle's overbearing presidential style favoured a return to a 
rnore balanced reading of the Constitution, which accorded greater decision-making power to 
the Premier. He also knew that Chaban-Delmas did not accept de Gaulle's interpretation of 
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the Constitution which robbed the government of its power to determine domestic policy 
orientation. 134 We would argue, therefore, that the combined force of these two extra-
constitutional variables was enough to dissuade Pompidou from attempting to dominate all 
aspects of decision-making when he first took office. As soon as Chaban's popularity began 
to threaten the President's status, however, Pompidou did not hesitate to draw upon the 
ambiguity of constitutional guidelines and established political conventions as a means of re-
asserting his supremacy within the regime. 
Despite assurances that his election would breathe new life into the institutions of the Fifth 
Republic, we saw how Giscard d'Estaing's exercise of presidential power simply served to 
reinforce the presidential practices of his predecessors. But if presidential power seemed to 
increase under Giscard's leadership, this resulted from the interaction of different factors 
which were unique to his presidency. In particular, it was the lack of a 'presidential' 
parliamentary majority in the National Assembly and the threat this posed to Giscard's power 
base which led him to explore the more monarchical aspects of the presidential role. He did 
this so effectively that, by the end of his mandate, he was portrayed by his critics as more 
authoritarian than de Gaulle had ever been. Therefore, although Giscard's political power 
Was undoubtedly diminished by the withdrawal of Gaullist support for his leadership after 
1976, his exploitation of the ceremonial trappings of the presidency ensured that he was able 
to protect his position within the regime. This showed that presidential power was not only 
dependent upon constitutional and political factors, but also upon the personality of the 
irncumbent and his ability to draw upon the more symbolic aspects of power as a means of 
bOlstering his authority. 
In nurturing this lofty, authoritarian image to compensate for his lack of political majority, 
however, Giscard saw public opinion turn against him in favour of his presidential rival, 
Fran90is Mitterrand. Having begun to accept the permanence of the regime and the need to 
adapt to the norms governing presidential politics during the 1960s, Mitterrand spent the next 
decade transforming the Socialist Party into a party capable of winning the presidency. He 
understood only too well the political realities imposed upon the Left by the introduction of 
136 
direct presidential elections and, under his leadership, the PS underwent its own process of 
'presidentialisation' in order to compete effectively for power. But this did not alter the fact 
that as the leader of the PS competing for the presidency in 1981, MiUerrand's candidature 
remained inextricably linked to the implementation of his party's programme of reforms. 
Exactly how this level of political engagement would affect his exercise of power remained to 
be seen. This is a question which we will seek to answer in the following analysis of 
Mitterrand's first five years in office from 1981 to 1986. 
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Chapter 4 
MITTERRAND AND THE SOCIALIST MAJORITY (1981-
1986): FROM PARTISAN PRESIDENT TO TACTICAL 
STATESMAN 
Franc;ois Mitterrand's decisive victory in the 1981 presidential elections may be seen as the 
conclusion of a remarkable political journey; one which witnessed his transformation from 
staunch opponent to ultimate consolidator of de Gaulle's institutions. The election of a left-
wing President served as a testament to both the resilience and the seductiveness of the Fifth 
Republic's Constitution. 1 It also marked the final phase of another process of evolution, that 
of the 'presidentialisation' of the PS, whose unprecedented success in the legislative elections 
held the following month ensured that Mitterrand's personal victory became a collective 
triumph.2 After twenty-three years in opposition, during which he had almost single-handedly 
turned the Socialist Party into a viable political force, with a membership exceeding that of 
any other party, Mitterrand had now set in place all the necessary conditions to implement the 
ambitious economic and social reforms which had formed the basis of both his presidential 
bid and his party's subsequent parliamentary campaign. 
This reformist agenda played a significant part in wooing voters over to the Mitterrand camp. 
Studies of the 1981 presidential contest reveal an electorate increasingly disillusioned with 
Giscard's authoritarian comportment and the inability of successive governments to combat 
unemployment and social inequality.3 Given these public concerns, Mitterrand's platform of 
'110 propositions pour fa France' lent him a dual electoral appeal; not only was he offering 
radical, new solutions to many of France's domestic problems in the form of a long-term 
Political project, but the reformist nature of Mitterrand's candidature seemed to promise a 
different style of presidential leadership, which was less likely to succumb to the monarchical 
tendencies of his predecessor.4 The proposals for constitutional reform set out in Mitterrand's 
electoral manifesto, and his continued attacks upon the abusive exercise of presidential 
Power throughout the Fifth Republic, also pointed towards a more equal distribution of 
responsibilities under the new left-wing administration. Although Mitterrand no longer 
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challenged the notion of presidential pre-eminence which rendered the Head of State 'Ie 
premier responsable de la politique franqaise',5 he still acknowledged his intention to restore 
the roles played by other political bodies in order to create a more balanced regime: 'd'abord, 
if me fal/ait remettre chaque institution a sa place: Ie gouvernement gouverne, Ie Parlement 
legifere et participe aux debats, sans contrainte d'aucune sorte. Quant a moi, si j'entends 
exercer la plenitude des responsabilites que Ie peuple souverain m'a confiees, je ne veux me 
substituer ni a I'un ni a I'autre des pouvoirs. L'equilibre de nos institutions y gagnera'. 6 
Initially, Mitterrand did fulfil public expectations in terms of his commitment to the speedy 
application of his presidential programme. The appointment of the experienced politician and 
PS heavyweight, Pierre Mauroy, as Prime Minister, and the inclusion of four Communists in 
the cabinet strengthened Mitterrand's image as a politically engaged President, who was not 
about to abandon his campaign promises or his links with the Socialist Party once in office. 
Thanks to the confluence of his own policies with those of the government, however, 
Mitterrand was able to fulfil this role without being seen to monopolise the executive; his 
ministers seemed to be enjoying a higher public profile and a greater freedom of action and 
influence over government policy than their counterparts under the previous administration. It 
was only when the government ran into serious economic difficulties in 1983, and was forced 
to abandon its policy of 'redistributive keynesianism' in favour of long-term austerity 
measures, that Mitterrand's identity as a committed Socialist President started to cause him 
problems.7 For although there may have been a strong groundswell of support in 1981 for a 
President who would break with Giscard's lofty presidential style, the more readily Mitterrand 
descended into the political arena to explain and defend government action, the more his 
popularity seemed to suffer; it was not until he started to focus his attention on promoting 
France's interests abroad, intervening in national affairs in a predominantly arbitrational 
capacity, such as during the schools' crisis of 1984, that his public image began to recover. 
This is undoubtedly one of the greatest paradoxes of his first septennate, yet it is largely 
unacknowledged in political studies of this period. Indeed it is all the more surprising given 
that this process of evolution, which saw Mitterrand move from partisan President to tactical 
statesman, is crucial to an understanding of his exercise of power between 1981 and 1986. 
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In his book lei et Maintenant, published in the run-up to the 1981 presidential contest, 
Mitterrand confinned that, if elected, he would be 'l'interprete Ie plus fidele des institutions de 
la Repub/ique'. 8 By 1986 it was clear that this so-called faithful reading of the Constitution 
was based upon the same broad principles of presidential dominance and ministerial 
subordination favoured by his predecessors. Never once did he relinquish his right to have 
the final say on major policy decisions or compromise his vision of France's role both 
internationally and within the European Community. He also proved willing to sacrifice his 
ministers and to allow his Premiers to take responsibility for policy decisions which had been 
badly received by the electorate (even if this ultimately failed to prevent the erosion of his own 
popularity). Yet it should be acknowledged that Mitterrand's ability to assert his pre-eminence 
within the regime was determined by many complex and, at times, contradictory factors, some 
of which had become pennanent features of the Fifth Republic, others unique to his 
presidency. It is only through an examination of the various resources which Mitterrand was 
able to draw upon to consolidate his position that we may gain a greater insight into his 
evolution as President. Existing studies on the Mitterrand double septennate fail to explore 
this subject effectively; they tend towards either in-depth analyses of a single aspect of 
presidential power (such as Revel's damning critique of Mitterrand's exploitation of his 
constitutional prerogatives or Labbe's analysis of his use of language as a political tool), or 
much broader chronicles of day to day events (like those of Lacouture or Attali), in which the 
elements affecting presidential power are only tangentially discussed. Our study aims to 
examine, in its different tensions and complexities, Mitterrand's exercise of power between 
1981 and 1986. This will involve a selective interrogation of the resources - institutional, 
POlitical and conjunctural - which Mitterrand deployed in order to maximise his power and 
manipulate his public image between 1981 and 1986. 
Taking as its starting point those constitutional powers available to the President following his 
election, the chapter will move on to discuss Mitterrand's interaction with three key groups, 
namely the PS and parliamentary majority, the government and his team of personal advisors 
based at the Elysee. To fully comprehend the impact which Mitterrand's changing 
relationship to these three groups had upon his exercise of power, each must be taken in turn 
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rather than as part of a simple chronological progression. In this way, the crosscurrents that 
exist between the groups may be more clearly brought out. The chapter will continue to adopt 
this approach, which permits a fuller discussion of the porous boundaries between the 
variables influencing presidential power, by going on to study the extent to which Mitterrand 
was able to use verbal depictions of the presidential role to assert his authority and shape his 
image as Head of State. It will then work towards a discussion of the limitations upon 
Mitterrand's power during what is widely regarded as the most politically constructive period 
of his double septennate.9 
4.1 The appointment of a new administration: balancing 
political loyalties and presidential privilege 
Following his election as President, one of Mitterrand's first tasks was to nominate a Prime 
Minister. His choice of Pierre Mauroy stemmed, in part, from their good working relationship 
within the PS throughout the 1970s (with the exception of Mauroy's brief defection to the 
Rocardian camp at the Metz congress in 1979) and Mauroy's role as Mitterrand's official 
Spokesman during the 1981 presidential campaign. On a more personal level, it could also 
be argued that Mitterrand chose Mauroy because he knew he could count on his undivided 
loyalty and dedication in his role as Premier. The President would, therefore, be able to retain 
full control over executive decision-making, starting with the designation of the remaining 
government ministers. 1o One might contend that, after years observing Mitterrand's 
leadership style at the head of the PS, Mauroy should have anticipated this display of 
preSidential pre-eminence. 11 However, it seems that the new Prime Minister under-estimated 
Mitterrand's willingness to embrace the same practices as his predecessors, and had drawn 
up his own list of possible candidates ready for presidential approval. 12 By the time Mauroy 
approached Mitterrand with these suggestions, most of the posts had already been allocated 
as a result of private discussions between the President and the individuals concerned. Thus 
according to Fifth republican convention, it was the newly elected Head of State who selected 
the cabinet, with the Prime Minister having very little say in the choices made. 13 This decision 
to ignore the principle of presidential-prime ministerial collaboration in the appointment of 
148 
ministers set out in article 11 of the Constitution, was an early indication of Mitterrand's 
acceptance of the Gaullist institutional hierarchy in which the Premier is little more than an 
executor of presidential orders. It also ensured that ministers felt wholly indebted to 
Mitterrand for their posts, further undermining Mauroy's prime ministerial authority before his 
premiership had even been officially announced. 14 
One of the only real restrictions upon Mitterrand's choice of ministers resulted from public and 
party expectations that the government team should reflect the various political configurations 
whose voters had brought him to power. As a result, most of the posts within the new 
government went to Socialist Party figures, apart from the nomination of three left-wing 
Radicals and Pompidou's former Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, who became the Minister for 
Foreign Trade. It was in Mitterrand's interests to appear as democratic as possible at the 
start of his presidency by ensuring that all the different factions within the PS were 
represented in his cabinet. The Socialists still needed to gain an overall majority in the 
forthcoming legislative elections in order to guarantee the successful implementation of their 
reform programme and Mitterrand was not about to jeopardise this victory by alienating 
certain groups within his own party. The outcome was a fairly eclectic ministerial team; a 
coalition of forces from the same political movement, which featured former political rivals, 
Michel Rocard and Alain Savary, various members of the militant CERES group and trusted 
friends and loyal supporters such as Jacques Delors, Laurent Fabius, Charles Hernu, Edith 
Cresson and Jack Lang. 15 
Yet if Mitterrand felt bound to appoint certain PS figures with whom he had had personal or 
Political differences in the past, his skilful distribution of portfolios allowed him to prevent 
individuals from benefiting too greatly from their roles in government. Michel Rocard, for 
example, was made Minister of State for the Plan, an appointment he later described as 
penance for daring to challenge Mitterrand in both his leadership of the PS and his bid for the 
presidency.16 Similarly, Alain Savary, the only cabinet minister to be chosen by Premier 
Mauroy, was offered the political hot potato of Education. Mitterrand, who had very little time 
for Savary, knew that whoever took on the task of pushing through the Left's proposals to 
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withdraw State funding for private schools, ran the risk of damaging their political career in the 
process. Indeed, this is precisely what did happen; Savary offered his resignation in June 
1984 following massive public demonstrations against these changes. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that when Gaston Defferre refused Mitterrand's offer to become President 
of the National Assembly and demanded the post of Interior Minister, Mitterrand duly 
submitted. Although Mitterrand had previously expressed the view that Defferre was too old 
for such a demanding role, he clearly felt unable to deny the request. 17 Therefore, it may be 
said that above and beyond the institutional hierarchy of the Fifth Republic, there existed a 
historical pecking order that allowed Defferre, as the elder left-wing statesman, to privately 
impose his wishes upon the new President. 
It was not until after the parliamentary elections in June, however, that Mitterrand finally 
tackled the question of Communist participation in the government. Ignoring the advice of 
certain colleagues, he announced the appointment of four Communists to ministerial posts 
Within the second Mauroy government, including the prestigious portfolio of Minister of State 
for Transport. 18 There was a double advantage to be reaped from this decision. Firstly, it 
acknowledged the contribution of PCF voters to both the presidential and legislative victories. 
Given that the National Assembly has the power to overthrow any government via a motion of 
censure,19 it was advisable for Mitterrand to grant all the movements on the Left some degree 
of government representation to avoid the embarrassment of such a motion being tabled by a 
Coalition of disgruntled Communists and left-wing Radicals. Secondly, the inclusion of 
Communists in the cabinet allowed Mitterrand to keep the PCF itself on a tighter rein. He 
feared that denying the PCF a voice within the executive would lead to a surge in public 
support for the party; it was only through a process of political co-operation and integration 
that the threat posed by the Communists would be removed - 'en les prenant a des postes 
secondaires, je les neutralise, dans 3 ans ils auront perdu toute !'importance politique,.2o As 
We have seen, this strategy had proven highly effective in reducing the PCF's electoral base 
from the late 1960s onwards. Given that the Communists themselves were entirely reliant 
uPon Mitterrand for any level of representation· within the government, one might argue that 
the President could have been more ruthless in his negotiations with the party. When George 
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Marchais raised objections to some of the posts on offer, a compromise was found which was 
agreeable to both sides. Mitterrand's flexibility even extended to granting Marchais the power 
to choose the individuals who would fill these positions. According to one source, the PCF 
leader was so overwhelmed by the President's generosity that he declared he had been 
wrong to doubt the sincerity of Mitterrand's Socialist convictions. 21 
The highly partisan nature of Mitterrand's election was also reflected in his choice of personal 
advisors. Contrary to Fifth republican tradition, whereby the Elysee staff are appointed from 
the highest echelons of the civil service, the new presidential team was dominated by the 
presence of Mitterrand's former PS colleagues, many of whom had played key roles in his 
1981 campaign. Reliability and trustworthiness are obviously important to any President 
when selecting his own private staff, but for Mitterrand these qualities had to be proven by 
many years of personal or political allegiance. The result was a team comprising old friends 
like Andre Rousselet and Frangois de Grossouvre and close collaborators during his 
leadership of the PS, such as Jacques AttalL22 Not only was this the most politically 
committed team ever seen at the Elysee, it was also the most varied in terms of its members' 
professional credentials; Mitterrand's entourage comprised, amongst others, two trade 
Unionists, three writers, an engineer and a doctor?3 Perhaps the best illustration of this 
Contrast with the predominantly technocratic presidential teams of de Gaulle, Pompidou and 
Giscard was the nomination of Pierre Beregovoy as Elysee Chief of Staff.24 This was the first 
time that anyone other than a top {marque had occupied this post. By appointing such a high 
profile left-wing politician to the most important position within his entourage, Mitterrand 
signalled his desire to maintain a close relationship with the parliamentary majority and the 
SOCialist Party, as well as the government. Beregovoy would act as Mitterrand's right-hand 
man liasing with ministers (in particular the Prime Minister) and the new PS leadership to 
keep the President informed of developments in all areas of policy-making. He was also the 
Only member of the Elysee team who could attend weekly cabinet meetings. 
So far our discussion of presidential power 'under the Fifth Republic has shown that any 
President who enjoys the support of a 'presidential' parliamentary majority may exercise 
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almost total control over government action. What has not yet been properly considered is 
the role played by the President's personal advisors in determining his level of influence over 
government affairs. Without the valuable research carried out by his private staff at the 
Elysee, the Head of State would be solely dependent upon his ministers for information. At 
the very least, this would make it harder for him to dictate policy or to challenge government 
decisions. At worst, it could seriously threaten his pre-eminence within the regime. With the 
backing of a loyal and efficient entourage answerable only to him, however, the President has 
at his disposal a team of experts, whose specially prepared dossiers ensure that he is kept 
fUlly up-to-date on all national and international issues. 25 Not only did these advisors help 
Mitterrand to retain his supremacy over executive power, but they also served a more 
partisan function. Given that Mitterrand clearly intended to make full use of his powers to 
bring about the 'change of society' he had promised throughout his election campaign, the 
appointment of a strong team behind the scenes at the Elysee was an essential means of 
preventing the government from becoming a threat to his own political authority or a hostage 
to the demands of the Socialist Party. In other words, they served as a kind of counter-
balance to the power of the PS and the government. This is a pOint to which we will return 
later in our discussion, when we examine the role played by presidential advisors in 
Supporting MiUerrand's position from 1981-1986. 
4.2 The President, the party and the parliamentary group: 
'est-ce Jospin qui gouverne?'26 
Throughout the 1981 presidential campaign MiUerrand made it perfectly clear that his own 
personal victory would be incomplete without the bac.king of a left-wing majority in Parliament. 
It came as no surprise, therefore, when he used his power to dissolve the National Assembly 
to call fresh legislative elections. The results of these elections defied all expectations; not 
Only did the Left win its first parliamentary contest under the Fifth Republic, but the PS alone 
sUcceeded in gaining an overall majority of seats. As Mitterrand proudly remarked: 'c'est la 
premiere fois dans I'histoire de la Republique qu'un parti dispose a lui seul de la majorite des 
Sieges a I'Assemblee nationale. Gambetta et de Gaulle avaient entrafne et couvert de leur 
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nom et de leur prestige ce qui, en realite, eta it une coalition de partis,.27 But whilst this 
apparently overwhelming public endorsement of Socialist Party values may have provided 
Mitterrand with the parliamentary representation he needed to implement his programme of 
reforms, it also raised important questions as to the role which the PS might legitimately claim 
for itself under the new administration. Furthermore, it remained to be seen how this, in turn, 
would affect the distribution of power within the executive. As a key component of 
presidentialism, the existence of a single party parliamentary majority now threatened to dilute 
Mitterrand's power by challenging government policy if it strayed from the party line, or by 
joining forces with the government to marginalise the President. In the following analysis of 
Mitterrand's relations with the Socialist Party during his first five years in office, we will seek to 
establish what kind of influence, if any, the party was able to wield over the State, and 
whether this resulted in a shift of power away from the presidency towards other bodies. 
'Si je ne suis plus parmi vous, dans Ie parti, je reste avec vous, avec nos idees et nos espoirs. 
Je reste socialiste a la presidence de la Republique'. 
Fran90is Mitterrand. Message to the Socialist Party Congress in Valence, October 1981.28 
This message sent by MiUerrand to PS delegates gathered at Valence aimed to reassure 
party members that he remained wholly committed to the Socialist policies which had formed 
the basis of his election campaign. Such a gesture of political affiliation was hardly 
necessary; in the five months since Mitterrand's election, the government had not only forged 
ahead with the implementation of many important social and economic reforms, but 
Mitterrand too had been keen to involve PS First Secretary, Lionel Jospin, at the highest 
levels of executive decision-making. From June 1981 onwards Jospin had become a regular 
Visitor to the Elysee. In addition to his weekly breakfast with the President to discuss 
gOvernment policy, he also featured amongst those privileged enough to be invited to lunch 
after Wednesday's cabinet meeting. Jospin was, as Pierre Avril puts it,a member of the 
presidential 'A team' - a term often used to 'refer to MiUerrand's closest colleagues - from 
Which the Prime Minister was excluded. 29 Nevertheless, many PS members, who were wary 
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of the presidential bias of the Fifth Republic's institutions, wanted further assurances that 
neither Mitterrand nor the Mauroy government would start to cut party political ties and 
abandon the pledges which had brought them to power. 
Despite the concern of certain factions within the PS, however, the party did not suddenly find 
itself out in the political cold, but continued to play an active role within the Socialist 
administration. The nature of this role was determined by the power available to the party in 
the form of the Socialist parliamentary majority and, to a lesser extent, its contact with 
Socialist voters at grass roots level. Jospin's own view of the party's function in 1981 was 
that it should act as 'Ia principale force du changement [ ... ], capable d'expliquer, d'eclairer les 
choix du Gouvernement et de convaincre. Mais illui faut aussi transmettre au Gouvernement 
Ie message qu'il reyoit des couches sociales ou if a su plonger ses racines, dire leurs 
revendications, leurs craintes, leurs espoirs. /I doit enfin mobiliser les masses populaires 
pour qu'el/es prennent toute leur place dans l'action,.30 In the early phases of Mitterrand's 
septennate, the PS intervened in a predominantly censorial capacity, acting as a kind of 
ideological reference point for the left-wing executive to ensure that it remained faithful to its 
Political undertakings and did not lose touch with the wishes of the Socialist electorate.31 
Louis Mermaz asserts that Mitterrand himself was largely responsible for setting up this type 
of role for the PS in his inaugural address, when he proclaimed that his election had, at last, 
handed control of the State back to left-wing voters (via their regional and national 
representatives), who had been deprived of power for so long.32 According to Mermaz, it was 
this speech 'qui a donne Ie climat general [ ... ]. Les socialistes, evidemment, ont mis cela en 
musique si I'on peut dire. Et c'est vrai qu'if y avait cette connotation excessivement forte que 
sans cesse on se referait aux 110 propositions de la campagne de Franyois Mitterrand'. He 
argues that this continued focus upon economic, social and political change enabled the PS 
leadership to play an active role in government affairs, overseeing the implementation of 
Mitterrand's presidential programme. 
During the first few months of Mitterrand's mandate, the PS executive exercised its unofficial 
censorial powers on several occasions to force the government to re-examine texts which did 
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not accurately reflect the party line.33 Successful examples of such PS checks on 
government action include the Pierret amendment to the finance law of 1981 and the Suchod 
amendment to the government's amnesty project.34 Such was the party's perceived hold over 
the government in late 1981 that some political commentators claimed they were witnessing a 
new distribution of powers under the Fifth Republic, with the leader of the PS directing 
government policy, as opposed to either the President or the Prime Minister. Others, like 
Jean-Louis Quermonne and D.Turpin, confirmed that the President remained at the head of 
the executive, but acknowledged that there was a three-way power sharing arrangement in 
place between the Prime Minister, the PS First Secretary and the leader of the Socialist 
parliamentary majority.35 
For some commentators this move towards greater party participation was a worrying 
development because it allowed the PS to influence executive decisions, which was contrary 
to the spirit of the Constitution. As Revel correctly points out, one of de Gaulle's main 
objectives had been to prevent 'I'ingerence des partis' through a stronger executive.36 By 
allowing Jospin to play an active role within the executive, Revel asserts that Mitterrand was 
moving away from the constitutional blueprint towards something resembling the Fourth 
Republic. In his study of relations between the President, the PS and the parliamentary 
majority in 1981, Avril also remarks upon the lack of constitutional justification for the 
increasing involvement of the Socialist Party leadership in government affairs. Even when 
such intervention failed to bring about the amendment of a piece of legislation, Avril maintains 
that the very act of being able to draw the government into negotiations in the first place 
showed that the PS executive was enjoying powers which, up to then, had eluded any other 
majority party within the regime. 37 Such observatior.s were vigorously disputed by the Prime 
Minister and the PS First Secretary, who maintained that the only time the party interfered in 
the workings of the State was in the case of disagreements between members of its own 
parliamentary group: 'Ie bureau executif du parti ne se pose pas en arbitre entre Ie groupe 
parlementaire et Ie Gouvernement. /I n'est saisi, par Ie president du groupe, qu'en cas de 
probleme entre les parlementaires [ ... J. Le PS n'est pas un rouage de I'Etat, if appartient a la 
societe' .38 However, these assurances were undermined by remarks made by other leading 
, 
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Socialists like Pierre Joxe, who claimed that 'ce que decident les deputes socialistes, c'est la 
IOi',39 and by contradictory statements from Jospin attributing responsibility for specific 
government projects to Socialist Party initiatives.4o 
Although Mitterrand was prepared to offer PS deputes the opportunity to jouer pleinement Ie 
jeu parlementaire',41 he did not shy away from encouraging the government to use article 49-
3 to oblige the majority to unite behind a given text. This occurred in November 1982, when 
the Prime Minister used this article to push through a controversial piece of legislation 
concerning the re-instatement of army generals, who had rebelled against the State during 
the Algerian conflict. Such was the strength of PS opposition to the bill that Mitterrand chose 
to speed up its passage through Parliament in order to prevent the government from suffering 
an embarrassing defeat at the hands of its own representatives.42 When certain aspects of 
the government's proposed energy policy did not receive the approval of the PS 
parliamentary group in October 1981, the government again took advantage of its ability to 
'regler les chases illegalement', as Mermaz puts it, using the legislative short-cuts provided by 
article 49. After lengthy discussions between the Prime Minister and PS representatives, the 
party finally agreed to rally behind the government. But even then Mauroy chose to turn the 
issue into a vote of confidence in the government's entire reform programme using 49-1, 
ensuring that he imposed the government line upon both the majority and the National 
Assembly as a whole. 
Is it valid, therefore, to conclude that the government was more partisan than presidential in 
the early phases of Mitterrand's first septennate, due to the involvement of PS executive 
members in policy formulation and implementati(m? Whilst the simple answer would appear 
to be yes, what remains unclear is whether this was a conscious choice on Mitterrand's part 
Or Whether it was an unavoidable consequence of his leadership of the party since 1971. In 
other words, were the PS and Mitterrand mutually dependent as a result of their common 
electoral platform in 1981, and did this prevent the President from distancing himself from the 
Party once in office? Or did he have other motives for keeping Jospin and Memaz so close? 
POSSibly the most accurate response to this question would be that both statements have 
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some truth. On the one hand, Mitterrand could not be seen to deny the PS a say in 
government affairs because of the partisan nature of his own election and his promises to 
enhance the role of Parliament. This pOint was picked up by Louis Mermaz when he noted 
that 'Ie gouvernement, Ie groupe parlemenatire, Ie parti socialiste etaient consideres comme 
un bloc par I'opinion. C'etait les socialistes au pouvoir, les gens ne faisaient pas la 
distinction ,.43 In this respect, it would have been difficult for Mitterrand to distance the 
executive from the party, at least in the early stages of his presidency, since they were 
generally perceived as forming a coherent political whole. 
On the other hand, there is little to suggest that the PS could have mounted any real 
challenge to presidential power had Mitterrand chosen to exclude it from government 
deliberations. Short of refusing to support specific legislation (the threat of which could be 
countered by the use of articles 49-1/3 or 38), the PS and its parliamentary majority were 
largely dependent upon the President for their power. As a result, it may be said that it was in 
the interests of all parties to co-operate with one another. The close working relationship 
between Jospin and the President enabled the party to resist becoming marginalised, whilst 
also allowing Mitterrand to safeguard against any attempts by the Premier or government 
ministers to isolate him by leaning upon the parliamentary majority to back their actions. In 
this respect, the party served as an instrument of presidential power or, to use Mitterrand's 
OWn definition, 'un remarquable relais qui peut intervenir a tout moment', providing him with 
an additional means of protecting his own position.44 
Mitterrand's close links with Jospin and Mermaz also meant that he was assured of their 
SUpport in trying to win over the majority when government legislation did not conform to 
Socialist Party policy. As Louis Mermaz explained: ' Lionel Jospin etait un peu la pour serrer 
les ecrocs et if veil/a it a ce qu'if n'y ait pas de debordements du PS ... Frangois Mitterrand 
I'avait mis la pour etre Ie gardien du PS' .45 This came in particularly useful in 1983, when 
Mitterrand finally accepted the advice of Mauroy and Finance Minister Jacques Delors and 
agreed to devalue the franc, rather than withdraw from the European exchange rate 
mechanism. Despite having been largely excluded from the discussions which led to this 
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decision, Jospin was called upon by Mitterrand to ensure that the PS rallied to support the 
government. Given that the President had just approved what was essentially a total 
abandonment of the Keynesian economic strategy which lay at the very heart of Socialist 
economic policy, the task facing Jospin was not an easy one. Nevertheless, he did succeed 
in convincing the party of the need for 'une parenthese' in the government's economic and 
social reform programme,46 even though it turned out to be much more than just a 'pause' in 
the end. 47 At the time, however, Jospin accepted the President's view that austerity 
measures were required to get the economy back on its feet, hoping that once this had been 
achieved, the government would 'reprendre une demarche plus dynamique,.48 Without Jospin 
to serve as a crucial link between the executive, the party and the parliamentary majority, it is 
doubtful whether this bitter pill would eventually have been swallowed by PS members, 
especially since most of Mitterrand's key supporters within the party had been recruited into 
his administration in 1981.49 
Although the party's ability to chastise the government under certain circumstances gave the 
impression that it was a powerful, independent force influencing executive decisions, behind 
the scenes the balance of power remained tipped in the President's favour.5o This view was 
confirmed by Louis Mermaz who concluded that 'Ie President de la Republique, Ie 
gouvernement influenyait autant Ie PS, plus Ie PS que lui, il influenyait Ie gouvernement'.51 
Hubert Vedrine, former Foreign Affairs advisor to the Elysee during the Mitterrand years, also 
remarked upon the distancing of the President from the party following his election in 1981, 
which prevented the PS from influencing foreign and defence policy. Despite the fact that the 
Ps had its own agenda in these areas, Vedrine maintains that it was unable to impose its 
choices upon Mitterrand, ensuring they remained as much the presidential 'domaines 
reserves' as they had been under his predecessors.52 As we have already noted, the same 
Was true for domestic policy orientation, with the PS eventually uniting behind almost all 
government proposals, even when they represented a clear shift away from the values 
espoused during the election campaign. 
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It would, however, be wrong to assume that this relationship was consistently one-sided. As 
we will see, it was Mitterrand's bid to reassert his image as a reformist President in order to 
win back the unconditional support of the PS and the parliamentary group that led him to take 
two controversial decisions in the fields of media and education; not only did these place a 
strain on the relationship between President, party and parliamentary majority, they also 
ended up launching Mitterrand into a new role as national judge, as opposed to the partisan 
President he had been during the first three years of his mandate. 
When the PS finally rallied to support the government's austerity measures in 1983,53 some 
political analysts claim that Mitterrand felt the need to reassure party heavyweights of his 
continued commitment to reform. In his book, Franr;ois Mitterrand: une vie, Giesbert asserts 
that it was in response to criticisms from Pierre Joxe, then leader of the PS parliamentary 
group, regarding the government's lack of reformist zeal that the President asked the Prime 
Minister to draw up the so-called anti-Hersant Law in November 1983.54 This project aimed to 
prevent press barons like Robert Hersant from monopolising the French media. Much as they 
wanted to see Hersant's control over the written media restricted, neither Mitterrand nor 
Mauroy believed that this law was the solution. Yet the project went ahead, and the fact that 
it did can only be attributed to the President's desire to keep the PS and the parliamentary 
majority happy, since they were the only groups in favour of the project. This is undoubtedly 
why Premier Mauroy chose to reveal the proposed legislation at the party conference at 
Bourg-en-Bresse, knowing that it would win widespread approval amongst militants and help 
the government to regain some of the support lost within party ranks following the change of 
economic policy.55 Mitterrand's readiness to appease the PS appears to sustain our 
argument that party and President were inextricably linked and, as a result, the PS was 
enjoying a greater say in government affairs than any other political movement in the history 
of the Fifth Republic. 
As the government's efforts to break Hersant's control over the media were hampered by 
numerous amendments to the text which were presented by the opposition in the National 
Assembly,56 Mitterrand decided to push ahead with another key Socialist Party policy 
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objective - the reform of Catholic education. The Savary Bill, named after the Education 
Minister, Alain Savary, aimed to create 'un grand seNice public, unifie et laic de I'Education 
nationale,.57 But whilst Mitterrand may have viewed this bill as a sure way of uniting the 
government, party and parliamentary group, he had not fully anticipated the level of public 
outrage which the project would generate; at the height of the protests against the project, 
over a million people took to the streets to demonstrate their opposition.58 Far from serving 
as a means of strengthening the bond between these three groups, the project resulted in the 
resignation of both the Prime Minister and the Education Minister, the withdrawal of the 
Communists from government and a sense of betrayal and disillusionment amongst Socialist 
party members.59 Arguably the only person to gain anything positive from the fiasco was 
Mitterrand, whose recourse to the old Gaullist weapon of the referendum (even though this 
never actually took place) enabled him to nurture a new image as a President whose 
responsibility to the nation as a whole had clearly taken priority over partisan loyalties. 
Although the benefits were not apparent at the time, this re-definition of Mitterrand's 
presidential role would prove to be his most useful political weapon as the prospect of 
cohabitation loomed closer. 
Unlike his apparently genuine indeCision during the financial crisis of 1983, Mitterrand's 
refusal to act decisively when protests first began against the Savary Bill seemed to be a 
deliberate and tactical move designed to protect his position. By asking for time to reflect 
Upon events and the course of action to be taken, Mitterrand placed his government in the 
firing line, whilst he remained more aloof from events. This enabled Mitterrand to 'Iaisser 
jouer les evenements',60 before taking the sudden decision to withdraw the Bill in its entirety, 
without having forewarned either Savary or Mauroy of his intentions. Ironically, it was 
preCisely this presidential arrogance and unaccountability which Mitterrand had attacked 
during his years in opposition. For many PS deputes who had hoped to see their ideological 
dreams converted into political realities, the final withdrawal of the Savary Bill was a major 
source of disappointment; not only because the government was forced to concede defeat, 
but also because Mitterrand's role in resolving the conflict seemed to confirm his transition 
from politically engaged President to tactical arbitrator, or to quote Serge July: 'Mitterrand 
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n'est plus Ie partisan elu d'un statut unique de I'enseignement, mais Ie President de tous les 
Frangais,.61 For many PS members who had never imagined Mitterrand as the advocate of 
compromise, this government climb-down represented the final break with the objectives 
listed in the' 110 propositions,.62 
What neither government ministers nor Socialist deputes knew, however, was that the 
presidential initiative to amend the Constitution so that a referendum could be held on the 
school's issue had already been approved by Jopsin before it was announced by Mitterrand 
on national television. Along with Michel Charasse,63 Jospin had been asked by Mitterrand to 
come up with possible ways of ending the crisis. Having ruled out the use of article 49-3 
which risked inflaming the situation further, Jospin agreed that a public consultation was the 
best option. Since February 1984, the PS leader had been privately voicing his concerns that 
the school's issue could seriously damage the unity and public image of the party.64 
Reflecting upon the events of that period in an interview with Favier and Martin-Roland, 
Jospin admits that he saw the withdrawal of the bill and the referendum proposal as the most 
effective way of bringing an irresolvable dispute to a swift conclusion - 'if faffait reculer sur ce 
terrain pour sauvegarder I'essentiel qui etait de poursuivre en bon ordre Ie septennat. Ce 
choix eta it incontestablement un peu cruel pour nos convictions, mais if etait guide par la 
necessite politique. C'etait Ie choix de la raison: preserver ce que nous avions engage depuis 
1981,.65 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that Mitterrand would have gone ahead with this 
prOject even if he had not obtained a green light from Jospin; his constitutional prerogatives 
certainly allowed him to impose such a measure upon the government and the parliamentary 
majority.66 Yet the fact that he chose to consult the PS leader before any of his Ministers, 
including Prime Minister Mauroy, underlines the importance which Mitterrand continued to 
attribute to Socialist Party support for his presidential leadership. Instead of the three-way 
Power sharing arrangement described by Quermonne, it may be argued that there was a 
three-tier power system in operation between 1981 and 1984 with the President at the top of 
the hierarchy, the party and its parliamentary majority in second position and the government 
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placed last. One might also contend that Jospin's decision to back Mitterrand's actions 
provided further confirmation of the party's adaptation to the norms of presidential politics. 
Having rallied behind the President's gradual abandonment of some of the principles which 
inspired the 110 propositions, the PS had to face up to the fact that important aspects of its 
political ideology had been undermined. This impeded the party's ability to inspire or censure 
government action. As one would expect, this rendered the PS increasingly reliant upon 
Mitterrand for its identity and voice within the regime.57 
4.2.1 jUne force solidaire mais autonome?,58 
According to Lionel Jospin, this 'supportive, yet independent force' was how Mitterrand 
envisaged the role of the Socialist Party after the Left's collective victory in 1981. Our 
discussion so far has shown this to be a relatively accurate description of the way in which the 
PS functioned in relation to the State throughout the first three years of Mitterrand's 
presidential mandate. The nomination of Laurent Fabius as Prime Minister in July 1984, 
though badly received by the more militant factions within the party, did not appear to alter 
this relationship. Aside from the absence of Communist ministers, the new government 
included representatives from all the different political currents within the Socialist Party, 
including J-P Chevenement, who had resigned from the Mauroy government in a gesture of 
disapproval at the President's decision to introduce economic austerity measures. By re-
appOinting Chevenement, Mitterrand displayed a willingness to recognise the party's right to 
disagree with or to actively challenge the government line, without forfeiting any future role 
within the executive.59 However, appearances can be misleading and whereas the PS may 
have seemed to be enjoying the same level of influence as it had done under Mauroy's 
premiership, in reality, it was far less able to intervene independently having seen some vital 
aspects of its ideology fall victim to the events of 1983/84. 
Faced with the prospect of defeat in the forthcomi"ng legislative elections, the PS remained 
united behind Mitterrand's leadership. Neither the party nor the parliamentary majority 
mounted any serious challenges to executive policy during this period, despite differences of 
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opinion between Mitterrand and Jospin over the sale of arms to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war 
and the decision to hand over control of the fifth television channel to the Italian media baron, 
Silvio Berlusconi.7o Mitterrand also continued to work closely with the party executive behind 
the scenes, but the number of meetings diminished as the President focused increasingly 
upon foreign affairs and defence. Nevertheless, Mitterrand's reduced involvement in 
domestic affairs did not prevent him from actively campaigning on behalf of the Socialist Party 
in the run-up to the 1986 parliamentary elections. Nor did it stop him from subverting one of 
the regime's most established conventions by opting to let Lionel Jospin head the Left's 
campaign.71 This decision, which put an end to months of press speculation and rivalry 
between Jospin and Fabius, went against Fifth republican tradition whereby the Prime 
Minister takes charge of parliamentary election campaigns. It is tempting to interpret this as 
another example of Mitterrand giving the PS leadership precedence over the Prime Minister. 
However, the fact that the President ended up playing a leading role in the 1986 campaign 
hints at a different agenda - one of preSidential control and image-making. By obliging Fabius 
to concentrate fully on his prime ministerial duties, the President was able to justify 
descending into the political arena to campaign on behalf of the Left. As our discussion of 
Mitterrand's discourse will show, not only did he defend the government's record in a way 
Which implicitly began to disassociate the presidency from party politics, but he used the 
media attention as an opportunity to set out the role that he intended to play under 
Cohabitation. It is doubtful whether Mitterrand would have been able to achieve either of 
these objectives with such ease had Fabius led the Left's campaign. 
4.3 Mitterrand and the Government 
'Le premier ministre et les ministres doivent executer la politique definie par Ie president de la 
Republique des lors que Ie president de la Republique a pour devoir de mettre en ceuvre Ie 
programme sur lecjuel il a passe contrat avec la nation'. 
Franc;:ois Mitterrand, 9 December 1981.72 
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While the involvement of leading Socialist Party figures like Lionel Jospin, Pierre Joxe and 
Louis Mermaz in government affairs introduced a new dimension to the debate over 
presidential power under the Fifth Republic, relations between Mitterrand and his government 
between 1981 and 1986 did little to significantly alter the tradition of ministerial subordination 
established under previous administrations. Not that the public was in any doubt as to 
Mitterrand's acceptance of the notion of presidential supremacy when he took over the 
presidency, but statements like the one quoted above, were often accompanied by pledges 
that Mitterrand would enhance the role of the Prime Minister in order to inject greater 
democracy into the regime: 'Elu President de la Republique, je changerais un certain nombre 
de choses, en particulier dans Ie cadre des relations du President de la Republique avec Ie 
gouvernement [ ... J. Tout en etant tres volontaire pour preserver la charge de la fonction et de 
la remplir entierement, je voudrais que I'on revienne a des mreurs un peu plus 
democratiques,.73 This created the impression that his election would bring some degree of 
change in the way power was distributed within the executive. 
When asked in 1974 what kind of qualities he would look for in a Prime Minister, Mitterrand 
replied J'ai besoin d'un homme en qui j'ai une confiance amicale et la certitude d'une 
competence, en meme temps que I'exacte longueur d'onde,.74 Given these criteria, it is not 
immediately obvious why MiUerrand should have appointed Mauroy as Premier in May 
1981.75 Not that Mauroy was an inexperienced pOlitician; as we have already noted, he was a 
dependable figure, who was well respected within the party and had been amongst 
Mitterrand's closest colleagues throughout the election campaign. Yet it was unusual that 
Mitterrand should have chosen a Premier who was by no means his logical successor as 
head of the PS, but an individual with whom he had on'ly recently been reconciled following 
Mauroy's criticism of his style of political leadership in 1978.76 According to Fifth republican 
convention, the first Prime Minister of any septennate is usually the natural leader of the 
majority party in the .National Assembly. 
Bearing in mind the mutually dependent nature of MiUerrand's relationship to the PS and the 
Socialist parliamentary group, however, the reasons for Mauroy's appointment become 
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clearer. Firstly, it would not have been in the President's interests to have appointed a key 
Mitterrandiste as Prime Minister; he needed to place his staunchest supporters in positions 
where they could protect him from potential challenges to his power, hence Pierre Joxe's 
nomination as head of the Socialist group in the National Assembly and Lionel Jospin's 
promotion to PS First Secretary. Secondly, Mitterrand would not have wanted to appoint 
anyone who might try to undermine his executive authority. This ruled out those young 
enough to harbour presidential ambitions, which might lead them to demand greater 
autonomy as Prime Minister than Mitterrand was prepared to grant in the early stages of his 
presidency. By appointing Mauroy, whose political career had so far been limited to his 
mayoral role in Lille, the President ensured that his Premier had no other source of legitimacy 
which would allow him to threaten presidential pre-eminence. Mauroy's nomination was, 
therefore, another example of Mitterrand consolidating his position; it certainly did not hail the 
start of a new distribution of power within the executive. 
As we saw in our opening chapter, presidential supremacy within the executive stems, in part, 
from the Constitution, which grants the Head of State the power to appoint the Prime Minister. 
Our study so far has shown that this typically results in the subordination of the Prime Minister 
to the President, as opposed to the executive dyarchy which, it has been argued, members of 
the CCC wished to see emerge at the founding of the regime. Mitterrand's relationship with 
Mauroy did not break with this convention; the new Premier accepted his role as chief 
eXecutor of presidential decisions, announcing to the National Assembly on 8 July 1981 that 
he would ensure 'Ie strict respect des orientations proposees par Ie president de la 
Republique,.77 It is interesting to note, however, that surveys conducted between June 1981 
and February 1982 show Mauroy enjoying a higher popul'arity rating than Mitterrand.78 On the 
one hand, this may be interpreted as a sign that the public did not perceive Mauroy as merely 
an executor, but as a political actor in his own right. On the other, it may simply mean that 
they did not care whether Mauroy was a presidential puppet or not so long as he continued to 
oVersee the speedy implementation of Mitterrand's electoral programme. The evidence 
Would seem to point to the first explanation; for in spite of his efforts to publicly assert his 
executive pre-eminence, Mitterrand intervened very little in government affairs during his first 
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few months in office. Szafran and Ketz claim that Mitterrand was very conscious that the 
Prime Minister should appear to be 'Ie veritable patron du gouvemement', in much the same 
way as Debre had been between 1958 and 1962.79 In any case, Mitterrand's legitimacy was 
so strong after the presidential election that he would not have needed to interfere 
excessively in domestic politics. This created the impression that Mauroy was enjoying a 
greater freedom of action than his predecessors. It is also worth noting that presidential-
prime ministerial relations had not really had time to deteriorate at this stage, and this surely 
contributed to the public's positive image of the working relationship between Mitterrand and 
Mauroy. 
It is true that early on in Mitterrand's first septennate, changes took place which seemed to 
promise an enhanced role for the government in executive decision-making. The number of 
interministerial committees reached record levels in the first few months of the new Socialist 
regime, whilst the number of presidential 'conseils restreints' halved over the same period.8o 
Of course, this may be partly attributed to the need for left-wing ministers and ministerial 
advisors to familiarise themselves with the internal workings of the State. However, the fact 
that the frequency of such meetings increased so significantly (as much as 40% compared to 
previous administrations), showed that policy issues and legislative projects were being 
debated more fully and more freely than they had been during Giscard's presidency.81 
According to Hubert Vedrine, one of Mitterrand's priorities had been to break with Giscard's 
style of leadership. Vedrine asserts that, on his arrival at the Elysee in May 1981, Mitterrand 
asked his friend Andre Rousselet to find out how things were organised under de Gaulle's 
presidency, so that he might adopt a similar approach.82 It is worth noting that Mitterrand did 
not take the step of reintroducing the 'conseils de cabinet', which took place under Debre's 
premiership, as these would have allowed cabinet meetings to take place without the Head of 
State being present. Whilst this measure would have given the government greater 
independence and provided Mitterrand with a prime means of illustrating his professed 
Commitment to greater institutional balance, he was clearly not prepared to risk granting his 
ministers such political autonomy and the 'conseils de cabinet' remained a thing of the past. 
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Further evidence that the government was no longer being directly dictated to by the Elysee is 
provided by a number of embarrassing inconsistencies which arose between ministerial and 
presidential statements on government policy. One such incident occurred in 1982, when 
Finance Minister, Jacques Delors, announced a lowering of building society interest rates 
without having first received the President's approval. When Mitterrand found out, he refused 
to accept the measure and demanded that the Prime Minister publicly deny Delors' 
statement.83 On another occasion, the President changed the composition of the new 
regulatory body for the media without informing Matignon. This decision wholly undermined a 
public announcement that had already been made by the prime ministerial advisor for 
Communications, Jerome Clement. Obviously, both these examples may be seen as typical 
exercises in presidential pre-eminence. Nevertheless, they do show that, in the early stages 
of Mitterrand's presidency at least, ministers were more than just executors of decisions 
which had already been made by the Elysee. Instead they were able to work on policy 
initiatives with their own teams before presenting them to the cabinet and the President. 
One might contend, however, that Mitterrand's determination to use his authority to impose 
deCisions upon his ministers ultimately prevented them from exercising any real autonomy 
OVer their specific fields of expertise. In this respect, it is questionable whether Mitterrand's 
presidency brought about any real change in the way power was distributed between the 
government and the Head of State. As Mitterrand himself explained at the beginning of his 
mandate: 'nul n'ignore, au sein du gouvernement comme ail/eurs, que Ie President de la 
Republique peut a tout moment faire prevaloir /,opinion qu'il a de /'interet nationaf.84 This 
statement takes the form of an implicit admission that government policy could be entirely 
dictated by the President should he deem this to be in the nation's best interests. 
In almost all cases when Mitterrand found himself in disagreement with a member of his 
government over a policy issue, the minister concerned was obliged to yield to the President's 
View or resign his post. We have already seen a striking example of this when it was noted 
that Mitterrand announced the withdrawal of the Savary Bill in 1984, without having even 
informed the Prime Minister or the Education Minister of his decision. Similar examples 
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abound throughout Mitterrand's first five years in office. Even at the start of his mandate 
when, it was argued, the President did not intervene so closely in government affairs, there 
are several important instances when he imposed his own personal preferences upon his 
ministers. This was the case for the government's nationalisation programme which went 
ahead in the autumn of 1981. In an interview with Lacouture, Michel Rocard claims that when 
the issue came up for discussion in the Council of Ministers, he argued strongly against the 
President, who was in favour of full nationalisations as opposed to the acquisition of a 51 % 
State share. Rocard's boldness prompted several other key ministers, amongst them 
Finance Minister, Jacques Delors, Foreign Affairs Minister, Claude Cheysson and Justice 
Minister, Robert Badinter, to voice their opposition to the President's proposal on the grounds 
that it would have serious repercussions upon the already struggling economy. Having 
listened to their views, Rocard asserts that the President rose from his chair and left the room 
with the words Je vous ferai connaTtre ma decision avant peu,.85 The following week, Mauroy 
told Rocard that the debate was now closed since the President had decided to go ahead with 
the 100% option. Despite the minor differences between this account and the one given by 
Favier and Martin-Roland,86 both versions attribute the final decision to the President. Both 
also contend that, apart from the aforementioned cabinet meeting, no further discussion took 
place between Mitterrand and his government on this issue before the President made his 
final choice. Therefore, although the President may have encouraged discussion amongst 
ministers, he alone controlled the exact nature of proposed government legislation and the 
speed and order in which projects were drawn up and presented to Parliament. This was 
Confirmed by Mitterrand in September 1981: 's'agissant de mes engagements, if m'appartient 
de vei/ler a leur mise en reuvre, notamment quant au calendrier de leur realisation ,.87 
Since Mitterrand had been careful to place his closest and most loyal colleagues in key 
POsitions outside government, he was able to impose his choices upon ministers, knowing 
that they were unlikely to be able to join forces with the PS or the parliamentary majority to 
force him to reconsider his decision. As we have already noted, this was one of Mitterrand's 
main reasons for appointing Mauroy as Prime Minister in order to isolate him from any 
external support mechanisms, thus ensuring that he was largely unable to challenge 
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presidential authority. In his book, 'La vie quotidienne a Matignon au temps de I'union de la 
gauche', Thierry Pfister supports this view. As a result of his opposition to Mitterrand at the 
Metz Congress in 1979, Pfister affirms that, throughout his period in office, Prime Minister 
Mauroy became 'I'objet d'un proces permanent en Mresie d~nt les procureurs implacables 
etaient Ie president du groupe socialiste a I'Assemblee nationale et Paul Quiles'. 88 He goes 
on to illustrate the extent to which these key PS representatives intended to challenge 
government decision-making if it did not conform to presidential policy, by referring back to a 
meeting of the PS group held in July 1981, during which Quiles exclaimed 'Ia ligne de Metz 
triomphera. Les autres devront soumettre ou se demettre!,.89 Again this corroborates our 
view that the Socialist Party was prepared to present itself as a resource upon which the 
President could draw to bolster his control over the executive. 
Not only were ministers bound to comply with presidential decisions (the alternative being 
their departure from government), they were also obliged to defend those choices as their 
own. Both Delors and Mauroy, for instance, were forced to justify the President's decision not 
to limit government spending and devalue the franc even further prior to 1983, despite the fact 
that both men believed such measures were absolutely imperative.9o Portelli and Colombani 
also note that Mauroy had been one of the first to underline the dangers of going ahead with 
some of the Left's more radical economic and social reforms due to the poor economic 
Climate. Yet he had to feign naivety in front of journalists when questioned about the potential 
recklessness of government strategy in these areas. 91 
Of all Mitterrand's ministers, it was undoubtedly Mauroy who suffered most as a result of this 
tradition of ministerial subordination. In his book, Les Annees Mitterrand, Serge July calls 
Mauroy 'Ie Premier Ministre experimentateur' - a reference to his obligation to push ahead 
With legislative projects, whilst Mitterrand observed the way in which such proposals were 
being received by the public. If the reaction was negative, Mitterrand could always announce 
the withdrawal or the amendment of a text in the hope of winning public approval for his 
actions. The Premier, on the other hand, was left discredited, having championed an 
unpopular policy and then been undermined by the President. Mitterrand's reluctance to 
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over-involve himself in policy matters for fear of lowering his popularity, whilst allowing the 
Prime Minister to act as a kind of lightening conductor for public discontent, is epitomised by 
the curt reply 'debrouil/ez-vous', which was given to Mauroy as he pleaded with the President 
for advice on how to resolve the school's crisis.92 Just as de Gaulle had left Pompidou in the 
firing line throughout the events of May 1968 while he procrastinated over what course of 
action to take, so Mitterrand too declined to involve himself in the events of July 1984 until he 
had devised a strategy that would sufficiently protect his presidential position. 
Such was Mauroy's loyalty to Mitterrand, however, that he accepted his role as principal 
POlitical scapegoat.93 Again this is illustrated by the Premier's readiness in 1984 to claim 
responsibility for the 39-hour week when, in reality, it was Mitterrand who had demanded that 
this legislation go ahead, in spite of warnings from Mauroy and Employment Minister, Jean 
Auroux.94 Revel does not accept this view that ministers were mere executors of presidential 
orders. Had this been the case, he argues, the notion of presidential accountability would 
have been re-established (since a superior must assume responsibility for the actions of his 
subordinates). Given that this did not occur, Revel contends that, in the eyes of the electorate 
at least, Mitterrand's ministers were more than just presidential servants. 
Revel's claim that the President was in no way accountable for government action is not 
borne out by surveys conducted during Mauroy's premiership. These show that efforts by 
ministers to shoulder the responsibility for presidential policies did not succeed in exempting 
Mitterrand from the effects of public disillusionment with the government. The President was 
so closely associated with the implementation of the government's programme that he could 
not escape the backlash that followed the introduction of austerity measures in 1983 or the 
Savary Bill the following year; in 1984 polls showed that Mitterrand was the most unpopular 
President the Fifth Republic had known.95 It would seem, therefore, that the public did regard 
Mitterrand as the driving force behind the government; for had he not been perceived as 
such, it is doubtful whether his popularity would ha·ve suffered to the same extent. The fact 
that Mitterrand attempted to distance himself from the problems of domestic politics from 
1984 onwards also suggests that he was aware of the need to appear less politically engaged 
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in order to improve his public image. One possible means of achieving this objective was to 
name a new Prime Minister to whom he would grant greater autonomy over domestic policy, 
so that as President he might begin to focus his attention more fully upon foreign and defence 
issues. Having rejected this option on numerous occasions, Mitterrand finally accepted 
Mauroy's resignation in July 1984 and appointed Laurent Fabius as his successor at 
Matignon. 
4.3.1 Fabius and Mitterrand: 'lui c'est lui, moi c'est moiIJ6 
Given that Laurent Fabius had carved himself a reputation as one of Mitterrand's most loyal 
supporters and closest colleagues since the Epinay Congress in 1971, it is easy to see why 
the press reacted to his nomination with headlines such as 'Mitterrand Premier Ministre' or 
'Mitterrand se nomme a Matignon'. 97 Fabius' arrival at Matignon was interpreted as a sign of 
a future increase in presidential control over government affairs. Far from liberating the Prime 
Minister from excessive intervention from both the Elysee and the Socialist Party leadership, 
Fabius' appointment appeared to complete the domination of the State by the President's 
men. Had Mitterrand really wanted to break with the problems of the past and distance 
himself from national affairs, one might argue that he should have opted for a candidate like 
Jacques Oelors, whose image as a more moderate left-winger and economic pragmatist 
Would indeed have been seen as the possible beginning of a different style of relationship 
between Prime Minister and President. Oelors had already been offered Matignon in 1982, 
Which he accepted on the condition that Mitterrand allow him full control of economic and 
financial matters.98 The President would not agree to this loss of influence over key policy 
areas and the offer was subsequently withdrawn. In light of this, one might reasonably 
assume that one of Mitterrand's main reasons for appointing Fabius was that he would be 
less likely to challenge presidential authority and would adapt, in much the same way as 
Mauroy, to the demands or constraints of his prime ministerial role. 
Most political analysts who have studied this period, however, agree that from July 1984 the 
President intended to grant the Prime Minister greater autonomy in the run-up to the 
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parliamentary elections. Franz-Olivier Giesbert asserts that Mitterrand wanted Fabius to 
govern in his own way and even asked his personal advisors at the Elysee to take care not to 
short-circuit decision-making at Matignon.99 He claims that the President aimed to keep a 
lower national profile, by offering 'fatherly' advice behind the scenes in order to avoid publicly 
undermining his new Premier's authority: 'Je tiens a ce que vous affirmiez bien votre 
autonomie. Je veillerai a ce que vous puissiez gouverner,.100 Hugues Portelli and Jean-
Marie Colombani also assert that Fabius had a significantly greater margin of manoeuvre than 
Mauroy. He was able to impose a more centralised style of government upon his ministers, 
and this resulted in an accretion of prime ministerial authority as Fabius took control of 
governmental communication and co-ordination. 101 He even negotiated his own television 
programme entitled 'Parlons France', which became a forum for extolling the virtues of 
government policy by means of 'questions' that had been carefully formulated to facilitate this 
process. 102 Although this conformed to the type of role which Mitterrand envisaged for his 
second Prime Minister - 'de detendre Ie bilan commun devant les electeurs apres cinq ans de 
luffes' - it is nonetheless reminiscent of the televised fireside chats which became a feature of 
Giscard's presidential style. 103 These changes in the dynamics within the executive dyarchy 
fOllowing Fabius' aPPointment may, therefore, be attributed to two factors: firstly, the 
President's readiness to grant his new Premier greater independence (on one occasion 
Mitterrand even insinuated that a reversal had taken place in the balance of power between 
Prime Minister and President); 104 and secondly, Fabius' determination to exploit this to the full 
in order to 'presidentialise' his public profile and reorganise government administration, so 
that all decisions were first approved by Matignon before being officially announced. 
On occasions Fabius took this notion of prime ministerial autonomy too far. At the very least, 
this caused the President mild embarrassment and some amusement, as in September 1984, 
when Fabius flippantly summed up his working relationship with the President as 'lui c'est lui, 
moi c'est moi'. At worst, however, Fabius' perception of his role did cause serious friction 
between Mitterrand and himself, as he appeared to be directly challenging presidential pre-
eminence. The first time this occurred was in 1985, following the sinking of the Rainbow 
Warrior by French secret agents. Once the enquiry into the incident got underway, Fabius 
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found Mitterrand was trying to protect Defence Minister, Charles Hernu. Unlike Mauroy, who 
did not attempt to resist the role of scapegoat thrust upon him during the school's crisis, 
Fabius was extremely resistant to the prospect of taking the blame for an incident in which he 
had played no part. Instead he led his own investigation into events, finally demanding that 
Mitterrand force Hernu to resign; a request which, under the circumstances, the President had 
little choice but to accept if he was to limit his own involvement in the affair. 105 The second 
clash between Prime Minister and President came in December 1985, when Mitterrand took 
the unprecedented step of meeting the Polish leader, General Jaruzelski, without informing 
his Premier. The following day in the National Assembly, Fabius admitted having been 
'personnellement trouble' by the President's decision.106 Such a public disavowal of 
presidential action by a Prime Minister could not fail to attract media attention; not only 
because it subverted the convention of prime ministerial subordination, but also since it 
implicitly challenged the notion of foreign affairs and defence as exclusively presidential 
domains. Unsurprisingly, Fabius' candour provoked an angry reaction from Mitterrand who, 
Attali claims, remarked: 'Fabius s'est trompe. II n'aurait jamais dO dire cela. C'est 
inaccpetable de la part de mon Premier ministre [ ... ]. /I restera Premier ministre mais je ne 
I'oublierai pas,.107 
Clearly Mitterrand expected a greater degree of diplomacy and subservience from his Prime 
Minister than Fabius was prepared to give. Ironically, one possible explanation for Fabius' 
deCision not to tow the presidential line in these matters was that he himself harboured 
presidential aspirations. As a result, he did not wish to be remembered as the chief executor 
of Mitterrand's orders, nor did he want to accept responsibility for controversial events, which 
Would damage his chances of being elected to the Elysee in the future. This would certainly 
help to explain why Fabius told Mitterrand he was not prepared to defend the government's 
record prior to 1984, if were he chosen by the President to head the PS legislative 
campaign.1G8 As far as Fabius was concerned, there was always a real danger that his 
actions and his attitude as Prime Minister might be aff~cted by his own presidential ambitions 
- a possibility to which one of Mitterrand's close advisors drew his attention in July 1984: 
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'Metiez vous de ce type. G'est un technocrate qui fait carriere. /I se fout pas mal de vous. /I 
servira de son interet et non Ie v6tre '. 1 09 
This idea that Fabius was taking advantage of his position as Prime Minister to improve his 
'presidentiabilite' may also account for his portrayal in the media from mid-1985 as 
increasingly arrogant. In a televised debate with Jacques Chirac, Fabius further compounded 
this image of self-importance by reminding his opponent 'Savez-vous que vous parlez au 
Premier ministre de la France?,110 Surveys published the following day revealed the extent of 
the damage caused by this patronising remark - only 24% of viewers thought Fabius came 
across as the better candidate. Such a performance undoubtedly irritated the President, 
since it did little to help the PS regain lost ground in time for the 1986 parliamentary elections; 
a recovery which up until that point was almost exclusively attributable to Fabius' popularity. 
More importantly for our study, it begs the question whether this poor rating was attributable 
to public disapproval of Fabius' self-importance because it did not comply with traditional 
eXpectations of prime ministerial comportment under the Fifth Republic. In other words, did 
Fabius lose the support of viewers watching the debate because his demeanour was too 
presidential and offended the sensibilities of a public that had grown accustomed to the self-
effacing tendencies of successive Premiers within the regime? 
Public perceptions of the relationship between President and Prime Minister between 1984-86 
seem to corroborate our claim that Mitterrand was no longer so closely identified with the 
determination and direction of domestic policy. Unlike the period 1981-83 when surveys 
showed a strong association on the part of voters between the President, the party and the 
gOvernment (a drop in the President's popularity would automatically produce a decline in 
support for the PS and Prime Minister and vice versa), the two years preceding the legislative 
elections reveal an important evolution in this relationship, which testifies to the success of 
Mitterrand's efforts to reshape his presidential image in time for the almost inevitable defeat of 
1986. Instead of mirroring presidential popularity, the level of public confidence accorded to 
Prime Minister Fabius was inversely proportionate to that accorded to Mitterrand and the PS. 
The President was no longer regarded as the principal government decision-maker, since 
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controversial incidents, such as the Greenpeace Affair, led to a rapid erosion in prime 
ministerial popularity, whilst the public rallied to the President who was attempting to dodge 
any responsibility for the affair by acting as an arbitrator above political divides. In the early 
stages of his premiership, this relationship worked to Fabius' advantage as he benefited from 
a high level of public confidence in his leadership, in spite of the general climate of pessimism 
affecting France at the time. By contrast, Mitterrand appeared unable to shake off the 
negative effects of economic austerity and the Savary Bil1.111 By the time his premiership was 
drawing to a close, however, Fabius' image was at an all-time low; the aforementioned 
indiscretions concerning Jaruzelski's visit and the Greenpeace affair were not well-received 
by the public and his popularity began to suffer.112 Mitterrand, on the other hand, had been 
successfully cultivating his image as the 'Ie gardien de la so/idarite' in the run-up to the 
parliamentary elections. 113 Thus, as the political climate improved with the promise of a new 
government to tackle France's problems, so the President, as the incarnation of France, 
benefited from this renewed public optimism. 
4.4 Les domaines reserves: 'Ie systeme de la presidence 
omnisciente et omnipotente'114 
Until his election in 1981, Mitterrand had consistently rejected the notion of so-called 
presidential 'domaines reserveS,.115 Throughout his period in opposition, he had repeatedly 
Challenged this constitutional convention, arguing that no field of policy-making was 
exclusively presidential. In 1978, for instance, Mitterrand claimed that Giscard was 
endangering the stability and the democratic functi~ning of France's institutions by 
perpetuating such a false interpretation of executive power: 'si Ie President de la Repub/ique 
reste aeeroehe a eet usage, qui n'est pas eonstitutionnel, du seeteur reserve et veut, en 
Somme, imposer ses decisions au gouvernement ... on se trouverait dans une situation 
extr{:mement difficile,.116 In this respect, one may have been justified in expecting 
Mitterrand's arrival at the Elysee to produce a revised reading of the Constitution, whereby 
the dual allocation of control over foreign affairs and defence to both the President and the 
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Prime Minister actually did result in a power-sharing arrangement between the Head of State 
and the Premier, and an enhanced role for Foreign and Defence Ministers. 
Once in office, however, Mitterrand abandoned his former stance to embrace the established 
tradition of presidential dominance in these fields. Interviewed by the author about 
Mitterrand's interpretation of the 'domaines reserves', Louis Mermaz conceded that 'il 
(Mitterrand) est entre tres vite dans les habits du general de Gaulle [ ... J. C'est vrai qu'iI s'est 
servi de la Constitution et qu'il en a tire Ie maximum,.117 Mitterrand later justified his change 
of heart on the grounds that his pre-eminence did not derive from an acceptance of political 
convention, but from an accurate reading of the Constitution: 'Quant a ce fameux domaine 
reserve dont tout Ie monde parle, moi j'ai toujours ete contre et je suis toujours contre. Ce 
qUe je viens d'evoquer (art.5, 15, 52 Const.) ce n'est pas Ie secteur reserve, ce sont les 
pouvoirs conferes par la Constitution au President de la Republique,.118 This statement was 
Obviously designed to silence critics, who were accusing him of having forgotten his former 
rejection of an exclusively 'presidential sector,.119 Yet in attempting to show that his views 
had not changed since 1958, Mitterrand simply revealed the full extent of his reconciliation to 
de Gaulle's institutions. As we have already noted, sole responsibility for foreign affairs and 
defence is by no means clearly attributed to the Head of State by the Constitution. Indeed, 
this formed the basis of the Left's original opposition to the 'domaines reserves' in the 1960s. 
By choosing to ignore this ambiguity, however, it may be contended that Mitterrand was not 
only perpetuating the existing convention but, as the above remarks show, he was attempting 
to transform it from an accepted practice into an institutional obligation. It is more than mere 
Coincidence that this declaration came at a point when the Left seemed destined to lose the 
forthcoming parliamentary elections, and Mitterrand was faced with the possibility that his 
authority over these areas would be challenged by a right-wing government. 
In his study of foreign and defence policy under the Fifth Republic, Cohen concludes that 
during the first five years of Socialist administration, presidential control over such areas 
increased due to Mitterrand's preference for independent decision-making and his 
reOrganisation of administrative structures at the beginning of his mandate.12o In an interview 
, 
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with the author, former Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson rejected this observation as overly 
simplistic, particularly in relation to his own period of office from 1981 to 1984, when he 
claimed to have enjoyed an unprecedented level of autonomy.121 According to Cheysson, 
there were only three aspects of French foreign policy over which the President insisted on 
maintaining total control: Europe, relations with the UK and US in matters of international 
security and finally, Israel. Responsibility for decision-making in the remaining areas was left 
predominantly to the team at the Quai d'Orsay, who were simply required to keep the 
PreSident informed of their actions. 122 Not only does this appear to undermine Cohen's 
findings, but it also contradicts the widely held view that Mitterrand had a special interest in 
areas such as The Third World, Algeria and relations with the francophone States. Instead 
Cheysson argued that landmark speeches, like the one Mitterrand made before the Knesset 
in 1983, were designed to create an image of the French President as a visionary and 
international peace-maker, when in reality he had no real interest in the Palestinian cause. 123 
Similarly, Cheysson claimed that the President cared little about francophone policy and 
handed over control of this dossier to a low-profile diplomat only a year after his election to 
the Elysee. He also added that with regard to Algeria, Mitterrand held the same views as he 
had done when he was Minister of the Interior under the Fourth Republic, although he would 
never have admitted this publicly. 
Describing the nature of his ministerial duties, Cheysson even went so far as to claim that, 
with the exception of the Prime Minister, he was the single most powerful member of the 
gOvernment between 1981 and 1984. Having successfully persuaded Mitterrand to rename 
the Foreign Ministry 'Ie Ministere des Affaires exterieures' in 1981, Cheysson asserted that he 
was required to oversee and, if necessary, overrule decisions taken by those ministers in 
Charge of Finance and Defence, since some aspects of these policy areas overlapped into the 
general domain of External Affairs. Cheysson also gavf- examples of initiatives which he had 
launched with Mitlerrand's knowledge, but without his consent,124 and of policies which he 
had pursued beyond the presidential remit. 125 When asked why such actions had failed to 
produce a major conflict between the President and the Foreign Minister, Cheysson offered 
tWo complimentary explanations: firstly, he affirmed that such disagreements or differences of 
177 
opinion were solely confined to those areas in which Mitterrand had no particular interest, and 
secondly, Cheysson argued that during this period, Mitterrand was far too busy with domestic 
affairs to concern himself with foreign policy decisions which fell outside of the three 
aforementioned 'presidential' areas. 126 Towards the end of his period in office, however, 
Cheysson did concede that he had proffered his resignation following a disagreement with 
Mitterrand in 1983 over France's involvement in Near Eastern affairs, but that the President 
had declined his offer. Had he accepted, Cheysson confirmed that he would have left office 
immediately, as he totally accepted the established principle of presidential pre-eminence 
within the 'domaines-reserves,.127 
If Cohen's assertion of increased presidential control is not borne out by Cheysson's account 
of his role at the Quai d'Orsay, it is certainly more easily applied to Roland Dumas' spell at the 
Foreign Ministry. Unlike Cheysson, who had a clear vision of both the role he intended to 
play and the policies he wished to implement, Mitterrand's old friend Dumas entered the 
government in 1984 without a political agenda. Throughout his period in office, he was 
Content to concentrate upon the implementation of those policies drawn up by the President. 
This interpretation is corroborated by studies of Mitterrand's presidency, which confirm that 
almost every political initiative launched by Dumas between 1984 and 1986 focused on one of 
the three aspects of foreign policy which Cheysson claimed Mitterrand favoured. This 
resulted in either the complete abandonment of many of the policies pursued by Cheysson in 
other areas until 1984, or the delegation of responsibility for these dossiers to the diplomatic 
Corps.128 More importantly, however, Dumas's willingness to act as an executor of 
preSidential decisions enabled Mitterrand to take full charge of foreign affairs, so that no 
decision was taken in this area without his prior knowledge and consent, bringing to an end 
the enhanced scope of action enjoyed by Cheysson, as well as his hopes of transforming 
foreign affairs into a more open and democratic area of pnlicy-making. 129 
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4.4.1 Advisors and special envoys: another string to the presidential 
bow 
One of the most important aspects of Mitterrand's approach to foreign policy was his 
development of 'une diploma tie parallele' - a team of personal advisors and foreign 
emissaries appointed by and answerable exclusively to the President for their actions. Not 
that de Gaulle or Giscard did not have their own teams of experts and close, personal 
collaborators, but the size of the presidential entourage increased considerably under 
Mitterrand and this undoubtedly allowed him to dominate the 'domaines reserves' to a greater 
extent than his predecessors. In addition to those permanent members of the Elysee staff 
Such as Jacques Attali, Hubert Vedrine, Pierre Beregovoy (replaced in July 1982 by Jean-
LOUis Bianco), the President also nominated special emissaries, whom he would send off on 
specific missions around the world. These presidential ambassadors did not always emanate 
from the ranks of the PS like Pierre Joxe or Jean Poperen, some were old friends (Patrice 
Pelat) or family members (Danielle, Jacques and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand ). Nor did they 
necessarily need to have any previous experience in their allocated field of interest as shown 
by Mitterrand's nomination of Guy Penne, as the Elysee representative for African Affairs. 13o 
These advisors enabled Mitterrand to set up a double circuit of information. On the one hand, 
he was kept up-to-date about international developments by the Foreign Minister, the Minister 
for Foreign Trade and the Premier. On the other, he used his own private staff, whose 
POlitical independence and personal loyalty were guaranteed, to research issues or meet 
foreign dignitaries on his behalf. Unlike the government which worked as a team sharing 
information and collaborating on specific dossiers, members of the presidential entourage 
Were not encouraged to work together. Instead, Mitterrand would see them individually, when 
and if he deemed it necessary. By avoiding the establishment of too fraternal an atmosphere 
at the Elysee, Mitterrand was able to retain a strong hold over his staff who, Attali asserts, 
Would compete against one another for his attention: 'un c~nseiller n'a pas a s'arroger une 
autorife qui n'emane pas de lui, mais a conquerir I'influence qu'i/ souhaite qu'on lui 
reconnaisse,.131 It also allowed the President to ascribe the same task to two different 
indiViduals within his entourage, knowing that neither was likely to find out. In this way, 
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Mitterrand would be provided with two separate reports on the same question, thus 
maximising his knowledge of a subject before he was required to make a decision. 
The existence of presidential advisors enabled Mitterrand to exclude the Prime Minister from 
foreign affairs; 132 on occasions the Premier was not informed of important decisions until days 
after they had been taken by the President in collusion with his Elysee advisors. One 
example of this style of leadership concerns the decision to send French troops into Chad in 
1983. Parliament was not in session at the time, so Mitterrand made use of his presidential 
prerogatives to launch the initiative, without having first consulted the National Assembly. It is 
not ironic to note that only three years earlier Mitterrand had attacked Premier Barre for not 
having involved the National Assembly in the decision to mount operation Kolwezi. 133 The 
fact that he chose not to inform the cabinet of his decision for a further two weeks, clearly 
illustrates the extent to which Mitterrand was prepared, and indeed able, to flout the 
guidelines of the Constitution by keeping the government, in particular the Prime Minister, out 
of international affairs. 134 
If the Premier did have a part to play in foreign affairs and defence matters, it was as a 
presidential mouthpiece or shield. Just as he was required to defend and sometimes assume 
Mitterrand's domestic policy decisions, so the Prime Minister also had to justify international 
POlicy initiatives in which he had had little or no input. Hence, Fabius reluctantly ended up 
protecting the government and the President during the Greenpeace affair. Similarly, the 
Foreign Minister, was also expected to support ali presidential action in this field. This did not 
Pose any Significant problems between Novemeber 1984 and 1986, when Roland Dumas 
tOok over at the Quai d'Orsay. Claude Cheysson, on the other hand, did not accept this role 
So readily and, on several occasions, this resulted in him publicly expressing a contradictory 
View to that of the President. 135 At times, Cheysson's determination to remain true to his own 
convictions, as opposed to simply adopting those of the Elysee, did succeed in persuading 
the President to reconsider his position or to reflect upon an issue for a longer period than he 
might otherwise have done.136 But on the whole, there were few advantages to be reaped by 
Cheysson or Mitterrand as a result of these displays of ministerial independence, since they 
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risked confusing both the electorate and the international community as to the real objectives 
of French foreign policy. Therefore, whilst it may be said that such challenges to the 
presidential monopoly over this area of policy-making injected a certain amount of creativity 
and discussion into foreign affairs during the first three years of Mitterrand's presidency, they 
did not alter the fact that the President alone had the power to take final decisions. Nor did 
they prevent this area from falling back under complete presidential control after 1984. As a 
result, it may be concluded that Cheysson's period in office did not ultimately contribute to the 
transformation of the 'domaines reserves' into what one might describe as 'domaines 
partages'. 
The way in which the Elysee entourage functioned between 1981 and 1986 reflected 
Mitterrand's personal leadership style and this may be seen as the second factor which 
Contributed to an overall increase in preSidential control over foreign affairs and defence 
during this period. Alistair Cole refers to Mitterrand's leadership as 'reactive' in so far as he 
was often 'forced to address agendas he had not selected, and to react to events he had not 
predicted,.137 One might also contend that it could be dubbed 'leadership by procrastination', 
given that when he was faced with an unexpected turn of events, Mitterrand had a tendency 
to use both his government and his entourage as a means of deflecting public attention, while 
he took his time deciding how best to tackle the matter in question. In this respect, we would 
agree with Serge July when he says that Mitterrand characteristically preferred to '/aisser 
mOrir la situation, attendre que /a fievre monte, qu'el/e aille jusqu'a son paroxysme pour enfin 
mobiliser toute son energie,.138 In other words, he gathered together as much information as 
POSSible, consulting ministers, experts and friends, before· intervening decisively at the most 
advantageous moment, even if this meant allowing a problem to go unresolved for longer 
than necessary. It was a flexible style of leadership which allowed Mitterrand to assess the 
potential impact of a specific policy upon the country, the government and the presidency in 
order to make the 'right' choice for France. However,. Cheysson asserted that it could be 
extremely exasperating for those involved in the consultation process because throughout the 
deliberations Mitterrand would appear to agree with every single point of view being 
preSented to him. In this way, the President retained the upper hand by ensuring that no 
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group or individual could claim to have influenced his decision-making: 'il ne voulait en aucun 
cas qu'un conseiller, un groupe de conseillers ou un ami avait Ie sentiment qui c'etait lui qui 
avait determine Ie President. Ce n'est pas un desir de tromper, c'est qu'iI ne voulait pas etre 
prisonnier de qui que ce soil'. 139 
Given that Mitterrand openly acknowledged his pre-eminence over foreign affairs and 
defence, his use of special envoys and advisors may be interpreted positively an example of 
his determination to explore all the channels open to him in order to make well-informed 
decisions in these sensitive areas. 140 As Claude Cheysson explains: 'sur tout probleme 
important pour lui, iI avait de differents cerc/es de conseillers, et ces cercles etaient places 
dans des dimensions differentes, iI n'y avait pas de contact ou possibilite de contact entre 
eux. Sur un grand sujet financier, naturellement il avait ses conseillers a l'interieur de 
I'administration, il avait ses conseillers a I'Elysee dont Ie contact avec I'administration n'etait 
pas toujours suffisant, il avait des conseillers bancaires prives qui n'avaient aucun contact ni 
avec I'administration, ni avec I'Elysee et iI avait des conseillers de je ne sais pas ou sur Ie 
meme sujet'. Critics of Mitterrand's style of presidential leadership, however, often focus 
upon his use of presidential advisors as proof of a willingness to exploit the more monarchical 
aspects of presidential power under the Fifth Republic. 141 They accuse Mitterrand of 
deliberately surrounding himself with courtisans, who were wholly devoted to serving him, in 
order to protect his position and to undermine that of the government. Cohen argues that, 
although the data provided by these advisors may have led to a deeper analysis of foreign 
POlicy issues, their presence often led to inefficiency and conflict as result of the lack of co-
ordination and communication both within the Elysee team itself and between presidential 
advisors and the government. 142 Vedrine accepts these accusations of administrative 
incoherence, but denies that Mitterrand encouraged the formation of a quasi-monarchical 
entourage. He sees the loyalty of Mitterrand's Elysee advisors as one of the unavoidable 
Consequences of his role as President - 'il Y a c.our. des qu'iI y a pouvoir', adding that 
Mitterrand had a horror of over-familiarity and an extreme sense of republican protocol. 143 If 
these individuals did behave like royal courtisans around their 'monarch', Vedrine claims that 
they did so voluntarily, since Mitterrand had no time for flattery or favouritism. 144 Yet one 
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could counter this statement by suggesting that the way in which Mitterrand chose to promote 
competitiveness between his personal advisors actively encouraged such courtisan 
behaviour. Furthermore, the fact that he sent presidential envoys to places where there were 
government ambassadors to negotiate on behalf of the French executive, and assigned tasks 
to advisors that were already the concern of specific ministers, gave the impression that there 
was a shadow cabinet in place at the Elysee, which could privately undermine the authority of 
the government. 
There is certainly evidence to support the claim that ministers felt threatened by the influence 
which Mitterrand's personal advisors exercised over both domestic and foreign policy. At the 
start of 1982, for example, Premier Mauroy, endeavoured to persuade Mitterrand to appoint 
Pierre Beregovoy to a government ministry, as opposed to continuing in his role as Elysee 
Secretary General. The reasoning behind this prime ministerial request derived from the fact 
that Beregovoy was a known opponent of economic rigour. If he remained as the President's 
right-hand man, Mauroy feared he would never be able to convince Mitterrand of the need to 
cut public spending. As it transpired, Mitterrand made his own mind up to introduce economic 
austerity, but this was not without having regularly consulted the so-called 'visiteurs du 
sOir',145 who recommended a dynamic change of policy direction, even though none of the 
individuals concerned had an official post within the government. On another occasion, 
Mitterrand's directeur du cabinet, Andre Rousselet, announced the appointment of new heads 
Of radio and television channels, but forgot to inform Jerome Clement, Prime Minister 
Mauroy's advisor for Communications, who was supposedly responsible for such 
nominations. Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the Elysee staff seemed to enjoy a 
higher public profile than under previous administrations and were described by one political 
commentator as 'Ie gouvernement-bis,.146 
Although the presidential entourage may have enjoye~ 'an image boarding on star status' 
during Mitterrand's period in office, one should not over-estimate its power.147 In her study of 
the preSidential staff under the Fifth Republic, Stevens identifies three main restrictions upon 
the autonomy of the Elysee team: firstly, the mammoth workload of these individuals 
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prevented them from being able to dedicate the time required for the formulation of policy, 
secondly, presidential advisors have no official decision-making powers according to the 
Constitution. Therefore, even if they did contribute to the elaboration of policy documents 
behind-the-scenes, these still required ministerial counter-signature. Finally, Stevens notes 
that no matter how influential some of Mitterrand's advisors may have seemed,148 they could 
not build a wall around the President and prevent him from continuing to consult the 
government, just as the government could not prevent Mitterrand from consulting his 
advisors. 149 In this respect, the members of the Elysee team may be collectively regarded as 
another aspect of presidential power, rather than the independently powerful body which 
some commentators would have us believe they became under Mitterrand's leadership.15o 
This is certainly an opinion shared by Claude Cheysson who, despite his considerable 
freedom of action as Foreign Minister, regards both the government and Elysee advisors as 
unable to exercise any real influence over foreign affairs and defence against the President's 
will. For as long as the President has the support of a the parliamentary majority, he may 
eXercise as much or as little control over the reserved sector, ensuring that, in the words of 
the former foreign minister, 'Ies domaines reserves continueront a echapper aux procedures 
democratiques '. 
4.5 Mitterrand's presidential discourse: an exercise in 
innovation and imitation 
Our study so far has shown how Mitterrand derived his power from the effective exploitation 
Of constitutional prerogatives, institutional conventions and party political affiliations. There 
Were, however, other less tangible factors which influenced the way in which he constructed 
and consolidated his role between 1981-86, the most important being his ability to exploit the 
sYmbolic, mystical status of the presidency under the Fifth Republic. 
Ihe aura which surrounds the presidency in modern French political culture may be traced 
back to de Gaulle who, as the regime's founder, portrayed his function in a variety of ways, all 
Of Which lent a mysterious, almost supernatural dimension to the figure of the Head of State. 
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In her analysis of de Gaulle's speeches and writings after 1958, Milne observes the President 
being depicted not simply as the equal or symbol of a glorious France, but as the favoured 
son, the 'creator', the consort and the avatar of the 'patrie'. 151 De Gaulle's ability to conjure 
up this mysticism around the presidency undoubtedly owed a great deal to both his unique 
personality and the special role he played in delivering France from the trauma of the Second 
World War. However, it was also facilitated by the ambivalent nature of the presidential role 
enshrined in article 5 of the constitutional text. In our first chapter, we noted how the term 
'arbitre' was open to two different interpretations. The first of these required the Head of 
State to rise above the party fray, intervening in a purely censorial or arbitrational capacity to 
protect the national interest. Thanks to the 1962 constitutional amendment, this notion of the 
relatively passive 'President-arbitre' was given a further, apparently contradictory, dimension, 
which transformed the President into the direct representative of the people. This required 
him to descend into the political arena to play an active role in governmental affairs. As a 
result, the notion of the presidency which evolved under de Gaulle's leadership had to 
accommodate two opposing sets of criteria: on the one hand, the Head of State was required 
to transcend internal divisions as the figurehead of the nation; on the other, he had to 
represent the electorate by engaging in political debate. 
This paradox, which characterises the nature of the French presidency, has now become a 
permanent feature of Fifth Republican politics. Successive Presidents have all drawn upon or 
adapted this Gaullist heritage, to varying degrees, in order to fulfil three main aims: to call for 
national unity, to justify presidential actions, authority or status and to valorise a specific set of 
beliefs or principles. 152 Even those competing in presidential elections must take into account 
the fact that they are not only being judged against their political opponents, but also against 
the legacy of de Gaulle. In other words, any aspiring candidate must collude in perpetuating 
this presidential myth, via gestures or discourse, in order to demonstrate successfully that 
he/she is worthy of the role of Head of State. 153 Our discussion of the presidentialisation of 
the Socialist Party in the 1970s re~ealed that, in addition to the radical discourse which he 
employed at political rallies, Mitterrand developed a separate, public discourse that was 
Clearly influenced by the increasing need to display both an understanding and an acceptance 
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(albeit an implicit one) of presidential traditions within the regime. In the following study of 
Mitterrand's speeches, press conferences and interviews following his election in 1981, we 
will examine the extent to which he went on to embrace, reject or reshape the discursive 
depiction of the presidential function, which emerged under de Gaulle's leadership. 
Given that his candidature in 1981 was inextricably linked to the implementation of a detailed 
political programme, Mitterrand was first and foremost a Socialist President, democratically 
elected by the people to bring about the 'break' with capitalism. This partisan identity 
necessarily affected the way in which he was able to draw upon the presidential legacy at the 
beginning of his mandate; his discourse focused principally upon the explanation of 
government policy and institutional procedures. Only foreign policy offered a real opportunity 
for the President to highlight his visionary qualities, although one might contend that he was 
still basking in the glory of the Left's double electoral victory and did not need to explore other 
ways of valorising his role. He was the instigator of 'radical' economic, social and political 
change - a mission which he had a duty to fulfil as a result of the mandate he had received 
from the people. This acknowledgement of popular sovereignty was essential for Mitterrand 
to justify his intervention in political decision-making: 
'Chacun sait que I'annee 1981 aura Me I'annee du changement que la France a voulu et que 
son peuple, Ie 10 mai, m'a charge de conduire avec Ie concours du gouvernement de la 
Republique et de I'Assemblee nationale issue des dernieres elections'. 154 
When circumstances permitted, however, Mitterrand willingly adopted a more lyrical style of 
language, which enabled him to play up the mystical aspects of the presidency, but without 
renouncing his political allegiances. In his inaugural address on the 21 st May 1981, for 
eXample, he depicted his accession to power as the culmination of two centuries of heroic 
struggle on the part of the working-classes to acquire the means to change society. In doing 
so, Mitterrand was able to bestow a unique historical legitimacy upon his person in the same 
Way that de Gaulle had done in 1958: 
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'En ce jour ou je prends possession de la plus haute charge, je pense a ces millions et ces 
millions de femmes et d'hommes [ ... J qui, deux siecles durant, dans la paix et dans la guerre, 
par Ie travail et par Ie sang, ont far;onne I'histoire de France sans y avoir acces autrement que 
par de breves et glorieuses fractures de notre societe. ' 
Moreover, by linking his own political philosophy to that of Jaures and to events which had 
taken on a legendary status in the French national consciousness, Mitterrand managed to 
integrate into this historical framework, so that he too acquired a special symbolism. He was 
casting himself as the father of modern French Socialism - an effect compounded by the 
ceremonious laying of roses upon the tombs of three left-wing icons in the Pantheon the 
same day: 
'e'est en leur nom d'abord que je parle, fidele a I'enseignement de Jaures, alors que, 
troisieme etape d'un long cheminement, apres Ie Front populaire et la liberation, la majorite 
Politique des Franr;ais, democratiquement exprimee, vient de s'identifier a sa majorite 
sociale,.155 
As government action began to run into serious economic difficulties, however, Mitterrand 
found himself increasingly obliged to defend government measures in the face of hostile 
questioning from journalists and the public. Such interviews kept presidential discourse on 
predominantly realistic ground. Unlike the honeymoon period when public optimism had 
enabled Mitterrand to enjoy expounding upon his role as the 'premier responsable de la 
Politique franr;aise', early indications that Socialist policies were not working undermined his 
Position and, as Gaffney rightly notes, left the President on many occasions 'struggling to 
present himself as possessing a dignity and vision' worthy of his office. 156 It is at this pOint 
that two main changes may be observed in Mitterrand's presidential speech, both of which 
are interlinked: the first is a gradual shift away from traditional Socialist rhetoric in favour of 
more consensual notions such as natio'nal unity, security and patriotism; 157 the second is an 
increasing tendency for the President to depict himself enjoying a special relationship with 
both the French people and France. Let us now look at these developments in more detail. 
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Mitterrand's abandonment of the political doctrine which had motivated his quest for the 
presidency throughout the 1970s was a slow and subtle process, the roots of which may be 
traced back to his speech at Figeac on 28 September 1982, when he publicly declared that 'Ie 
socia/isme a la franqaise [ ... ]je n'en fais pas une bible'. Although the President continued to 
discuss government policy at length in interviews and speeches, the radical language he 
employed in the 1970s and at the beginning of his mandate was replaced by a vaguer 
rhetoric, which created a direct bond between himself and the French that was not dependent 
upon party political allegiances: 
'Mon r61e comme President de la Repub/ique franqaise est [ ... ] de parvenir a reduire cet 
antagonisme pour realiser I'union ou Ie rassemblement des Franqais pour Ie redressement 
national'. 158 
This new terminology also allowed the President to embrace changes in policy direction, 
which had resulted from the failure of government measures to combat unemployment and 
inflation. Not that he explicitly acknowledged his sudden conversion to the merits of a mixed 
economy; instead Mitterrand maintained that his political philosophy had not altered in order 
to create a feeling of consistency and reliability around his persona: 
'J'ai toujours ete partisan de la liberte d'initiative et de I'esprit d'entreprise et je veux mettre 
en place une societe d'economie mixte,.159 
He even described the economic crisis besieging France as an international phenomenon,160 
thus projecting responsibility for domestic problems onto vague external factors beyond 
presidential control. But if such statements rang rather hollow and were limited in their ability 
to shield the presidency from public discontent, the crisis did provide Mitterrand with an ideal 
Opportunity to rise above party political divides in order to call for greater national solidarity. 
Military terminology such as 'bataille', 'effort', 'combat' 'conquete' and 'sacrifice' appeared with 
increasing frequency in Mitterrand's discourse, and served as a possible means of rallying the 
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public to his leadership in the same way that a commander might rally his troops before 
battle: 1e cherche a convaincre les Franqais qu'i/ faut serrer les dents quand on veut gagner 
un combat diffici/e,.161 In this case, it was the President who was leading the fight to see 
France emerge victorious, and inviting the electorate join him: 
'Franqaises, Franqais, mes chers compatriotes [ ... ]. II faut avanttout gagner la bataille pour la 
modernisation de la France et pour I'emploi, a laquelle je vous appelle de consacrer toutes 
vos forces,.162 
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections, Mitterrand was again able to exploit this battle 
metaphor both to rally support for the Left and to attack the Right. By portraying government 
reforms as the worthwhile products of a long political struggle, Mitterrand was able to implicitly 
cast the Right as the enemy force, whose accession to power would threaten the 'Ia paix 
sociale et la paix civile' achieved under his leadership:163 
'II n'y a pas de clameurs qui me feront modifier ce que nous avons entrepris pour fa France. 
Je veux qu'elle gagne et je n'accepte pas qu'on la fasse perdre,.164 
These appeals for the French to unite against the common enemy (usually unemployment or 
industrial stagnation) often involved a portrayal of the President as what Milne might liken to 
de Gaulle's notions of the 'Favoured Son' or the 'Chosen one,.165 These were typically 
Characterised by an exaltation of France and her enduring greatness, and by an unconditional 
Pledge to serve the patrie, whatever sacrifices and heroism that mission might require. Such 
statements elevate the President to a position where he actually becomes the incarnation of 
those qualities which make France great. Although Mitterrand's language was not as 
melodramatic as de Gaulle's, he nonetheless drew upon the main elements of the Gaullist 
presidential legacy to enhance the mystery and prestige surrounding his function: 
'Je vous appelle Franqaises, Franqais a m'aider pour que, face a la crise qui secoue Ie 
monde, la France unie dans ses profondeurs, aborde Ie temps qui viennent. Moi j'ai 
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confiance. Ma volonte n'est que I'expression de cette force que je sens vivre partout et qui 
est celie de notre patrie,.166 
The economic problems which beset France also enabled Mitterrand to accentuate his role as 
President-guide, determined and uniquely gifted to see France out of trouble towards a 
prosperous future. Often the President would underline the fact that the electorate were 
resistant to or tired of the measures needed to restore France to her rightful status. Far from 
threatening his position, however, these revelations of weakness on the part of the French 
only served to highlight the President's exclusive vision and knowledge. He represented 
hope, constancy and tenacity in uncertain times: 
'Personellement, je sais exactement ou I'on va. Dans la f6ret des mesures, grandes ou 
petites, decidees par Ie gouvernement, je sais ou se trouvera direction et je ne perdrai pas Ie 
nord, soyez-en sOrs,.167 
The above examples clearly demonstrate Mitterrand's ability to make a virtue out of necessity; 
for although his ability to indulge in lofty pronouncements was undoubtedly impeded by the 
constant need to defend the government's poor economic record, Mitterrand still managed to 
find ways of implicitly highlighting the President's special status. His readiness to use what 
Wayne Northcutt refers to as the 'language of realism' to address the concerns of the general 
public during this period, for instance, helped to build up a climate of honesty and openness 
around his leadership.168 One might also contend that Mitterrand portrayed himself as the 
guarantor of democratic dialogue within the regime. By openly acknowledging the errors 
made by the Socialist government, as well as the potential struggle facing the France in its bid 
to overcome these difficulties, Mitterrand appeared as the only individual, whose supreme 
sense of duty and honour obliged him to tell the French people the unadulterated truth: 
'Ma mission est de dire la verite des Fra~gais aux Frangais. Cette mission je la rempliraf .169 
'Mon devoir est de parler clair et de m'opposer aux demamgogues de tous ordres,.17o 
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In this way, Mitterrand not only encouraged the electorate to again place their trust in his 
leadership after the disappointments of 1983, but he also created a sense of direct 
communication between himself and the French which facilitated his transition from partisan 
President to President of all the French and, more importantly, the protector of the 'acquis 
sociaux' under cohabitation. Furthermore, Mitterrand was able to combine the 
aforementioned qualities of vision and honesty to lay claim to quasi-claiNoyant powers, 
justifying his actions on the grounds that History would prove their validity. 
One might even go so far as to argue that, on occasions, such statements implied that History 
was the only true judge of the presidency.171 Again this subtly played upon the notion that the 
Head of State was more than just a democratically elected representative - he possessed 
superior qualities, which made it impossible for him to be judged in the same way as other 
French citizens. 
Above all, it was the field of international affairs which gave Mitterrand the greatest scope to 
focus upon the grandeur of his presidential status, without exposing him to criticism that he 
was becoming as monarchical as his predecessors. As the representative of French interests 
on the international stage, the President was expected to rise above party political divisions to 
speak as the voice of the whole nation. Mitterrand did not break with this convention, but 
proved just as capable as de Gaulle, Pompidou or Giscard of using foreign policy and 
defence as a way of asserting his supreme authority, reaffirming his legitimacy and caNing 
out a world mission for himself. We may cite a few examples to illustrate these three uses of 
presidential discourse: 
'Ma vofonte est d'aboutir a fa liberation du Tchad par une pression con stante, par fes moyens 
qUe je decide, et non qu'on veut m'imposer,.172 
'Ce terrorisme-fa, comme fes autres, 'me' trouvera devant fui [oo.j. J'ai fa charge de veiller a fa 
securite des Frangais [ ... j, j'ai aussi fa charge de veil/er a fa grandeur de fa France,.173 
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'Le President est Ie seul juge des interets vitaux de la France [ ... ]. La piece maitresse de la 
dissuasion, c'est Ie Chef de I'Etat, c'est moi, car tout depend de sa determination. Le reste 
n'est que matiere inerte,.174 
'Le President de la Republique incarne la nation, l'Etat, la Republique, Ie pays tout entier. 
Chacun devrait s'en souvenir davantage,.175 
'La (au Uban) comme ailleurs, la France defend les principes de l'independance nationale et 
I'equilibre des forces dans Ie monde,.176 
On occasions, Mitterrand's speeches abroad provoked controversy; during a trip to Moscow 
in June 1984, for example, the President dared to remind the Soviet powers of human rights 
issues. He showed similar determination in 1981, when he openly dismissed US claims that 
the presence of Communist ministers posed a serious threat to international securitY,177 and 
again in 1985, when he opposed the Star Wars project and US proposals for free trade. 178 On 
both occasions, his resistance to American initiatives and interference in national affairs won 
him the approval of the electorate and the media, as he was perceived as the defender of 
French interests in the face of US intimidation. 179 By refusing to compromise his convictions 
in the interests of international diplomacy, Mitterrand not only displayed an independence of 
spirit reminiscent of de Gau"e, but he gave the impression that he possessed a kind of 
inte"ectual and moral supremacy, which allowed him to challenge the superpowers. 18D 
Mitterrand's ability to focus upon himself and the different elements of his presidential function 
Was tested further in the run-up to the 1986· election. Paradoxically, it was the prospect of a 
right-wing victory - an institutional arrangement that commentators anticipated would result in 
a substantial loss of presidential authority - which allowed Mitterrand to develop a whole new 
dimension to his power as the guardian of the Republic's institutions. In a televised interview 
broadcast on TFI in July 1985, Mitterr-and affirmed his intention to refer strictly to the 
COnstitution in order to define the role he would play under cohabitation: 'Mon devoir, je /e 
connais: respecter les textes. Et les textes disent que Ie gouvernement determine et conduit 
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la politique de la nation'. However, the President went on to claim that above and beyond the 
specific institutional role attributed to him in the 1958 text, he had a unique moral authority to 
make decisions on behalf of the French: 'Ie President de la Republique a non seulement une 
fonction institutionnelle precise, mais aussi une fonction morale et d'autorite qui n'est pas 
disputee,.181 Lurking behind this assertion was the implicit message that, as President, 
Mitterrand was blessed with a special understanding of the Republic, which set him apart 
from all other Frenchmen and enabled him to fulfil this duty to safeguard France's interests 
better than any other; as he pointed out in 1984, 'c'est parce que c'est diffici/e que je fai 
decide. ,182 
The construction of this particular aspect of the President's legendary status is an excellent 
illustration of the way in which language may be used not only to reflect changing political 
realities, but to forge reality itself. For although there was no real textual justification for 
Mitterrand's assertion of moral superiority, he was able to validate such a notion through his 
discursive manipulation of the Constitution and traditional expectations of the presidential 
role. This is a point to which we will return in the following chapter, when we examine the 
impact of cohabitation upon the exercise of presidential power between 1986 and 1988. 
Even when Mitterrand did descend directly into the political arena to campaign on behalf of 
the PS, he nonetheless took great care not to allow his seemingly partisan statements to 
Undermine the image he had been creating for himself as President of all the French. One of 
the ways in which he achieved this objective was by emphasising the personal, as opposed to 
the party-political, nature of his interpretation of Socialism (outside of PS rallies when he 
Confirmed his continued allegiance to party iaeals).183 Often he would pass off a reference to 
his Socialist beliefs in a very casual way, as if it were irrelevant or secondary to other more 
important matters: 'je suis socialiste, c'est comme cela. Je crois qu'on Ie savaif quand j'ai ete 
(!Iu '.184 As Gaffney rightly asserts, such comments have the paradoxical effect of 'enhancing 
the persona of Mitterrand because they -are like honest admissions, while neutralising the 
accusation that he is partisan' .185 
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4.6 Restrictions on presidential power 
Our discussion so far has shown how Mitterrand promised to bring change to France in the 
form of social and economic reform and a more faithful interpretation of the Constitution, 
which would inject a greater dose of democracy into de Gaulle's institutions. As far as the 
first two criteria are concerned, one might refer back to the title of Mitterrand's 1971 
publication and say that he achieved 'Ie socialisme du possible'. In other words, the 
President endeavoured to implement most of the major reforms listed in the 110 propositions, 
but was forced to halt the process in 1983 when economic realities undermined the 
fundamental reasoning behind such pOlicies. In terms of his success enhancing the roles 
played by Parliament, the government and other bodies such as the Constitutional Council 
and the media, the answer is less clear-cut. On the one hand, it has been shown that 
Mitterrand was equally, if not more powerful than previous occupants of the Elysee thanks to 
the support he received from three key groups: namely the government, the Socialist Party 
and parliamentary majority, and his team of personal advisors, as well as his clever use of 
discourse and pragmatic style of leadership. On the other hand, however, one could also 
argue that this was counter-balanced by other factors, which ensured that Mitterrand did not 
dispose of unlimited power within the regime. Therefore, before we can draw any definite 
conclusions, we should discuss these possible restrictions on presidential power in more 
detail. 
Amongst the most important reforms implemented by the Left were those of decentralisation 
and the liberation of the so-called 'Paysage audiovisuel franqais', both of which aimed to bring 
about a dilution of State control over the regions and the media respectively. In the long run, 
decentralisation largely achieved its objective (even if, as some critics have argued, it merely 
resulted in the preponderance of the same authoritarian executive model on a local level),186 
but the process of administrative restructuring that this policy involved took many years. As a 
result, the effects of any reduction in centralised decision-making were not evident until later 
on in Mitterrand's septennate. The lifting of State control over broadcasting began in July 
1982 with the creation of the 'Haute Autorite de I'Audiovisuel' (later replaced by the CSA), an 
independent body charged with appointing the Presidents of the six public broadcasting 
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companies. It was continued in 1985 thanks to government legislation authorising private 
television stations. 187 Yet despite these decisive moves to free television and radio from 
interference on the part of the executive, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the 
President continued to exercise an important influence over this sector, mainly due to his 
power of appointment. 188 Similarly, it should be noted that the government's nationalisation 
programme gave Mitterrand a greater number of posts to appoint to than any other Head of 
State under the Fifth Republic. One should not under-estimate the extent to which this power 
enabled the President both to shield his own position from attacks and to indirectly influence 
decision-making in different areas from public transport to the coal industry. Mitterrand clearly 
understood its importance; what other explanation can there be for the President's decision to 
extend the list of posts nominated by the Head of State prior to the 1986 parliamentary 
elections? 
It may also be added that Mitterrand's commitment to the process of European integration, 
signalled by his decision to remain in the EMS in 1983, ultimately required him to give up 
some decision-making power to technocrats in the Finance Ministry and the Banque de 
France, as well as to the representatives of supranational institutions. 18g This might seem to 
Contradict our earlier assertion that the President increased his control over foreign affairs and 
defence during his first five years in office. It may be argued, however, that the effects of any 
loss of presidential control over the 'domaines reserves' which resulted from France's 
membership of European bodies, was more than compensated for by Mitterrand's effective 
Use of his Elysee advisors and his unique presidential style. As we have seen, the 
President's development of a personal diplomatic corps enabled him to consolidate his hold 
Over foreign affairs. Furthermore, his leadership in these areas, which built upon de Gaulle's 
legacy of authority and national independence, also served to create a sufficiently statesman-
like image that would prove to be one of Mitterrand's most effective tools during cohabitation. 
Some critics go so far as to claim that Mitterrand's presidential leadership saw the emergence 
Of an additional presidential sector, that of cultural policy. From the start of his presidency, 
Mitterrand took a particular interest in this area, giving the go-ahead for a veritable wave of 
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architectural projects, known as '/es grands travaux', and allocating a significantly higher 
amount of State funding to this sector than under previous administrations.19o With his friend 
Jacques Lang as Minister of Culture, Mitterrand was able to intervene easily to determine the 
orientation of cultural policy, especially after the aforementioned decree, which extended 
Mitterrand's list of appointments to include the directors of the Paris Opera, the Louvre and 
other cultural institutions. Consequently, one could agree with Revel when he contends that 
this area offered the President yet another means of increasing his influence over national 
affairs, as well as making his mark (quite literally) on French history.191 
But if Mitterrand was, at times, seduced by the monarchical trappings of the presidency, such 
as the power to nominate friends and allies to key posts throughout the State or to protect 
certain colleagues from political censure, it may be contended that this was partly offset by an 
increase in the influence of other bodies over national decision-making during this period. 
The plethora of legislative projects which passed through Parliament, for example, led to an 
enhanced role for the Constitutional Council, which provided the opposition with its only real 
means of challenging government policy given the size of the Left's majority in the National 
Assembly. Thanks to an earlier Giscardian reform allowing a group of 60 or more deputes to 
call upon the Constitutional Council to make a judgement, sixty-six pieces of legislation were 
Subject to this procedure in five years, with the Constitutional Council ruling against the 
government in more than half of those cases. In this respect, it played a key role in ensuring 
that many Socialist projects were debated more fully, both in Parliament and in the media, 
before they became law, providing at least some opportunity to control executive power under 
the regime. 
Checks on presidential action did not only come in the form of specific pieces of government 
legislation being referred to the Constitutional Council by the opposition; as our earlier 
analYSis of presidential-party relations following the 1981 victory showed, the PS and its 
parliamentary majority enjoyed an unprecedented influence over national affairs during this 
period. Admittedly, this power lessened after 1984. Nevertheless, on numerous occasions it 
was sufficient to persuade the executive to alter policy objectives. The mere threat of party 
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dissidence was often enough to convince the executive to revise legislation before it was 
presented to Parliament. This clearly demonstrates that, unlike de Gaulle's period in office 
when the UDR was little more than a vehicle for presidential propaganda, the PS still 
maintained its right to question the decisions of the Socialist executive and to debate policy, 
without damaging the Left's institutional position. That said, the executive had at its disposal 
article 49-3 (as well as 49-1 and 38) and did not hesitate to use it, in spite of Mitterrand's 
previous condemnation of such practices. 192 
Perhaps the most effective restriction upon Mitterrand's scope of action between 1981 and 
1986, however, were the French themselves. For although the public had no real possibility 
of sanctioning the Head of State outside of presidential elections and referenda (the latter 
being entirely at the President's discretion), they could still show their disapproval via surveys 
and national demonstrations. Having been directly elected by the people, Mitterrand had a 
Constitutional responsibility to reflect the views of the French in all their diversity. In the case 
of the Savary Bill, public opposition to the project led the President to abandon his previous 
stance and parade a concern for national interests, which took precedence over his own 
POlitical convictions. Likewise in 1985, public expectations that heads should roll as a result 
of the Greenpeace affair made it impossible for Mitterrand to resist the resignation of Defence 
Minister, Charles Hernu. 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
As the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic, we have shown how Mitterrand's power 
Was predominantly political in the first few years of his presidency. The key role played by the 
Ps in drawing up the 110 propositions, which formed the basis of Mitterrand's presidential 
programme in 1981, meant that the party and its parliamentary group enjoyed an 
unprecedented level of involvement in national decision-making between 1981-86. Even 
when Mitterrand began to distance himself increasingly from domestic politics from 1983 
onwards, he still recognised the need to maintain PS support for his leadership, forcing the 
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government to push on with contentious policy initiatives like the anti-Hersant law to appease 
the party faithful. 
Similarly, Mitterrand's initial control over government action was largely determined by his 
professed commitment to the reforms detailed in his manifesto. As a result, ministers also 
experienced greater degree of control over their specific areas of responsibility than under 
former administrations. Unlike the parliamentary group, however, members of the 
government owed their appOintment directly to Mitterrand and, as result, there were instances 
when this constitutional subordination obliged ministers to yield to the presidential view or 
resign. Therefore, whilst the level of autonomy enjoyed by the government in the first few 
years of Mitterrand's presidency was partly due to their shared political objectives, as our 
interview with Claude Cheysson showed, it was also attributable to the President's 
discretionary power to grant his ministers greater freedom of action when and if he chose to. 
The economic U-turn in 1983 seriously undermined the political programme which had so far 
linked Mitterrand, the government and the party group, and this affected their relationship in 
different ways. On the one hand, the Socialist party saw its power decrease as it became 
more dependent on Mitterrand as a reference point for its actions and a voice within the 
executive. On the other hand, the government and, in particular, Prime Minister Fabius 
appeared to be enjoying enhanced autonomy as Mitterrand's falling popularity prompted him 
to focus his attention upon the consensus building areas of foreign affairs and defence. 
Incidents such as the withdrawal of the Savary Bill in 1984, however, highlight the fact that the 
PreSident could intervene at any moment to impose his will upon the government. In this 
respect, it may be said that Mitterrand did little to break with the interventionalist practices of 
his presidential predecessors and his pre-eminence over government affairs was never 
seriously contested. 
By exploiting the more symbolic aspects ot' his function, such as presidential discourse and 
the domaines reserves, at a time when his popularity was at an all-time low and his political 
credibility was diminishing, our discussion has shown how Mitterrand was able to gradually 
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discard his highly partisan image in favour of that of the supreme national judge above the 
party fray. In so doing, Mitterrand began to re-structure the nature of his power within the 
regime, so that it was no longer so dependent upon the presence of a socialist parliamentary 
majority. Instead, he claimed that his authority derived from the President's institutional 
supremacy and the unique visionary qualities which he had brought to the presidential 
function. This ability to adapt his exercise of power to changes in the political conjuncture, 
whilst stili conforming to one of the two contrasting interpretations of the presidential 
arbitrational function discussed in chapter 1, may be seen as one of Mitterrand's greatest 
strengths during his first septennate. Not only did it help to protect him from further public 
disenchantment with the government, but it also facilitated his transformation from Socialist 
President into tactical statesman in time for France's first experience of political cohabitation. 
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Chapter 5 
THE FIRST PERIOD OF COHABITATION (1986-88): 
A NEW EXPERIENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
'Pour sortir de ce labyrinthe [Ia cohabitation} if y a un fiI d'Ariane, c'est la loi, c'est la 
Constitution. Avec ce fiI d'Ariane-la, ne vous (aites pas de soucis, je ne me perdrai pas'. 
Franyois Mitterrand, 7 February 19861. 
Until 1986 the presence of a favourable parliamentary majority, which shared the broad 
political objectives of the President, had been a constant feature of the Fifth Republic. In this 
respect, the victory of the right-wing coalition in the legislative elections held in March that 
year represented a step into constitutionally unexplored territory? The threat of so-called 
'cohabitation' had been real enough in the run-up to the 1978 elections,3 giving rise to a wave 
of debates concerning the pOlitical and constitutional implications of such an arrangement. 
The sudden collapse of the Common Programme in 1977, however, sufficiently undermined 
the Left's campaign to ensure that this did not become an institutional reality for a further eight 
years. Yet it would seem that Mitterrand was somehow destined to experience 'cohabitation' 
- not as Prime Minister (as the leader of the Union of the Left, he would have been the logical 
chOice for this post in 1978), but as the first left-wing President of the Fifth Republic. By 1986, 
it is true to say that the prospect of cohabitation was no longer perceived as a serious threat 
to the sUNival or long-term stability of the regime, as it had been during de Gaulle's 
presidency;4 not least because Mitterrand had declined to over-dramatise the consequences 
of an opposition victory by clearly stating his intention to see out the rest of his mandate 
regardless of the result, and to name a Prime Minister who reflected the newly-elected 
majority.s Nevertheless, when this period of cohabitation, or 'co-existence' as Mitterrand 
preferred to call it,6 opened, many questions w'ere raised as to how the new power-sharing 
arrangement would work in practice: would the Constitution prove flexible enough to 
accommodate this executive dyarchy? How much control (if any) would the President be able 
to retain over the State faced with an opposition government? And would this temporary 
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isolation from political decision-making have any lasting impact upon the nature of 
presidential power under the regime? 
Some commentators have assumed that de Gaulle never envisaged cohabitation. This is not 
so: de Gaulle did foresee the possibility that the President could one day be stripped of his 
support in the National Assembly, and to suppose otherwise would be to seriously under-
estimate de Gaulle's understanding of his own Constitution.? What he did not anticipate, 
however, was the effect that this institutional arrangement would have upon presidential 
power. Faced with a hostile government and parliamentary majority, de Gaulle claimed the 
Head of State would become 'paralyse,.8 This was also a view shared by former Prime 
Minister, Raymond Barre, who denounced the prospect of cohabitation as a return to the 
submissive style of presidency that had characterised the Fourth Republic.9 In 1986, some of 
Mitterrand's opponents may have hoped to see this prediction come true, with the presidency 
reduced to little more than a ceremonial function. But Mitterrand had no intention of allowing 
this situation to result in a general loss of presidential authority and status within the regime. 
As the opening remark clearly shows, the President knew only too well that he had at his 
disposal, in the form of the Constitution, the most effective means of ensuring that he became 
neither powerless nor marginalised as a result of the Right's victory. It was this text, with 
which Mitterrand had what is perhaps most accurately described as an ambiguous 
relationship, that would prove be his political lifeline between 1986 and 1988. 
From the outset of cohabitation, Mitterrand appeared confident and in control. Far from 
Showing signs of disappointment or disquiet at the newS of the Left's defeat, there was almost 
an air of self-satisfaction about his first television appearance,10 in which he underlined the 
'narrowness' of the right-wing victory.11 Mitterrand soon made it clear that he had no intention 
of relinquishing any more power to Prime Minister Chirac and his team at Matignon than was 
Constitutionally necessary, as illustrated by his fn~quently cited declaration before Parliament: 
'Ia Constitution, rien que la Constitution, toute la Constitution!'.12 Although one cannot deny 
that the redistribution of prerogatives which occurred under cohabitation did allow the Chirac 
administration full control over domestic policy-making and implementation, it is widely 
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accepted that throughout the 27 month period the balance of power remained tipped in 
Mitterrand's favour. The 'symbolic' powers of the President as set out in article 5 enabled him 
to pose as an 'arbitre-juridique', 13 playing a discreetly censorial role as the nation's tribune, 
duty-bound to intervene should any government initiative threaten civil rights or endanger the 
so-called 'acquis sociaux'. They also enabled Mitterrand to retain overall control of foreign 
affairs and defence, despite efforts by Chirac in the early stages of cohabitation to challenge 
presidential dominance over these areas. Mitterrand was able to exploit these dimensions to 
the presidential function in order to continue to build the image which he had begun to 
cUltivate from 1984 onwards, that of the nation's protector above party divides, whose wisdom 
and clarity of vision gave him a quasi-sacred authority within the regime. The result was that 
unlike Jacques Chirac, who entered the presidential race in 1988 in the shadow of his 
performance as Prime Minister, Mitterrand was able to campaign for re-election on the basis 
of his popularity as the President who had guided France through the potentially stormy seas 
of cohabitation without rocking the boat. 
Having opened with a discussion of the Constitution and the possible readings to which it 
gives rise, our study went on to trace Franc;:ois Mitterrand's evolving relationship to the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic from his rigid opposition in 1958 to his final reconciliation to 
the presidential practices of the regime after 1981. In this respect, it is fitting that we should 
conclude with an examination of cohabitation, since it brings our analysis full circle in two 
ways: firstly, by stripping the President of his parliamentary majority, this period promised to 
bring about a 'parliamentary' application of the Constitution,14 restoring the balance of power 
originally envisaged by the members of the CCC; secondly, it took Mitterrand back to the 
roots of his own early opposition to the regime when he too had favoured such a reading of 
the text, whereby the Prime Minister became the true head of executive power. Therefore, by 
studying Mitterrand's exercise of power under the constraints of cohabitation, we will not only 
gain a better understanding of the kind of presidency that might have emerged under the Fifth 
Republic had successive occupants of that office not succumbed to the temptation to 
dominate all areas of political decision-making, but we will also see just how capable 
212 
Mitterrand had become at manipulating the Constitution and public opinion to his advantage, 
so that throughout cohabitation his pre-eminence within the regime remained unchallenged. 
In terms of public popularity, cohabitation marked the pinnacle of Mitterrand's pOlitical career 
- never again would he experience the levels of popular approval accorded to him between 
1986 and 1988. 15 There is more than a little irony in the fact that the victory of the Right 
brought about a renewal of public support for President Mitterrand, whilst Premier Chirac saw 
his popularity suffer at times as a result of unpopular government measures; a paradox which 
Emeri has referred to as the game of 'qui perd gagne,.16 In the following analysis, we will 
seek to show how Mitterrand managed to attract public support for his leadership during 
cohabitation, despite being severely restricted in his ability to influence national affairs. 
Although on an internal level, cohabitation may have turned over executive power to the 
Prime Minister, on an external level, it favoured the revalorisation of the presidential function; 
it was this outward impression of authority which enabled Mitterrand to preserve his position 
at the top of the institutional hierarchy throughout the two years that this arrangement lasted. 
Whilst the minutiae of the constitutional issues arising from cohabitation have been 
comprehensively charted in other studies,17 our focus lies instead with the way in which 
Mitterrand strove (successfully) to create an image of power during this period, even when 
that power was not explicitly accorded to him by the Constitution. By exploiting the 
vagueness of those presidential responsibilities defined in article 5, the chapter will argue that 
Mitterrand carved out a mission for himself which not only maintained his pre-eminence within 
the regime, but produced a new kind of 'presidentialism', independent of parliamentary 
support, which relied increasingly upon the mystical aura which had developed around the 
presidency. 
5.1 The presidential mission 
When Jacques Chirac commented that 'Ie 16 mars, Franr;ois Mitterrand a perdu la plus 
grande part de cette licence monarchique',18 he severely under-estimated the President's 
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ability to use his remaining constitutional powers both to disrupt the implementation of the 
government's programme and to undermine the Prime Minister. According to Mitterrand's 
interpretation of the presidential mission set out in article 5, he had two main roles to fulfil 
under cohabitation: 'd'assurer la continuite de I'Etat d'une part et, d'autre part d'{Hre Ie garant 
de l'independance nationale,.19 To these he added a third, which supposedly derived its 
justification from the Preamble and article 2 of the Constitution, that of the defender of 
republican values: 'Le President doit veil/er a I'application des grands principes sur lesquels 
se fonde la RepubJique indivisible, lai'que, democratique, sociale qui autorise toute croyance 
et qui doit respecter quiconque, quel que soit son origine ou sa race'?O This represented an 
innovation in constitutional terms and experts have questioned the legal basis for such a 
claim.21 However, as guardian of the Constitution, the President had the power to impose his 
interpretation of the text. This made it difficult to challenge Mitterrand's understanding of the 
preSidential mission since he alone had the right to judge exactly what the Constitution 
intended that mission to be. As Ardant notes, 'comment en effet Ie President de la 
RepubJique pourrait-il pretendre faire respecter la Constitution s'il n'etait habilite d'abord a 
dire ce qu'iI impose?,22 Together, Mitterrand claimed, these objectives would succeed in 
restoring the true nature of the President's 'fonction arbitrale', which had remained unexplored 
since the beginning of the regime?3 In the following discussion we will show how the 
PreSident was able to use these three interlinked aspects of presidential 'arbitrage' to 
influence government action and public opinion during cohabitation in such a way that he did 
not open himself up to sustainable accusations that his interventions were politically 
motivated. We will also examine the extent to which a number of conjunctural and political 
factors, not least the imminence of the 1988 presidential elections and the unprecedented 
nature of this institutional arrangement, favoured Mitterrand's exploitation of his constitutional 
prerogatives throughout this period, ensuring that, as predicted, he did not become 'un 
PreSident au rabais,.24 
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5.1.1 Refusals, reservations and reassurances: presidential 
intervention in national affairs under cohabitation 
As one might expect from any Prime Minister whose government has a political life 
expectancy of only two years, Jacques Chirac set about executing his electoral programme 
without delay. In order to minimise the time needed for certain key projects to become law, 
the new Premier had warned Mitterrand that he intended to use the decree procedure (article 
38), which required presidential countersignature, in addition to the usual parliamentary 
channels. Although, in principle, the President had raised no serious objections to the use of 
decrees as a means of speeding up the legislative process, he advised the Prime Minister 
that he would only accept a limited number and that, in accordance with his interpretation of 
article 13, he reserved the right to refuse his countersignature for any proposals which were 
not in the interests of national progress.25 Less than one week after the new government had 
been formed, Mitterrand exercised this discretionary power for the first time, refusing to sign a 
decree which aimed to remove restrictions governing worker redundancies. This presidential 
veto was, in fact, a purely symbolic gesture since the government could still ensure that the 
project became law by re-introducing the bill into the National Assembly, and using article 49-
3 to ensure that the majority rallied behind it. The existence of an alternative legislative 
procedure was an essential part of Mitterrand's strategy because it allowed him to defend his 
decision on the grounds that it did not prevent the government from implementing the reform. 
Yet if the political battle was ultimately won by the government,26 the moral victory belonged 
to the President, who had successfully demonstrated his power to act as 'Ie juge superieur de 
/'interet national'. 27 
The same may be said of the next confrontation, on Bastille Day 1986, when Mitterrand 
announced that he was not prepared to countersign the decrees to allow the privatisation of 
65 nationalised industries. Two different reasons were given for this refusal: initially, 
Mitterrand declared that he had not received the necessary assurances that the proposed 
reform did not constitute an attack upon France's post-war social infrastructure, which he had 
a constitutional obligation to protect.28 Following on from this notion of preserving the national 
heritage, the President soon began to argue that the sale of shares in these privatised 
cOmpanies to foreign investors represented a threat to French (economic) independence - a 
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move he could not be seen to condone. 29 Although the President's decision not to sign these 
decrees had been largely expected by government and public alike,30 Camille Cabana, the 
minister responsible for privatisation under the Chirac administration, claims that there was a 
general reaction of astonishment amongst cabinet members as to the explanations given for 
this refusal. Instead of rejecting the decrees because they proposed to reverse some of the 
nationalisations carried out by his own government five years previously, Mitterrand justified 
his decision on the grounds that those nationalisations carried out between 1945-6 could not 
be evaluated in the same way as those which followed much later.31 As Cabana explained in 
a letter to the author: 'Ie President Mitterrand se fit /e defenseur determine des 
nationalisations operees en 1945 par /e gouvernement du general de Gaulle. /I semb/ait 
considerer que s'iI pouvait se resigner a /a mise en cause des nationalisations operees sous 
Son autorite a partir de 1981, celles de l'immediat apres guerre, en revanche, revetaient un 
caractere sacraliSe,.32 
However paradoxical this reasoning may have seemed to Cabana and his colleagues in 
government, given Mitterrand's opposition to de Gaulle throughout his political career, it is 
nonetheless clear why the President chose to refer back to 1945 and not 1981 as a 
justification for his actions; to successfully project an image of neutrality in accordance with 
public expectations of his constitutional role under cohabitation, Mitterrand had to refrain from 
any action which could be interpreted as deliberate and politically-motivated presidential 
obstructionism. Had he chosen to defend his own programme of nationalisations, the 
President would have immediately opened himself up to accusations from the Right that he 
had not yet discarded his Socialist mantle. By posing as· 'Ie gardien du temple et de I'Mritage 
gaulliste', as Cabana puts it, Mitterrand was not only seen to 'appliquer /a Constitution de 
bonne foi', 33 but he managed to successfully silence many of his potential critics on the Right, 
having drawn public attention to the fact that a Gaullist-Ied government was proposing to 
dismantle part of its own political heritage. One might· also suggest that in establishing a link 
between his present mission and de Gaulle's past achievements, Mitterrand hoped to 
appropriate some of de Gaulle's quasi-legendary image as the champion of French grandeur. 
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Cabana remembers feeling equally surprised that Mitterrand should portray the proposed 
privatisations as the selling-off of French economic interests to foreign predators. He claims 
that the Right came to power in 1986 only to discover that the previous administration had 
been indulging in the illegal transfer of assets from nationalised companies to oversees 
investors throughout its five years in office. Some of these transactions had even become the 
object of legal procedures on the part of a trade union. In order to sort out this mess inherited 
from the Socialists, he asserts that the government was obliged to incorporate a special 
chapter into the privatisation decrees to 'regu/ariser /es privatisations 'sa uvages , d'un 
gouvernement de gauche attaquees par des actions judicia ires d'organisations de gauche'. 
Therefore, when the President raised objections to the 'ordonnances' in the Council of 
Ministers on the grounds that they eroded national independence, Cabana felt compelled to 
respectfully remind him that one aspect of the decrees aimed to rectify the 'violations 
deliberees et repetees de /a /egalite' committed by members of his own government, who had 
clearly not regarded the prospect of foreign investment as a serious problem during their 
period in office. Although Lacouture notes that Cabana's spirited intervention enabled the 
majority to score a point against the President (which might explain why the Privatisation 
Minister recalls with amusement that Mitterrand listened to his comments 'd'un visage ferme, 
pour tout dire reprobateur'),34 it did not persuade him to alter his position. The President was 
no doubt aware that the Chirac government was unlikely to exploit these revelations as a 
means of undermining his objections; for in seeking to legalise these dubious practices, the 
Right risked being portrayed as a belated accomplice to the alleged violations. 
Whether Mitterrand had the legal right to refuse his co~ntersignature, which he did again 
regarding the reform of electoral districts and changes in working hours, is still an issue of 
debate.35 In her study of the legal problems of cohabitation, Cohendet contends that 
Mitterrand did not have the power to veto government decrees once they had been drawn up, 
as his countersignature was not intended as an act of approval or disapproval, but was Simply 
there to authenticate the outcome of government deliberations. In other words, Cohendet 
regards Mitterrand's role in this decision-making process as limited to his presidence of the 
COuncil of Ministers (article 9).36 Colliard presents a more convincing argument in opposition 
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to that of Cohendet, stating that the whole principle of presidential countersignature would be 
meaningless if it did not carry some pOlitical force. Given that only specific acts are subject to 
this procedure, he maintains that this is not just 'Ia formalite qu'est la promulgation de la loi 
votee par les representants' but 'Ia manifestation de la legitimite qui donne a son acte sa 
force juridique,.37 Both Fournier and Duverger are also of the opinion that Mitterrand was 
within his constitutional rights to refuse to sign the privatisation decrees. For unlike article 10, 
which requires the President to promulgate all laws within a two-week period, article 13 does 
not stipulate any such time restriction - an omission which they see as a strong indication that 
the Head of State is under no obligation to sign.38 Whilst the arguments presented above 
give us a brief flavour of the conflicting views on this subject,39 none of them may be seen as 
providing a definitive interpretation of article 13. This lack of constitutional clarity was a key 
factor in allowing Mitterrand to seize upon this issue as an opportunity to mark his distance 
from the government. As Cabana correctly pOints out 'Ies textes n'etaient d'aucun secours, if 
n'y avait ni precedent, ni jurisprudence, ni voie de recours',40 consequently, Mitterrand was 
able to refuse his signature, safe in the knowledge that there was no higher authority than the 
presidency to decide whether this was, in fact, contrary to the 1958 text. 
Nevertheless, some of Chirac's younger ministers did not wish to see the Premier give in to 
Mitterrand over the privatisation decrees. They viewed the President's public refusal as an 
opportunity to portray him as the instigator of an institutional crisis, which could have 
otherwise been avoided. To be fair to Premier Chirac, the risk involved in being the first to 
break up this constitutional arrangement, which the French had clearly wanted, was 
Considerable. Had he resigned on 14 July, when Mitterri:md announced his decision not to 
sign the 'ordonnances', then he may have seriously damaged his political credibility prior to 
the forthcoming presidential election. In truth, neither Chirac nor Mitterrand could allow this 
eXperiment to fail through lack of mutual co-operation if they were to stand a good chance of 
Winning in 1988. However, Chirac's situation was .definitely the more delicate of the two 
because he had openly acknowledged his intention to stand for the presidency, whereas the 
incumbent Mitterrand was still refusing to be drawn into discussing the possibility of a second 
mandate, preferring to pose as the elder statesman free of personal ambition.41 This gave the 
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President a much greater margin of political manoeuvre under cohabitation than his opponent 
at Matignon, who had to work hard to prove his ability to see France through this period to 
appear a credible contender for the Elysee. Close advisors of the Prime Minister have argued 
that he made this task infinitely more difficult for himself when he backed down over this 
issue,42 since it set a precedent for the way in which the remaining 23 months of cohabitation 
would unfold - with Chirac being forced to bow to the supremacy of the President within the 
regime. This is ably illustrated by a comment Mitterrand made during a visit to the town of 
Istres the following year: 'Ie President de la Republique fait ce qu'jf veut, la ou il veut quand jf 
Ie veut'.43 
Towards the end of cohabitation, Mitterrand grew even bolder in his use of the power of veto. 
One incident, in particular, which occurred in December 1987, shows the extent to which the 
President was prepared and able to hamper government action without fear of public 
condemnation, due to his increasingly popular image as national arbiter. It concerned the 
government's request for an extra session of Parliament to debate a bill that proposed to 
modify the statute of the car manufacturer Renault. Mitterrand flatly refused this demand and 
issued the following statement to justify his decision: 'Le gouvernement ne peut ... ni decider la 
convocation d'une session extraordinaire, ni en fixer I'ordre du jour. Ces competences 
relevent de la seule responsabilite et de la seule appreciation du President de la 
Republique,.44 As with the privatisation decrees, the constitutional basis for such a refusal 
was highly debatable, but this is not our primary concern. More relevant to our study of the 
way in which preSidential image functioned under cohabitation is the fact that neither the 
public, nor the media commented upon the political transparency of Mitterrand's veto. In 
March 1960, de Gaulle had been the first to exercise this alleged prerogative by refusing an 
extra session of Parliament requested by the majority of deputes in the National Assembly.45 
At the time this decision was widely condemned as unconstitutional and Mitterrand later cited 
it as a perfect iIIustratibn of de Gaulle's 'Coup d'Etat permanent' in his publication of the same 
name. Far from denouncing Mitterrand for having contradicted his former stance, however, 
most journalists praised him for having 'rappele ses prerogatives constitutionnelfes' in 1987.46 
Mitterrand had clearly been so successful in nurturing his image as constitutional guide that it 
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actually seemed to award him some kind of personal immunity from public and political 
scrutiny. 
Arguably even more surprising was the compliance shown by the Prime Minister in the face of 
this refusal; instead of seizing upon the opportunity to exploit the inconsistency of Mitterrand's 
constitutional vision, Chirac politely acknowledged that the President's decision was 
'parfaitement Gonforme a ses prerogatives presidentielles et je ne /'ai jamais Gonteste,.47 In 
reality, however, the Prime Minister's position was more complex than it seems, for he too 
had to take account of the way in which Mitterrand's image was not only serving as a weapon 
with which to impede government action, but also as a shield protecting him from criticism. 
From the start of cohabitation, Prime Minister Chirac had been forced to echo the President's 
view that political conflict would be avoided under cohabitation, if constitutional guidelines 
were properly adhered to. The underlying message behind such statements being that the 
text had not been properly respected since the beginning of the regime.48 The problem for 
Chirac was that article 5 accorded Mitterrand the unique power to decide what the 'correct' 
interpretation of the text should be. In the light of his implicit admission that the Constitution 
had been consistently misinterpreted before 1986, the Prime Minister was left with little room 
to criticise the Head of State's motivation and justification for refusing an extra-session of 
Parliament. To have attacked this decision would have left the government open to 
accusations that it did not respect the strictly formal reading of the Constitution, which was 
supposedly being applied by Mitterrand. Political convention also had its part to play in 
determining Chirac's reaction to this veto; after all, how could a Gaullist Prime Minister 
challenge Mitterrand for simply exercising a prerogative. that had been originally claimed by 
de Gaulle? Chirac's potential for critique was, therefore, stymied by the combined force of 
two opposing notions: de Gaulle's established 'presidentialist' interpretation of the 
Constitution on the one hand, and the self-proclaimed faithful reading provided by Mitterrand 
on the other. 
In addition to this capacity to complicate government action using the power of veto, 
President Mitterrand was able to hammer away at the government's reforms and Chirac's 
220 
political credibility by making known his reservations concerning specific projects. Once 
again he drew upon his presidential role as national arbiter above the party fray to justify 
these verbal interventions, which covered all areas of government decision-making from the 
proposed devaluation of the franc and the introduction of private prisons to immigration and 
audio-visual reforms.49 Often these reservations formed part of the President's official press 
release, published after the weekly meeting of the Council of Ministers.5o This was, for 
instance, how the public got to hear about Mitterrand's objections to the proposals of Justice 
Minister, Albin Chalandon, to tighten nationality controls on second generation immigrants 
living in France. As 'garant de /a cohesion nationa/e', part of Mitterrand's constitutional duty 
required him to intervene 'chaque fois qu'une decision pourrait nuire a I'unite des Frangais, 
pourrait apparartre injuste ou exclure du mouvement general une partie des Frangais ... Je 
dois veiller a ce que les decisions du gouvernement ou de la majorite ne soient pas 
attentatoires a ce qu'il y a de sain, de bon et de necessaire dans I'unite nationale,.51 By 
registering his disapproval regarding this particular text on the grounds that the measures 
proposed risked contributing to the greater marginalisation of a segment of French society, 
Mitterrand succeeded in fulfilling this responsibility. Yet if the President commented readily 
on certain issues which were guaranteed to win him public approval, he was careful to avoid 
passing judgement on those benefiting from greater popular consensus. When the Right 
revealed the four aspects of its law and order reform, for example, there was a notable 
silence from the Elysee. Favier and Martin-Roland attribute this reserve to Mitterrand's 
appreciation of public attitudes towards this area of policy-making and the fact any criticism 
could have easily been turned against him by the government (as the reforms were 
recognised as considerably less repressive than anticipated).52 One might, therefore, refer to 
the President's strategy under cohabitation as one of selective intervention, which ensured 
that Mitterrand gleaned maximum effect from those specific reservations he did choose to 
make public. 
Mitterrand's successful manipulation of the role accorded to him in article 5 also enabled him 
to exercise a more subtle, but equally effective influence over national politics by means of 
personal expressions of reassurance and understanding, which he extended to specific 
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groups in society whose interests were being threatened by the political objectives of the 
Chirac government. This task was rendered easier by the fact that he had been liberated 
from the heavy responsibility of managing domestic affairs in March 1986 and was free to tour 
the country meeting people, making speeches and generally promoting his new role as 
protector of the French and guardian of social harmony. It was also facilitated by government 
errors which, Louis Mermaz asserts, had the effect of rallying the public behind the 
President.53 At times, Mitterrand's expressions of solidarity were independently motivated, 
such as when he publicly pledged his sympathy for GPs, who were complaining about their 
poor treatment as little more than foot soldiers within the medical profession.54 More often 
than not, however, preSidential reassurance was sought out directly by a group in the hope 
that Mitterrand's involvement would ultimately bring about a change of stance on the part of 
the government. This is true of the striking railwaymen who met the President in January 
1987 to discuss their dispute. Rather than release a political statement which could be 
portrayed as unwarranted presidential meddling in government affairs, however, Mitterrand 
justified this meeting as part of his duty to maintain national unity: 'Ma porte est ouverte a tous 
les Frangais. Une main tendue est-ce mal pour la France? Le President de la Repub/ique 
n'a pas de competence directe dans les conflits sociaux de ce type. Je ne me substitue pas 
au gouvernement'.55 This had the desired effect of rebuffing government accusations that he 
was involving himself unnecessarily in domestic affairs, whilst also strengthening his image as 
the supreme arbitrator in national conflicts.56 It also created the impression that the President 
was willing to listen to the needs of the French in a way that the Prime Minister and 
government were not, the importance of which cannot be under-estimated in the light of the 
forthcoming presidential election. 
Perhaps the most effective illustration of the extent to which the President's power had 
gathered a momentum of its own, requiring very little active promotion from the Head of State 
himself, is provided by the events which followed the gov~rnment's announcement of its plans 
to review the entrance procedure for University education. The Devaquet reform, as it was 
known, provoked a national crisis which almost brought down the Chirac government. 
Mitterrand's active involvement in the conflict was actually limited to two very brief remarks 
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that he made regarding the proposed legislation on one day in November 1986, just as 
opposition to the reform was gaining in force. Whilst refraining from any explicit 
condemnation of the government's proposals, Mitterrand's comments were nonetheless 
couched in such a way as to be widely interpreted as an implicit declaration of solidarity with 
those teachers and students campaigning against the bil1.57 Although Mitterrand never 
intervened again in what quickly turned into the major political conflict of cohabitation, his 
initial remarks were all it took for him to become the protestors' political champion, 
transforming the anti-Devaquet movement into a mass demonstration of support for his 
leadership. Far from becoming the politically inert Head of State predicted by de Gaulle and 
Barre, Mitterrand had clearly constructed such a convincing image of power after only nine 
months of cohabitation that a couple of indirect verbal digs at the government carried enough 
moral authority to allow Mitterrand to seize upon public opposition to the project and exploit 
the existing wave of support for his return to executive decision-making. 
Furthermore, when a young student, Malik Ousseline, was fatally injured in a clash with police 
during the conflict, Mitterrand paid a visit to the boy's family to express his condolences,58 a 
gesture which won the President general public approval. By the time the Devaquet reform 
was scrapped, Chirac's popularity had fallen to 37%, whereas that of Mitterrand remained at a 
steady 53% of the electorate.59 During the conflict the President sought to be all things to all 
people: to the left-wing electorate, he was the loyal leader in political isolation, to the young, 
he was the father-figure looking after their future interests, to the rest of the country, he had 
acted as emblem of stability and unity above party divides by declining to exploit the crisis 
(and more specifically the tragic death of Malik Ousselirre) as a means of attacking the 
government. In this respect, it may be argued that Mitterrand's exercise of the 'symbolic' 
POwers of article 5 lent him a dual image during the Devaquet crisis, which fulfilled the two 
apparently irreconcilable requirements of the presidential function - those of 'arbitrage et 
autorite' - discussed in the opening chapter of o~r s.tudy.6o This ability to meet the 
eXpectations of voters on both the Left and Right regarding the President's role within the 
regime was undoubtedly a decisive factor in securing Mitterrand's re-election to the 
presidency in 1988. 
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5.1.2 Foreign Affairs and Defence: 'Plus ~a change ........ ?' 
In the light of the results of the 1986 legislative elections, the fields of foreign and defence 
policy looked set to experience a significant transfer of power from the President to the Prime 
Minister. Due to the overlapping of certain constitutional prerogatives, namely articles 5, 15, 
20 and 21, as well as the Premier's extensive list of State appointments, it seemed likely that 
cohabitation would bring about a new, and some argued accurate,61 reading of the 
Constitution, which would oblige the Head of State to surrender some control over the 
'domaines reserves' to a government that was no longer obliged to bow down to the tradition 
of presidential pre-eminence. Prior to the Right's victory, Mitterrand made clear his 
determination to retain control over these areas, warning the public that: 's'iI y avait 
confiscation de /a politique exterieure, ce serait un coup d'Etat',62 to which Chirac had swiftly 
replied 'on ne peut imaginer qu'un gouvemement issu d'une majorite vou/ue par /e peup/e 
n'ait pas en rea/ite /e pouvoir d'assumer /a po/itique sur /aquelle cette majorite s'est engagee, 
notamment une politique etrangere et de defense' .63 Not only do these comments reveal a lot 
about the political tussles which lay ahead of these two individuals, but they also provide 
another example of the many paradoxes which characterised cohabitation: prior to 1981 few 
could have imagined that Mitterrand, former opponent of the presidentialist reading of the 
Constitution, which established such notions as the 'reserved sector', would become its 
defender,64 fewer still could have anticipated a Gaullist Prime Minister being the first to 
actively challenge this constitutional convention only five years later. 
At first, Mitterrand was slow to react to Chirac's struggle for influence in these areas. Polls 
conducted during the first few months of cohabitation had shown that the majority of the 
French electorate approved of the re-organisation of roles between President and Prime 
Minister. Mitterrand's initially conCiliatory approach may, therefore, be partly explained by the 
fact that he could not attack Chirac for encroaching upon what he saw as his exclusive 
Constitutional territory, as this would have risked enflaming' public opinion.65 Besides which, 
the presence of both the Head of State and the Prime Minister at the G7 summit in Tokyo in 
March and at the European summit at the Hague in June 1986, apart from causing some 
ConfUSion regarding seating arrangements,66 had not harmed France's international image -
224 
the French executive having been seen to speak 'd'une seule voix', to use Chirac's widely-
quoted expression.57 Many political commentators have agreed with Colombani's view that 
this period of 'co-operation', which lasted approximately three months, constituted the first act 
of the political drama that was cohabitation.58 It might be more appropriately dubbed 'the 
calm before the storm', for it was soon followed by a prolonged period during which the 
President reasserted his exclusive right to determine foreign and defence policy, before 
eventually embarking upon a shorter spell of overt criticism of government action in these 
areas as the 1988 presidential election drew closer. 
Having tolerated the Prime Minister's early attempts to remould foreign affairs and defence 
into areas of shared executive control, Mitterrand soon felt compelled to remind the public of 
his supreme authority over these dossiers, especially when Chirac began claiming 
responsibility for significant actions, such as the refusal to allow American planes on the way 
to bomb Tripoli to fly over France.59 In this case, the President ensured that the Prime 
Minister's remarks did not go uncorrected, since they clearly undermined his unique 
responsibility as 'garant de I'independance nationale et de I'integrite du territoire' for any 
decision involving national security. Nevertheless, Mitterrand still declined to contradict 
Chirac personally, recruiting loyal supporters, such as Charles Hernu, to defend his version of 
the truth in newspaper and television interviews. 70 This was an effective tactic employed 
repeatedly by the President between 1986 and 1988 in order to avoid becoming directly 
involved in what could otherwise have been criticised as a political point-scoring exercise 
against the Prime Minister, which would have been in total contradiction to the non-partisan, 
harmonising role that he was purporting to fulfil under cohabitation. 
From June 1986 onwards, Mitterrand was firmly on the offensive, seizing every opportunity to 
'arreter les tentatives de debordement (du Premier ministre) dans les domaines de la politique 
exterieure et de la detense,.71 Given that Premier Chin~c was seen to be playing an active 
role in these areas, representing the French at international summits (almost always 
alongside the President) and receiving foreign dignitaries at Matignon, Mitterrand's capacity to 
undermine the Prime Minister appeared fairly limited. Unlike Chirac, who was trying to break 
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with the traditional image of prime ministerial subordination, however, Mitterrand was able to 
draw upon the established convention of presidential dominance over these areas with 
maximum effect in order to portray Chirac's involvement as that of an executor of presidential 
decisions according to Fifth republican tradition: 'je ne me plains pas quand je vois Ie Premier 
ministre, comme Ie faisaient ses predecesseurs, developper avec beaucoup de dynamisme la 
politique qui me convienf.72 He maintained that his pre-eminence in international affairs 
remained unaffected by the change of government: 'Ies grandes orientations de la defense et 
de la diploma tie de la France sont celles que j'ai definies ou poursuivies depuis cinq ans et 
demi. Elles n'ont pas change depuis Ie 16 mars,.73 Such statements helped to dispel any 
notion of the Premier's newfound autonomy in these areas, whilst successfully reinforcing 
Mitterrand's image as a symbol of continuity and authority. The President even managed to 
play upon the fears of the electorate to justify his sole responsibility for these dossiers, 
warning that any incoherence caused by government 'interference' might endanger public 
safety.74 Following these remarks, Chirac did indeed begin to retreat a little, back to more 
familiar dossiers over which the President had no direct influence, aware that his efforts to 
stake a claim to joint control over international affairs were having little positive impact upon 
his popularity ratings at home.75 Although Chirac may not have been constitutionally obliged 
to concede to Mitterrand's view of these areas as exclusively preSidential domains, he did so 
out of political pragmatism, realising that his actions were beginning to be portrayed in a way 
that was damaging to his own image and to national interests as a whole. 
In reality, Mitterrand did have to accept restrictions placed upon his ability to access data and 
to take independent initiatives by the arrival of a right-wing government. Without the support 
of a favourable parliamentary majority, the President could no longer dictate budgetary 
allocations to foreign affairs and defence; it may be argued that this factor alone brought 
about an important reduction in Mitterrand's control over decision-making in these areas. 
Furthermore, where the 'reserved sector' spilled over into. dornestic affairs, such as France's 
relations with the Middle East and the francophone African States, the President also saw his 
Power of influence largely confined to infrequent consultations behind the scenes. During the 
negotiations to free the French hostages held in Iran, for example, Mitterrand had to send 
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over his own personal emissaries to Beirut and Damascus and recruit members of his team at 
the Elysee to discreetly obtain information about the state of affairs, since Matignon had 
chosen to keep him uninformed of day-to-day developments. 76 Whilst it is true that the 
President was probably only too willing to see the government saddled with the responsibility 
for such delicate and potentially explosive areas as New Caledonia and Iran, the fact remains 
that had he wanted greater control, it would have been at the government's discretion as to 
whether or not this request was granted. The amount of presidential criticism directed at 
aspects of Chirac's foreign policy during cohabitation bears out this assertion that the Head of 
State's scope of action within the 'domaines reserves' was quite limited; his principal means 
of influencing the government was via verbal warnings and advice - justified using article 5 - in 
the same way as his interventions in domestic policy. Areas attracting presidential 
disapproval included government relations with Pretoria, its attitude towards the American 
Star Wars project and, perhaps most notable of all, Chirac's handling of the hostage crisis in 
New Caledonia. Yet if Mitterrand was able to make public his reservations concerning 
specific projects to try and turn national opinion against the government, this was not 
necessarily enough to dissuade Chirac from implementing his plans - as shown by the 
decision to forge ahead with the development of a 'light' ballistic missile against presidential 
wishes. 77 On occasions, Mitterrand was even presented with a fait accompli, such as when 
the government sent over French troops to help maintain public order in Gabon, without prior 
discussion with the Elysee.78 The problem for the government was that such independent 
initiatives attracted little media attention, whereas the President's role as France's main 
representative at summit meetings and his assertions of autonomy over defence policy 
continued to be highly publicised, creating the impression that he remained firmly in control of 
these areas. 
Political analysts differ greatly in their evaluation of the effect which cohabitation had upon the 
extent and nature of presidential power over foreign affairs arid defence. Some, like Samy 
COhen, contend that this period brought about a veritable power-sharing arrangement in 
these areas, with the President and the Prime Minister forced to find constant compromises to 
ensure that French interests never fell victim to an executive power struggle, which would 
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also have been politically damaging to both parties. 79 Anne-Marie Cohendet is amongst 
those who take the opposite view; she asserts that the first cohabitation provided the purest 
application of the principle of the 'domaines reserves' that the Fifth Republic had ever seen, 
as the President no longer had any influence over domestic affairs and was truly confined to 
his reserved sector. Our own view stands somewhere between the two. For whilst we 
accept the findings of studies such as those of Favier and Martin-Roland and Lacouture, 
which point to a definite loss of presidential influence in these areas, we must also take into 
consideration the results of opinion polls taken at the time which strongly suggest that this 
was not a feeling shared by the majority of the French electorate, who continued to view the 
President as the decisive force in foreign affairs and defence.8o Once again, this brings us 
back to our argument that Mitterrand's power under cohabitation derived less from his 'literal' 
constitutional prerogatives, than from the symbolic role accorded to him by article 5, which 
had been used by successive Presidents to justify their dominance of the 'domaines 
reserves'. This is certainly the picture painted by Jean-Bernard Raimond, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs from 1986 to 1988, who wrote that 'Ie President attachait une tres grande importance a 
ses prerogatives dans les relations intemationales et voulait marquer aupres de moi, des Ie 
debut de cette per;ode de cohabitation, que c'etait lui qui restait I'autorite supreme en matiere 
de politique efrangere'. 81 Raimond attributes the fact no serious conflict arose between 
himself and the President, as a result of Mitterrand's desire to continue to dominate foreign 
affairs, to his experience as a diplomat which, he claims, fostered an atmosphere of co-
operation and respect between the Quai d'Orsay and the Elysee from the beginning of 
cohabitation.82 
What we would argue, therefore, is that although the President's control over these areas did 
SUffer as a result of the Right's victory in 1986, he did not have to let the public know that 
SUch a dilution of his power was taking place. His carefully chosen words and gestures gave 
the impression that nothing had really changed in these fields and they remained the 
President's special concern. Even Chirac's persistent presence at Mitterrand's side on the 
international stage did not redress the (im)balance; Conac rightly notes that it only served to 
reinforce the Prime Minister's image as an executor, in charge of handling press conferences 
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and closing summits, whilst the President took part in the more meaningful deliberations.83 
Chirac could almost certainly have mounted a more convincing challenge to expose the 
actual weakness of Mitterrand's position, but he declined to do so, restricted by his own 
presidential aspirations and public expectations that the President should retain overall 
control of these sectors. The Prime Minister was also frustrated in his efforts to challenge the 
Head of State's monopoly in foreign affairs and defence by the fact that they represent the 
areas of greatest political continuity;84 this made it very difficult for Chirac to clearly stamp his 
mark on these areas as most of the government's objectives were indistinguishable from 
those of previous administrations. As a result, one must agree with Avril and Gicquel that 
Mitterrand was seen to retain the upper hand over the 'domaines reserves' during 
cohabitation,85 even if a re-distribution of power did occur behind the scenes. Paradoxically, 
the long-term impact of this was an increase in presidential control over defence and foreign 
affairs during Mitterrand's second term in office.86 
5.2 President Mitterrand et 'fa soumission tribunicienne': 
when weakness becomes strengths7 
'Ce qui compte ne sont pas /es ressources d~nt un homme dispose reellement mais ce que 
/es gens influents croient sur ce point'. 
F.G. Bailey, Les reg/es dujeu po/itique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,1971), p.254. 
Our study so far has shown how Mitterrand was able to use the vague notion of the 
President's mission based on article 5 of the Constitution to carve out a unique role as 
supreme national judge, whose actions were motivated by a superior mission than that of the 
government. This not only enabled the President to retain his dominance of foreign and 
defence issues, but also justified strategic interventions in national affairs, thus ensuring that 
he did not become a figure in powerless isolation. It has been argued that Mitterrand's clever 
use of words and gestures attracted support across the electorate as voters recognised in him 
qUalities which they expected the President of the Republic to embody: voters on the Left 
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approved of his use of vetos and verbal reprimands to hamper the action of the Chirac 
government (although they might have wished to see this activity stepped up), while those on 
the Right reacted positively to the amount of self-restraint shown by the President in allowing 
cohabitation to function relatively smoothly. Parodi refers to Mitterrand's position under 
cohabitation as one of tribunary submission. Whilst this expression may accurately reflect the 
political reality of the President's situation, it nonetheless creates the somewhat misleading 
impression that he was constitutionally subordinated to the Prime Minister and government 
during this period. We have shown that this was not, in fact, the case; thanks to his 
successful manipulation of his remaining prerogatives and certain conjunctural factors unique 
to this period, Mitterrand was arguably just as powerful between 1986 and 1988 as he had 
been for the first five years of his mandate, but in a different way. For instead of being based 
upon the presence of an overwhelming parliamentary majority, Mitterrand claimed that his 
power derived from a higher source, that of the Constitution. In this respect, one could 
contend that he was in a more advantageous position, since he no longer had to shoulder the 
responsibility for government policy, leaving him free to create a fresh image as France's 
guide, whose ability to rise above ideological divides bestowed upon him a moral authority 
surpassing that of any other body under the Fifth Republic. 
The most important point highlighted by our discussion, therefore, is that presidential power 
during cohabitation was, to a significant extent, a question of image-making. In other words, 
Mitterrand's ability to continue to playa high-profile role in national and international affairs 
depended on how successful he was at convincing public and politicians alike that he still 
occupied a legitimate function within the regime and, more importantly, that he was not devoid 
of the means to fulfil his responsibilities effectively. The ambiguity of article 5 provided the 
key to this exercise. However, as we have already stated, Mitterrand had begun laying the 
foundations for his role under cohabitation during Fabius's premiership. The importance of 
this preparatory work in ensuring that the President's sudden loss of political power did not 
result in his complete marginalisation cannot be under-estimated. One aspect of these 
preparations involved his use of language and, in particular, his depiction of the presidency. 
In her study of Mitterrand's discourse from 1981-91, Dominique Labbe asserts that a renewal 
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of his vocabulary took place between January and April 1985, which did not appear to have 
been triggered by any events of that period.88 The changes Labbe notes do, however, appear 
to relate to the kind of non-partisan role that the President ended up playing under 
cohabitation. She remarks, for example, that there was a conscious distancing of Mitterrand 
from the achievements of the Socialist government, a noticeable absence of the social and 
economic references which had been so prevalent in his early presidential discourse and a 
sudden preoccupation with the Constitution (as opposed to 'Ies institutions' - de Gaulle's 
favourite euphemism for his presidentialist interpretation of the text). Perhaps the most 
interesting observation Labbe makes concerns the repeated references to de Gaulle, which 
started to appear in Mitterrand's discourse around this time. 89 He was clearly trying to 
establish a notion of political continuity between de Gaulle's occupancy of the presidency 
some twenty years previously and his own leadership of France since 1981. This would 
appear to add weight to our earlier suggestion that Mitterrand was enhancing his presidential 
status by means of association with de Gaulle's 'au-dessus de la melee' style of leadership, 
and by demonstrating that he had remained faithful to the broad lines of foreign and defence 
policy established during the early years of the regime. 
Two further elements characterised Mitterrand's preparations for cohabitation: the extension 
of the Head of State's list of appointments and the introduction of proportional representation 
for the 1986 legislative elections, both of which were tactical moves designed to provide the 
presidency with maximum protection in the event of the Left's defeat. By increasing the 
number of posts which he could nominate, the President ensured that he continued to be 
surrounded by faithful supporters throughout the State. The replacement of the double ballot 
majority vote with that of PR in 1985, allowed Mitterrand to limit the size and nature of the 
right-wing victory. Without such a measure, the RPR-UDF alliance would have secured a 
majority of over sixty seats in the National Assembly in March 1986, as opposed to the narrow 
two-seat victory that resulted from the proportional system.90 .Therefore, although PR did not 
stop the Left from losing these elections and merely masked what would otherwise have been 
a solid right-wing victory, it nonetheless prevented the Right from portraying the outcome as 
an overwhelming endorsement of its policies and, more importantly for Mitterrand, as a 
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massive disavowal of his leadership. This was crucial to the President's strategy under 
cohabitation; in order to be able to exploit article 5 with maximum effect, Mitterrand had to be 
able to convince the public that his position had not been undermined by the Socialist defeat 
and that his political legitimacy remained intact. PR not only provided an effective means of 
guaranteeing this result but, given that it had been one of the original 110 propositions, 
Mitterrand was able to justify its application as the realisation of another electoral pledge,91 
rather than an example of deliberate political opportunism. Commentators, however, were 
not slow to point out the hollowness of this claim. The sudden decision to introduce PR in 
time for the 1986 parliamentary elections was no mere coincidence; it formed the basis of 
Mitterrand's successful development of his role under cohabitation. 
Earlier in our discussion we asserted that the President was equally, if not more powerful 
under cohabitation, but that the nature of this power differed from that which he had enjoyed 
from 1981 to 1986. In the previous chapter, it was shown that Mitterrand's power during the 
first five years of his mandate derived from the massive Socialist presence in the National 
Assembly and his skilful appropriation of the presidential practices of his predecessors, which 
rendered him the primary source of executive policy-making. In this respect, we might refer to 
the President's power over this period as political and traditional in fifth republican terms. 
This changed under cohabitation; when the President lost his parliamentary majority, he was 
obliged to rely entirely upon the Constitution and, in particular article 5, to determine his role 
within the regime. As a result, his power between 1986 and 1988 may best be described as 
Constitutional and symbolic. The advantage of this second type of presidentialism was that it 
allowed Mitterrand to promote the notion that he had a superior mission to fulfil, thus building 
up a mystical aura around his function. He depicted himself as the very Iynchpin of national 
stability, able and willing to rise to the challenge of sacrificing his personal convictions for the 
greater good of the French people: 'Qu'est-ce que je cherche depuis six ans? Je cherche a 
eViter les crises inutiles, les crises graves que sont toujours le~ crises institutionnel/es ... Mon 
devoir est superieur ames propres convictions,.92 One cannot help but be reminded of de 
Gaulle's old adage 'moi ou Ie chaos', when hearing Mitterrand's assertions that without his 
sense of responsibility and guidance, the country would be plunged into crisis as a result of 
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this new institutional arrangement: je n'ai pas souhaite cette situation politique, on s'en do ute, 
je la vis et je la gere. J'ai voulu eviter une crise dont Ie pays aurait souffert. J'agis en 
consequence'. 93 
Statements like those we have just cited imply that Mitterrand possessed unique, superior 
qualities, which bestowed upon him a higher authority than that of the government. For 
instance, the President's remark in February 1987 that je respecte Ie gouvernement mais 
plus encore les grands principes' not only illustrates how Mitterrand set himself apart from 
other political actors within the regime in order to emphasise his special aptitude to safeguard 
French national heritage,94 but it also contains the hidden message - 'Ie gouvernement ne 
respecte pas les grands principes'. Thus, in one single phrase, Mitterrand succeeded in 
extolling his own virtuosity and institutional supremacy, whilst at the same time indirectly 
questioning the integrity or the legitimacy of the government, depending upon whether this 
lack of respect for republican values derived from intention or ignorance. Either way, such 
effective use of language enabled the President to create an impression that he was very 
much 'Ie maitre de cette experience',95 making it very difficult for those on the Right to criticise 
his interventions during cohabitation without fulfilling the irreverent role which Mitterrand had 
carved out for them. This negative image of the government and, more specifically, the Prime 
Minister, was also compounded by Mitterrand's refusal to refer to Chirac by name, preferring 
the more impersonal term 'Prime Minister', with its connotations of institutional subordination. 
The way in which Mitterrand used language to successfully to humiliate Chirac was no more 
evident than in the head to head television debate, which took place between the Premier and 
the Head of State, by then official presidential rivals, on 28 April 1988.96 Throughout the 
entire discussion Mitterrand insisted on calling Chirac, Monsieur Ie Premier ministre. This 
Was clearly designed to pigeonhole Chirac in his role under cohabitation (and during 
Giscard's septennate) so that the viewing public found it harder to envisage him as President. 
On the rare occasions when Mitterrand did pronounce ,his Premier's name during 
Cohabitation, it was either to show disapproval - for instance, by associating Chirac with an 
unpopular decision or event - or to demonstrate how the government had come round to the 
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President's way of thinking.97 Both options provided Mitterrand with an effective, yet subtle 
means of chipping away at Chirac's image and credibility. 
5.3 Cohabitation: a new reading of the Constitution 
Whilst the above observations show that Mitterrand was, in fact, still operating in a political 
way under cohabitation, surveys indicate that such manoeuvres were not consciously noted 
by the majority of the electorate;98 the overall impression was that he was a figure capable of 
rising above political allegiances in order to oversee the smooth functioning of the regime. 
This interpretation of the preSidential role, which was implemented by Mitterrand under 
cohabitation, bears an uncanny resemblance to that of the modern constitutional monarch 
identified in Francis Delperee's analysis of 'Ia fonction du rap.99 As the title of the study 
suggests, Delperee asserts that the monarch typically performs three main functions within 
the regime: to authenticate, to represent and finally to symbolise. If we examine each of 
these roles in turn, clear parallels may be drawn with Mitterrand's exercise of power between 
1986 and 1988. Firstly, the monarch does not have the power to make laws or political 
judgements, he merely approves government action (most frequently via countersignature) on 
the grounds that it conforms to constitutional guidelines. As we saw in our discussion of the 
'crise des ordonnances', this role as the 'notaire de la nation' was readily assumed by 
Mitterrand, who was always prudent enough to provide constitutional justifications for his 
decisions. According to Delperee, the second aspect of the monarch's official function is to 
represent the nation abroad since 'Ie rai est I'autorite pub/ique qui assume Ie mieux, dans la 
continuite d'une personne .. .Ies engagements de I'Etat,.100 This was the principal reason 
given by Mitterrand for his continued domination of the areas of foreign and defence policy. 
Finally, the constitutional monarch has a symbolic duty as the supreme representative of the 
regime whose legitimacy is unquestioned. To fulfil this role, he must not be seen to support 
Or undermine the government by making overt political statements, but present himself as a 
SOurce of strength and continuity, independent of changes in electoral preferences, by directly 
addressing the nation, listening to the views of every group in society and mediating in 
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conflicts. Again, we have found examples of all three of these qualities in Mitterrand's 
occupancy of the presidency from 1986-88. 
We would argue, therefore, that a new style of presidency emerged under the first 
cohabitation, one which was much closer to that originally envisaged by the members of the 
CCC, who had wanted the Head of State to occupy a more symbolic role as a permanent 
source of stability, unity and authority above party divides. This was the kind of moral 
authority which Mitterrand claimed derived from article 5. It enabled him to promote the 
mystical status of the presidency and, as a result, to create an image as a quasi-sacred figure 
whose position within the regime was unaffected by the trials and tribulations of day to day 
political life: 'e'est pour moi une grande force de savoir que je represente cette permanence 
devant I'Histoire,.101 In our opening chapter we also noted how members of the CCC had 
received explicit assurances from de Gaulle and his advisors that the Prime Minister would 
become the true head of government; this was also achieved under cohabitation. 102 For 
although Mitterrand did manage to slow down or indirectly influence the implementation of 
certain aspects of government policy, Premier Chirac nonetheless enjoyed an unprecedented 
level of independence from presidential interference during this period. Even the President's 
efforts to perpetuate the notion that international affairs and defence policy were his exclusive 
domaines did not alter the fact that, behind the scenes, the Head of State was experiencing a 
definite loss of control over these areas. Mitterrand later claimed that the transfer of 
executive power in domestic policy-making from President to Prime Minister had already 
taken place during Fabius' spell at Matignon.103 We would contend, however, that unlike 
Fabius's premiership, when Mitterrand's withdrawal from nati<;>nal affairs had been a 
deliberate and conscious choice designed to facilitate the creation of a less partisan personal 
image, his exclusion from this area between 1986 and 1988 was imposed upon him by the 
parliamentary reading of the Constitution which resulted from the Right's parliamentary 
Victory. One might also add that whereas Mitterrand could have reclaimed control over 
domestic policy at any point whilst the Left was still in power, under cohabitation he was 
forced into a kind of obligatory political exile that could only come to end in the event of new 
presidential elections. This was indeed the style of regime envisaged by the members of the 
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CCC. As the following remark clearly shows, even Michel Debre foresaw that cohabitation 
would bring about a significant revisitation of the 1958 Constitution: 'Ia qualite de nos 
institutions se verifiera quand if y aura une majorite a I'Assemblee dont I'orientation politique 
sera differente de celie du chef de I'Etal' .104 It was only through a parliamentary interpretation 
of the Constitution, which Debre referred to as '/'interpretation non-gaullienne',105 that France 
would finally acquire a President whose power and status within the regime were more akin to 
those of a constitutional monarch. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
Commentators such as Colliard have asserted that the parliamentary reading of the 
Constitution, which characterised the first period of cohabitation, brought about a substantial 
reduction in presidential power. 106 However, we have argued that the nature of the Head of 
State's power depends upon the interaction of a whole range of variables and will alter as a 
result of changes in the parliamentary majority and other circumstantial and personal factors. 
It WOUld, therefore, be more accurate to say that during cohabitation Mitterrand experienced a 
reduction in his political power, but that he was able to fall back on his symbolic power in 
order to maintain his supremacy within the institutional hierarchy and his presence in national 
and international affairs. In other words, whatever political power Mitterrand lost as a result 
of the Left's parliamentary defeat in 1986, he more than made up for by exploiting the 
ambiguity of article 5 to conjure up an image of grandeur around his function. This led former 
critics of cohabitation to acknowledge that they had been wrong to predict that this period 
Would seriously weaken the presidency; just over a year into the 'experiment', Raymond Barre 
admitted that 'Ia fonction (presidentielle) est moins entamee qu'elle aurait pu l'etre,.107 
In addition, we have argued that Mitterrand's interpretation of his presidential duties under 
Cohabitation was significantly facilitated by a range of circumstantial factors, such as the 
forthcoming preSidential election, the climate of national solidarity which resulted from the 
Wave of terrorist attacks in France during 1986, the student protest movement, the railway 
strike and, it has also been suggested, a certain wariness on the part of the Chirac 
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administration to challenge Mitterrand's proven political dexterity. Yet it must be said that 
none of these elements would have been as beneficial to Mitterrand's exercise of power 
under cohabitation had it not been for article 5 of the Constitution and the President's skill in 
manipulating this to his distinct advantage. The presidential mission set out in article 5 even 
allowed Mitterrand to negotiate or claim an involvement in government affairs, which should 
no longer have been part of his constitutional role. Here we have highlighted another paradox 
of cohabitation: Mitterrand's loss of political power resulted in such an effective exploration of 
his symbolic constitutional prerogatives that it not only prevented the loss of presidential 
status within the regime, it also allowed Mitterrand to regain a degree of political influence. As 
a result, it is probably true to say that Mitterrand was slightly more involved in government 
affairs than members of the 1958 CCC would have liked. Yet this does not alter the fact that 
the first period of cohabitation represented the closest application of the parliamentary 
reading of the Constitution that the regime had seen. Thirty years after the Fifth Republic's 
official inauguration - a period which, we have seen, witnessed a constant decline in the 
importance of constitutional guidelines in defining the presidential role - the 1958 Constitution 
received renewed scrutiny and recognition as the fundamental operative variable determining 
the extent and limits of presidential power under the regime. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to examine the origins and evolution of 
presidentialism under the Fifth Republic through an analysis of two key phases in the 
development of the modern French presidency: namely, the 'Gaullist constitutional' phase 
from 1958-69 and the 'socialist consolidation' phase from 1981-88. By exploring the different 
variables which determine the level and scope of power available to the President at any 
given point in time, our study has sought to show that presidentialism is a highly flexible 
notion which is subject to a range of interpretations and manifestations. 
We have identified four main variables which shape the exercise of power under the Fifth 
Republic. The most important of these variables, we have argued, is the Constitution. In 
particular, it is the vague definition of the President's symbolic powers set out in article 5, 
together with the introduction of universal suffrage in 1962, which have allowed successive 
Heads of State to justify their own personal interpretations of the presidential role. We have 
also seen how the inherent ambiguity of some aspects of the constitutional text lends 
presidentialism an enduring flexibility, which enables the President to adapt his exercise of 
power in order to exploit additional resources available to him as a means of enhancing his 
authority within the regime. In this way, the Constitution provides the Head of State with a 
basic operative framework of power that may be elastically stretched by means of 
supplementary political, personal and conjunctural variables, but which will return to its 
'natural' state for the next occupant of the presidential office. 
The centrality of the Constitution as a reference point for presidential action was particularly 
evident at the start of the regime, as politicians and public alike observed the extent to which 
de Gaulle's exercise of power could be related back to constitutional guidelines. However, as 
we saw in our opening chapter, it soon became. apparent that the Constitution had failed to 
provide a single, clear definition of the presidential role and, as a consequence, its 
effectiveness as a means of predicting and controlling presidential action was undermined, 
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and its importance seemed to diminish. This effect was compounded by de Gaulle's 
willingness to openly flout certain unambiguous guidelines when it suited, setting a tempting 
precedent for his successors to the Elysee. In fact, it was not until the Left lost the 
parliamentary elections in 1986 that the Constitution received renewed attention as Mitterrand 
sought to constantly justify his actions and to criticise those of the Chirac administration by 
referring back to the 1958 text. This strategy proved extremely beneficial both for Mitterrand 
personally and for the public image of the presidency, which had suffered after years of highly 
interventionist leadership under successive Heads of State. The experience of cohabitation 
served as a reminder that the President could fulfil a more symbolic function above the party 
fray, and subsequent experiences of political cohabitation have shown that electoral support 
for this interpretation of the presidential role is far from lacking. 
The experience of cohabitation also highlighted the importance of political variables in 
shaping the nature and limits of presidential power. Following the Left's defeat in the 1986 
legislative elections, Mitterrand found himself without the backing of a left-wing majority in the 
National Assembly. In chapter 5, we examined how this change impacted upon the nature of 
the presidential role and the scope of Mitterrand's power, forcing him to adopt a position 
above the party fray as national guide and defender of the Constitution. Whilst this role gave 
Mitterrand limited scope for intervention in government policy-making and domestic affairs, it 
did not render him powerless; rather it enabled him to explore a new form of presidential 
power, which was independent of political affiliations, highly personalised and symbolic. It 
allowed Mitterrand to lay claim to a kind of moral superiority within the regime reminiscent of 
the kind of historical legitimacy that had been a feature of de Gaulle's presidential leadership. 
In chapter 3, we also saw how the size and composition of the parliamentary majority 
impinged upon President Giscard's scope of action after he lost the guaranteed support of the 
Gaullist majority in 1976. Whilst this did not prevent Giscard from directing government 
decision-making, it certainly affected his. ability to ensure that his policies received 
parliamentary backing. To compensate for this loss of political authority, Giscard began to 
rely increasingly on the more monarchical aspects of the presidential role as a means of 
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bolstering his authority. Unlike Mitterrand under cohabitation, however, Giscard's lofty 
comportment sat uneasily with this earlier image of dynamism and, in this respect, it was 
portrayed negatively as a 'derive monarchique', as opposed to Mitterrand's ascent to 
Olympian heights during the first period of cohabitation. 
If party political support was not immediately perceived as a key presidential resource at the 
founding of the regime this was due to de Gaulle's well-known disdain for the party system 
and his reluctance to directly acknowledge the role played by the Gaullist Federation in 
facilitating both his return to and exercise of power. For although the Gaullist party itself 
successfully completed the transition from a rally of personalised support for de Gaulle into a 
party of government, de Gaulle's historic persona enabled him to underplay its importance in 
determining the scope of political power available to the Head of State. 
Following de Gaulle's resignation, however, party political support emerged clearly as a key 
aspect of presidential power, since his successors could not lay claim to a special historic 
legitimacy as a means of justifying their actions; to secure the presidency, any contender had 
to be able to unite a political majority behind his candidature. In the case of George 
Pompidou this posed no difficulty as he inherited the overwhelming Gaullist majority returned 
in the 1968 parliamentary elections. Valery Giscard d'Estaing's position, however, was less 
secure because he owed his election to a coalition of political forces, the largest of which was 
the Gaullist party. 
The importance of political factors in determining presidential power was never more evident 
than during the first five years of the Mitterrand presidency: As leader of the PS and the Left's 
presidential candidate throughout the 1970s, Mitterrand's election in 1981 was inextricably 
linked to the implementation of a detailed programme of reforms, which had received the 
backing of the Socialist Party. With the support of an overwhelming 'presidential' majority in 
the National Assembly, Mitterrand was undoubtedly the. most politically powerful President the 
Fifth Republic had ever seen. However, as we noted in chapter 4, the extent to which 
Mitterrand's presidential power was dependent upon political variables between 1981-5 
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meant that the success or failure of government policies had a direct impact upon his power 
base. Hence when socialist economic reforms began to run into trouble in 1982, Mitterrand's 
popularity and his presidential authority also started to suffer. This prompted the socialist 
President to distance himself increasingly from party politics by granting greater autonomy to 
Premier Fabius and focusing his attention on consensus-building areas such as foreign affairs 
and defence. As a result, we have argued that he was able to shift the balance of factors 
shaping his presidential authority away from political variables towards the personal and 
constitutional variables which formed the basis of his power under cohabitation. 
Our study has also discussed the way in which the personality and private agenda of each 
incumbent influenced their exercise of presidential power. In de Gaulle's case, the personal 
was invariably powerful enough to allow him to override other factors determining presidential 
power and lay claim to prerogatives that had no real constitutional basis or political 
justification. Furthermore, we have shown how de Gaulle's strong, charismatic leadership 
style had a lasting impact upon the political behaviour and discourse of his successors, who 
sought to perpetuate the quasi-mythical status of the presidency as a means of enhancing 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. This was less true of Pompidou whose 
presidential image owed a great deal to his role as de Gaulle's able Premier between 1962-8. 
Our study of Mitterrand's discourse both in opposition and at the beginning of his first 
mandate, however, is particularly interesting in this respect, since it clearly shows how 
Mitterrand was able to use language to construct his image as the embodiment of modern 
French socialism. This lent his candidature and presidential victory in 1981 a visionary 
quality, which served to enhance Mitterrand's personal authority. Thanks to the flexibility of 
French presidentialism, Mitterrand was then able to re-shape his image in time for 
cohabitation in order to launch himself into a new role as the experienced elder statesman 
and supreme national guide. 
In addition to these constitutional, political and personal variables, we have also examined the 
way in which circumstantial factors affect presidential power. De Gaulle's dramatic return to 
the political arena to found the Fifth Republic, for instance, can only be understood in the 
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context of the Algerian crisis and against the backdrop of an unstable parliamentary regime. 
Without such an extreme political situation and compliant personnel, like Fourth Republican 
President, Rene Coty, it is doubtful whether de Gaulle would have had the opportunity to re-
enter politics, let alone justify drafting a new Constitution. In our study, we have looked at 
numerous examples of unexpected economic, political and social events which forced the 
Head of State to modify his exercise of power in ways he had not originally envisaged. In 
chapter 2, we saw how de Gaulle decided to adopt a very low profile during the student 
protests of May 1968 and allow the Prime Minister to deal with the crisis. In the long run, this 
proved to be an effective strategy; not only did it enhance Premier Pompidou's image as an 
capable negotiator, it also boosted de Gaulle's political support as the public tired of the 
protest movement and returned a landslide Gaullist majority in the 1968 parliamentary 
elections. The unpredictable nature and timing of these conjunctural factors invariably means 
that they do not always seNe to bolster presidential authority, but may also constitute a 
substantial threat to the Head of State's power base. In chapter 4, for example, we showed 
how the economic U-turn of 1983, followed by the demonstrations against the Savary Bill in 
1984, brought about a significant drop in public support for Mitterrand's presidential 
leadership. 
Our study has thus revealed that presidentialism is an ambivalent concept which is shaped by 
the interaction of four fundamental variables. But whilst all the factors influencing presidential 
power are important under each presidency, we have seen how their relative importance may 
change from one phase of the presidency to the next. In 1981, for instance, we argued that 
political factors were paramount in determining Mitterrand's power, whereas during 
cohabitation personal and constitutional factors were g~nerally seen to playa more influential 
role. What this study has shown, therefore, is that the way in which Presidents exercise 
power will differ according to the unique set of conditions under which each presidency 
operates. 
It is precisely this inability to impose a fixed definition on French presidentialism which has 
given rise to such dispute and debate amongst political commentators and constitutional 
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analysts. For whilst it is tempting to see presidentialism as the over-concentration of power in 
the hands of the Head of State or, as Michel Debre once put it: 'Ie fait que Ie President de la 
Repub/ique s'occupe de trap de chases', we have shown that this does not fit with our 
experience of presidential power during cohabitation. 1 Nor could we agree with Luchaire and 
eonac's argument that presidentialism represents 'I'effet d'une longue conjoncture violant les 
realites structurelles du regime institue par la Constitution de 1958'; our analysis of the 
constitutional text and drafting process concluded that the presidential role is open to 
contrasting interpretations, so it is impossible to establish exactly what these 'realites 
structurelles' really are.2 Therefore, although commentators are right to identify 
'presidentialism' as the primary characteristic of the Fifth Republic, the thesis has shown that 
this a complex and shifting notion, dependent upon the interaction of various constitutional, 
political, personal and circumstantial factors specific to each presidency. As a result, we are 
required to re-interpret our understanding of presidentialism under the Fifth Republic with 
each new President and/or set of legislative elections. 
Presidential ism after 1988 
Following Mitterrand's presidential victory in 1988, one might reasonably have assumed that 
the redistribution of executive responsibilities which occurred under cohabitation might 
become an enduring feature of the Fifth Republic. This was certainly the view held by 
constitutional analyst, Jean Gicquel, who predicted that the experience of cohabitation would 
have a lasting impact upon the balance of power within the regime.3 There is clearly some 
truth in this claim - cohabitation certainly showed that the President could fulfil a more 
symbolic function without renouncing his institutional'supremacy - proving that the kind of 
presidency envisaged by the members of the eee in 1958 was indeed possible and, judging 
by Mitterrand's popularity during this period, highly desirable. Nevertheless, it did not 
permanently alter the presidential role: once re-elected, Mitterrand quickly returned to the 
interventionist practices which had characterised his first five years in office. 
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Unlike the period 1981-86, however, when MiUerrand's control over executive decision-
making had been clearly visible, his re-appropriation of these prerogatives in 1988 was less 
effective and resulted in an increasingly Olympian style of presidency. During his second 
mandate Mitterrand appeared rather autocratic and out-of-touch with the French electorate. 
This image was not helped by revelations of the President's dubious political affiliations during 
the 1940s, nor by failing health, which forced MiUerrand to reduce his public engagements to 
such an extent that, by the end of his fourteen years in office, he was perceived as a remote 
figure who had been in power for too long.4 
Yet the fact that Mitterrand left the presidency on a more ceremonial footing in 1995 does not 
imply that his successor found the presidency fundamentally changed. Our discussion of the 
way in which presidential power was exercised differently by successive Heads of State has 
shown that, thanks to the ambivalence of constitutional guidelines, each President inherits a 
skeletal framework of powers which may be enhanced by the effective exploration of the 
political, personal and circumstantial factors specific to his mandate. MiUerrand's experience 
in office is no exception; for in spite of his exploration of the plenitude and restrictions of 
presidential power, it may be said that he left the French presidency much the same as he 
found it - flexible, ambiguous and fundamentally resilient - ready to be shaped by his 
successor to the Elysee. 
It should, however, be pOinted out that the primacy of presidential power under the Fifth 
Republic has, until now, been made possible by the absence of technical changes to the 
constitutional blueprint since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1962.5 For although the 
notion of a more equal distribution of power between t,he executive and the legislative was a 
constant theme in Mitterrand's discourse between 1958 and 1995, none of the constitutional 
reforms likely to bring about such a change were among the lasting legacies of his 
presidency. One of the original '110 propositions', which formed the basis of Mitterrand's 
government programme in 1981, for instance, called for a reduction of the presidential 
mandate from seven to five years. This, it was claimed, would bring about a fairer distribution 
of executive power and prevent the President from acquiring a quasi-monarchical status 
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within the regime. Nevertheless, this idea was never actively pursued by Mitterrand, despite 
the fact that he had fourteen years in power to try and effect such a change which, surveys 
consistently showed, had overwhelming public support.6 In this respect, one must agree with 
Cole when he wryly asserts that, 'whatever his [Mitterrand's] discourse in opposition, the 
Gaullien model of presidential supremacy proved too seductive to be seriously challenged,.7 
Shifts in the balance of power during the current period of cohabitation between President 
Chirac and Premier Jospin have since provided precisely the conditions necessary for Jospin 
to put into action that which Mitterrand had only ever put into words. On 24 September 2000, 
a referendum was held to decide whether the much-maligned septennate should be replaced 
by a five-year presidential term (/e quinquennat). Despite a disappointingly low turnout, over 
73% of votes cast were in favour of bringing the presidential mandate in line with that of 
Parliament.8 
Far from bringing an end to the presidential debate, however, the introduction of the 
quinquennat has so far only served to renew speculation and discussion about the Head of 
State's role within French political culture. One only has to look at the range of reactions to 
this reform in the run-up to the referendum to understand the contrasting interpretations to 
which it gives rise. Whilst the vast majority of commentators agree that the quinquennat will 
have some impact upon presidential power under the Fifth Republic, they disagree 
significantly about the form that this will take. On the one hand, supporters of a presidential 
interpretation of the Constitution, like Jean-Louis Debre, see the introduction of the 
quinquennat as a means of strengthening presidential authority over government decision-
making: 'Ie quinquennat renforcera la legitimite du Pre~Jdent de la Repub/ique tout en evitant 
deux derives, Ie regime presidentiel et Ie regime parlementaire. Le quinquennat, en harmonie 
avec ce qu'ont voulu les constitutionna/istes de 1958, fera du chef de I'Etat veritablement 
I'organe central de nos institutions,.9 On the other hand, opponents of the reform have 
warned that it could have precisely the opposit~ effect by substantially weakening the 
presidency: Ie passage au quinquennat recele deux risques: celui d'une derive vers Ie regime 
presidentiel ou Ie regime des partis et, contrairement a ce qu'on peut entendre dire, cela ne 
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reduira pas Ie risque de cohabitation, mais un rapetissement du President de la Republique, 
cle de voate des institutions'. 10 
Just how this reduction in the President's term of office will alter the balance of power within 
the regime remains to be seen; only the future will tell whether a five-year mandate will bring 
about a clearer definition of the presidential role. What seems certain, however, is that the 
debate itself is unlikely to lose momentum. With Premier Jospin promising further 
constitutional amendments to modernise France's institutions,11 the nature and limits of 
presidential power under the Fifth Republic are set to remain at the forefront of political and 
constitutional debates for the foreseeable future. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
In order to trace the development of presidentialism under the Fifth Republic from 1958-1988, 
we have consulted a wide range of primary and secondary textual sources. 
Primary sources 
Having identified the 1958 Constitution as the operative variable for this study, our selection 
of source material has been largely determined by the need to relate the evolution of 
presidential power under the regime back to the constitutional text and the intentions of those 
involved in the drafting process. Our study begins, therefore, with an examination of the 
Constitution itself, the texts on which it was based and the three-volume Travaux 
Preparatoires, which document the official discussions that took place at each stage of the 
drafting process. 
The thesis then draws upon the writings and speeches of de Gaulle and Mitterrand to trace 
their evolving interpretations of presidential power. De Gaulle's Discours et messages 
between 1940 and 1969 have been published in five chronological volumes by Pion, whilst 
extracts from Mitterrand's key speeches and press conferences between 1958 and 1981 may 
be found in two volumes entitled Politiques I and /I published by Fayard. During his years in 
opposition, Mitterrand also produced seven books discussing his career - past, present and 
future, his political beliefs and values and his personal aspirations. Although some of these 
works are more overtly 'party political' than others,1 all of them, with the exception of Ma part 
de verite (1969), deal to some extent with the nature and'limits of presidential power. In the 
absence of a single volume or volumes bringing together Mitterrand's speeches, press 
conferences and inteNiews from his first septennate, we were obliged to consult sources 
citing these texts (in full or in part), such as the Le Monde archive in the University of Warwick 
Library, the three-monthly Chronique constitutionnelle compiled by Pierre Avril and Jean 
Gicquel for the review Pouvoirs and the yearly summary of French politics provided by 
L 'Annee politique. 
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Our understanding of Mitterrand's exercise of presidential power also benefited greatly from 
the first-hand accounts of his former colleagues Louis Mermaz and Claude Cheysson, who 
were interviewed by the author in Paris during the summer of 1999. As a staunch 
Mitterrandiste throughout the 1970s and President of the National Assembly between 1981 
and 1986, Louis Mermaz was well-placed to discuss the relationship between Mitterrand and 
the Socialist Party both in opposition and in office. Claude Cheysson, on the other hand, was 
a diplomat whose experience and strength of personality brought interesting new dimensions 
to the traditionally presidential area of Foreign Affairs. Of course, it must be acknowledged 
that both men were concerned with projecting a certain interpretation of events which cast 
them in the best possible light. Nevertheless, the fact that neither had agreed the author's 
questions in advance enabled her to lead the discussion and to press both interviewees to 
justify their responses, producing some very interesting and insightful comments. We also 
approached Camille Cabana, Jacque Chirac's Minister for Privatisation, who agreed to 
answer a questionnaire focusing on the relationship between the President and government 
during cohabitation. Unsurprisingly Cabana was rather critical of Mitterrand's exercise of 
presidential power between 1986-88, but he nevertheless acknowledged the extent to which 
presidential intervention did successfully hamper some aspects of government action during 
this period. 
Secondary sources 
The thesis also draws on a variety of secondary sources which examine the evolution of 
presidentialism under the regime. Arguably the most important secondary material for the 
purposes of our study is provided by constitutional law)'ers such as Didier Maus, Franyois 
Goguel and Jean Giquel, who seek to analyse the exercise of presidential power within the 
framework of reference provided by the Constitution. We have shown, however, that the 
Constitution alone does not determine the way in presidential power is exercised by the Head 
of State. As a result, we have also consulted a range of additional secondary literature, which 
highlights the importance of political, personal and circumstantial factors in determining the 
level of power available to the President. Amongst these books and articles we may include 
256 
the work of meticulous biographers like Jean Lacouture, Pierre Favier and Michel Martin 
Roland, political analysts such as Olivier Duhamel and leading political commentators like 
Pierre Viansson-Ponte. Finally, the study has examined a selection of opinion polls 
conducted by SOFRES during the Mitterrand presidency in order to take account of the role 
played by public opinion in influencing the scope and nature of presidential action. 
Notes 
1 In particular, Le Socialisme du possible (1971) and La Rose au poing (1973). 
- -- -- ---- -----1 
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APPENDIX I 
Presidents and Prime Ministers of the 
Fifth Republic 1958-1988 
Presidents 
Charles de Gaulle 
Georges Pompidou 
8 January 1959 to 28 April 1969 (resigned 
following referendum) 
20 June 1969 to 2 April 197 4 (deceased) 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 21 June 1974 to 21 May 1981 (defeated in 
presidential election) 
Franc;ois Mitterrand 21 May 1981 - (successfully re-elected in 1988) 
Prime Ministers 
Michel Debre From 8 January 1959 
Georges Pompidou From 14 April 1962 
Maurice Couve de From 10 July 1968 
Murville 
Jacques Chaban- From 20 June 1969 
Delmas 
Pierre Mesmer From 5 July 1972 
Jacques Chirac From 27 May 1974 
Raymond Barre From 25 August 1976 
Pierre Mauroy From 21 May 1'981 
Laurent Fabius From 17 July 1984 
Jacques Chirac From 20 March 1986 
APPENDIX II 
Interview with Louis Mermaz, 6 July 1999. 
Questions 
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1. Dans quelle mesure, selon vous, les rapports entre M. Mitterrand et Ie parti socialiste ont-
ils ete transformes par I'election de M. Mitterrand a la presidence de la Republique? 
2. Entre 1981 et 1986 Ie parti socialiste et la majorite parlementaire socialiste peuvent-ils 
etre consideres comme un bloc homogene de soutien du President de la Republique ou 
remplissaient-ils des fonctions differentes par rapport a I'executif? 
3. II me semble qu'au debut du mandat presidentiel de M. Mitterrand, Ie parti socialiste 
jouait Ie role de censeur ideologique d~nt les interventions visaient surtout a faire en sorte 
que les actions du gouvernement ne s'ecartaient pas des pro messes electorales. 
Partagez-vous cette opinion? 
4. Sur I'orientation de la politique nationale entre 1981 et 1986, Ie PS jouissait-il d'une 
influence plus importante que celie du gouvernement? 
5. L'epreuve de la rigueur economique a-t-elle rendu plus tend us les rapports entre Ie parti, 
la majorite socialiste et Ie President? 
6. Vu que certains membres du gouvernement (y compris Ie Premier ministre Pierre 
Mauroy) n'etaient pas tres favorables a la loi «anti-Hersant», peut-on interpreter la 
decision de M. Mitterrand de poursuivre cette politique comme un geste d'apaisement 
envers Ie parti dec;;u par la reorientation de la politique economique du gouvernement? 
7. Selon votre experience en tant que President de l'Assemblee nationale entre 1981 et 
1986, des politologues ont-ils raison de conclure qu'au cours de cette periode M. 
Mitterrand a vraiment commence un processus de 'depoliticisation' au sein du parti 
socialiste? 
8. II y a ceux qui ont accuse Franc;;ois Mitterral'ld d'avoir cree un gouvernement bis a 
l'Elysee en forme de conseillers personnels. A votre avis, ont-ils raison de lancer de 
telles accusations c~ntre Ie President? Y avait-il des domaines ou Ie parti se trouvait 
largement exclu du processus de decision, je pense evidemment aux domaines dits 
«reserves» de la defense et de la diplomatie? 
9. Au cours de cette periode la majorite s'est toujours ralliee a la position presidentielle sur 
des questions politiques importantes. A p~rt Ie refus de voter un texte a I'Assemblee 
nationale, ce qui aurait ete peu concevable, quels moyens Ie parti et la majorite avaient-
ils a leur disposition pour contester ou simplement pour montrer leur desapprobation a 
I'egard de certaines decisions prises a l'Elysee? 
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10. L'experience de la premiere cohabitation a-t-elle provoque un rapprochement entre Ie 
parti socialiste et Ie President de la Republique ou est-ce que I'on peut parler 
d'eloignement des cette epoque par rapport a Franc;:ois Mitterrand? 
11. Nous avons parle des rapports entre Ie parti et M. Mitterrand suite a la victoire de la 
gauche en 1981, mais il parait clair que meme avant son election comme President de la 
Republique, M. Mitterrand avait deja reussi a 'presidentialiser' Ie PS. Que pensez-vous 
de la maniere dont M. Mitterrand a dirige Ie parti pendant les annees 70? 
12. N'etait-il pas difficile pour un mouvement qui avait toujours rejete I'idee de la 
personnalisation du pouvoir d'admettre une telle evolution, c'est-a-dire la domination du 
parti par M. Mitterrand et ses fideles? 
13. Que diriez-vous a ceux qui pretendent que M. Mitterrand a encourage la rivalite entre les 
differentes factions existant a I'interieur du parti socialiste afin de consolider son autorite 
en tant que Premier secretaire? 
APPENDIX III 
Interview with Claude Cheysson, 6 September 1999. 
Questions 
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1. Tout en acceptant I'invitation de Frangois Mitterrand de devenir membre de son 
gouvernement en 1981, vous I'avez persuade de rebaptiser votre ministere 'Ie 
ministere des Relations Exterieures'. Quelle etait la signification de ce changement? 
2. Lors de votre nomination aviez-vous I'intention de restaurer un peu les prerogatives 
anterieures du ministere, c'est-a-dire jouer un role plus important dans la conception 
de la politique exterieure? Avez-vous realise ce but? 
3. Dans son livre, Hubert Vedrine affirme qu'au debut de son premier mandat Frangois 
Mitterrand n'a pas ose imposer son choix personnel au Quai d'Orsay, mais il a 
accepte votre nomination connaissant votre bonne reputation en tant que diplomate 
experimente. Le fait que vous n'etiez pas un de ses proches (ou ses fideles au PS) 
en 1981, vous a-t-il garanti plus d'independance vis-a-vis de I'influence presidentielle 
sur les affaires etrangeres? 
4. II me semble que votre determination de jouer pleinement votre role au sein du 
gouvernement (sans trop d'ingerence presidentiel), vous a parfois mene a exprimer 
des opinions qui n'avaient pas regu I'approbation de Frangois Mitterrand ou a 
outrepasser des directives presidentielles. Comment Ie President de la Republique 
a-t-il reagi a vos propos ou vos actions dans ces cas? 
5. Le President aurait pu vous contraindre a demissionner suite aces controverses, 
pourtant vous etes reste en fonctions pendant trois ans. Comment expliqueriez-vous 
votre longevite au Quai d'Orsay? 
6. Jean Lacouture maintient que Frangois Mitterrand et vous ne pouviez fonctionner 
qu'en harmonie a propos de I'Europe et des rapports Est-Ouest. II est vrai que sur 
plusieurs questions importantes, il y avait une divergence de vues entre vous et Ie 
President de la Republique. Avez-vous toujours pu surmonter ces differences 
d'opinion? 
7. Croyez-vous qu'iI faut une certaine convergence de vues entre Ie President et Ie 
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres pour assurer la coherence et Ie bon fonctionnement 
de ce domaine? 
8. La nomination de Roland Dumas comme Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres en 1984 
signifiait-elle une reprise en main de ce domaine par Ie President de la Republique? 
9. II Y a ceux qui ont accuse Frangois Mitterrand d'avoir cree une «diplomatie 
parallele» a I'Elysee en forme de conseillers et d'ambassadeurs personnels. A 
votre avis, ont-ils raison de lancer de telles accusations c~ntre Ie President? 
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10. Y-avait-il des cas ou vous aviez I'impression que ces conseillers presidentiels 
empietaient sur votre territoire en tant que Ministre des Relations Exterieures? 
Je pense evidemment a des gens comme Jacques Attali, Hubert Vedrine et Jean-
Louis Bianco? 
11. J'ai souvent entendu parle du style Mitterrand qui consistait a encourager, (de fa90n 
subtile), la concurrence entre les membres de son entourage. Etiez-vous conscient 
d'un tel c1imat de rivalite entre ministres et conseillers presidentiels entre 1981 et 
1984? 
12. Quel etait Ie role du Premier ministre dans Ie domaine des Affaires etrangeres? 
13. Dans la lettre que vous m'avez ecrite iI y a trois mois, vous avez faite une distinction 
entre votre experience en tant que Ministre des Relations Exterieures et celie de vos 
successeurs au Quai d'Orsay, surtout ceux qui ont occupe Ie ministere pendant les 
periodes de cohabitation. Selon vous, quelles ont ete les consequences de la 
cohabitation sur Ie pouvoir presidentiel dans Ie domaine des Affaires etrangeres? 
14. Je m'interesse surtout au premier mandat de Fran90is Mitterrand, donc je me suis 
concentree sur une analyse de la premiere peri ode de cohabitation seulement. A 
votre avis, Jacques Chirac a-t-il reussi a transformer les domaines reserves en 
domaines partages entre 1986 et 1988? 
15. La cohabitation pourrait-elle etre dangereuse pour la coherence de la politique 
etrangere? 
16. Certains politologues ont compare Ie style et les choix politiques de Fran90is 
Mitterrand dans Ie domaine de la politique exterieure avec ceux de de Gaulle. 
Partagez-vous cette impression? 
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APPENDIX IV 
Questionnaire for Camille Cabana, 29 June 1999. 
1. Quelle etait la nature des relations que vous entreteniez avec l'Elysee entre 1986 et 
1988? 
2. En tant que delegue aupres du ministre de I'Economie et des Finances charge de la 
privatisation, avez-vous anticipe Ie refus du President de la Republique de signer les 
ordonnances de la privatisation? 
3. En juillet 1986 M. Mitterrand a explique ce refus en raison de son role comme protecteur 
des acquis sociaux. II a accuse Ie gouvernement de vouloir vendre "une partie du 
patrimoine national" aux interets etrangers. Quelle etait votre reaction et celie du 
gouvernement a cette demarche presidentielle? 
4. Selon les recherches de Catherine Nay vous etes personnellement intervenu en Conseil 
des ministres afin de rappeler au President Ie fait que depuis 1982 des ministres 
socialistes avaient vendu a I'etranger des filiales d'entreprises nationales. Comment Ie 
President a-t-il reagi avos remarques? 
5. A I'epoque de la crise des ordonnances tout un debat se deroulait sur Ie role institutionnel 
et les prerogatives constitutionelles du President de la Republique face a une majorite 
parlementaire opposee. A votre avis M. Mitterrand etait-il dans son bon droit de refuser 
sa signature aux ordonnances? 
6. Grace a ce pouvoir qu'on pourrait appeler " discretionnaire", M. Mitterrand a-t-il vraiment 
reussi a entraver I'action du gouvernement ou considerez-vous que ses actions etaient 
plutot vides de po ids politique, mais simplement con<;ues pour mettre en valeur I'image 
qu'il cultivait de "garant de la cohesion nationale"? 
7. Personne ne peut contester Ie pouvoir de dissolution du President de la Republique. Le 
gouvernement a-t-il pris au serieux les menaces proferees par M. Mitterrand de dissoudre 
I'Assemblee nationale avant les elections presidentielles de 1988? 
8. Pourrait-on dire que la periode 1986-88 a vu la mise en reuvre de I'interpretation 
parlementaire de la Constitution, a savoir celie preconisee par les membres du Comite 
constitutionnel consultatif? 
9. Dans I'ensemble, croyez-vous que la premiere cohabitation a eu des consequences 
permanentes sur Ie fonctionnement du regime politique en France ou n'etait-elle qu'une 
parenthese qui n'aurait pas change Ii:! tendance presidentielle de la Cinquieme 
Republique? 
10. L'experience de la cohabitation a-t-elle modifie votre jugement sur M. Mitterrand? 
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